diff --git a/AUTH.md b/AUTH.md index 3b6ddd3..00ff28b 100644 --- a/AUTH.md +++ b/AUTH.md @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ - **决策 B — `user_id` 继续 = OIDC `sub`，不引内部 id**。新增薄 `accounts` 表（键在 `sub`），其中存一个**稳定匹配键**（默认取 JWT 的 `email` claim）。日常切换 OAuth provider 即账号失效——**运维须知此前提**。仅当管理员显式启用“后端迁移标记”时，cdrop 才在新源登录时按该匹配键自动关联回同一账号（受控窗口，非日常自动 link，规避账号接管）。 - **决策 C — 2FA 委派给 provider**。cdrop 不自存任何第二因子密钥，仅保留敏感动作的 **step-up 钩子**（要求 provider 再认证），默认关闭。 - **决策 D — 扫码方向 = 陌生设备显码、已登录手机扫码批准**（微信 / WhatsApp 网页版模型）。陌生设备常无摄像头但有屏，最贴合“临时借设备传文件”。 -- **决策 E — 扫码会话 = 受限访客会话，持久性可选**。批准时选“信任此设备（7 天滑动）”或“仅此次（1 小时）”；访客会话能收发文件，但不能改账号、不能再批准别的设备、不能签发长效 token。 +- **决策 E — 扫码会话两档，scope 与持久性绑定**。批准时二选一:“信任此设备（完整会话，7 天滑动）”——授予 scope=full、kind=self，可完整使用本账号(自有设备用);“仅此次（受限访客，1 小时）”——授予 scope=guest、kind=guest，能收发文件与消息，但不能改账号、不能再批准别的设备、不能签发长效 token(陌生/借用设备用)。默认偏向更安全的“仅此次”。（原设计两档皆 guest、仅持久性不同;2026-06-21 实测后改为 scope 随档绑定,消除“信任却受限”的语义矛盾。） > 本文取代 `.scratch/auth-inversion-diff.html` 中按“全反转”写的 §四 大半——那五个“凭证保管者”决策（无邮件重置 / 开放注册 / argon2id 等）在折中下随委派 provider 而消散。 @@ -129,9 +129,10 @@ CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_login_requests_expires ON login_requests (expires - **签名密钥**：从 `SESSION_SECRET` 派生独立 HMAC 密钥（`DeriveSessionTokenKey(SESSION_SECRET)`，与既有 `DeriveHS256Key(HS256Secret)` 区分密钥域）。`SESSION_SECRET` 在 prod 本就强制非空，无新增必填密钥。 - **载荷**：`{ sub: user_id, sid: session_id, typ: "session", scope: "full"|"guest", iat, exp }`。短 TTL（默认 900s）。 - **校验**：中间件新增 `verifySelfToken` 分支（§9）。靠 `typ:"session"` + 独立签名密钥与 scoped shortcut token（`typ` 缺省、`scope:"clipboard"`、走 `shortcut_tokens` 查吊销）区分，互不串验。 -- **吊销 / 撤销**：access token 无状态、短命；长效凭证是 `web_sessions` 行。`/auth/refresh` 每次（≤TTL 周期）查 session 行存活与未吊销，故吊销在一个 TTL 内生效。`oidc` 会话 refresh 仍打 IdP，保留 IdP 侧登出 / 吊销传播。 +- **吊销 / 撤销（即时）**：长效凭证是 `web_sessions` 行；access token 短命且**绑定 `sid`**。`verifySelfToken` 每请求按 `sid` 查 session 行——行被删除（吊销）即当场拒绝，故吊销在被吊销设备的**下一次请求**即生效，而非等一个 TTL。`oidc` 会话 refresh 仍打 IdP，保留 IdP 侧登出 / 吊销传播。 +- **被吊销设备的感知与回退**：服务端拒绝之外，前端把“访问被拒且续期也被拒”视作会话不可恢复 → 就地清空登录态并回到登录页（`net/api.ts` 的 `forceLogout` + `__root` 反应式守卫）。**离线设备**于下一次使用（请求 401 或开机 cookie 续期失败）得知；**在线设备**经 `Hub.Kick` 关流 → 约 1s 后重连撞 401 得知。两路殊途同归到 `verifySelfToken` 的 `sid` 查行。 -> RS256（IdP access token）退出每请求热路径，仅在 OIDC exchange 时验 `id_token` 签名一次（§5）。中间件保留 RS256 分支作兼容（桌面端等仍直接带 IdP token 的客户端），待后续统一迁移到自签后再清理——避免 flag day。 +> RS256（IdP access token）已退出浏览器每请求热路径：浏览器登录（含 OIDC）一律持自签 token，OIDC exchange 时验 `id_token` 签名一次（§5）作唯一信任锚，refresh 仍打 IdP 轮换 refresh_token 但同样回自签 token。中间件保留 RS256 分支仅供**桌面端**（自跑 loopback PKCE、直带 IdP token）；桌面端即时吊销留后续。 ### 3.2 受限能力门（guest 会话） @@ -179,6 +180,14 @@ CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_login_requests_expires ON login_requests (expires 前端：新设备“显码页”+ 手机“批准页”+ 设备 / 会话管理（列出 `granted_by` 借用设备、可吊销）。 +### 4.4 登录会话列表 = 全部设备（统一视图 + 自动清除） + +「登录会话」面板收敛到“一台设备 = 一条会话”：列表即当前登录此账号的全部设备。既往“手动清除设备”入口已撤，导致被吊销设备长期滞留——本节即为此消除。 + +- **统一列表**（`GET /api/auth/sessions`）：`web_sessions`（浏览器 oidc / self / guest、扫码）**并入**原生客户端设备（桌面 / iOS，`type ∈ {macos, windows, linux, ios}`）。原生客户端用 IdP 令牌、不入 `web_sessions`，故从设备登记表 `devices`（即决策里说的“等价表”）呈现：`id` 形如 `device:<设备名>`、`kind` 取设备类型、`native=true`。同名已有会话的设备不重复列出；无会话的 `browser` 型（孤儿）与 `shortcut` 型（自有面板）不在此列；过期会话已隐藏。这满足“原生设备也在会话列表登记”，且离线原生设备照常显示（`devices` 留有 `last_seen`）。 +- **吊销即清设备**：吊销网页会话（`DELETE /api/auth/sessions/{id}`）在删会话行后**连带删除其设备登记**（除非另有同名在用会话），再 Kick + 广播 presence → 被吊销设备即时从所有列表消失。原生客户端的“登出”改走 `DELETE /api/devices/{name}`（同样要求 step-up），删设备 + Kick；该设备若仍在线，会在下次请求经中间件重新登记（原生**即时**吊销需客户端配合，留后续）。 +- **孤儿自动清除**：设备清扫器（每 1h）除按 `last_seen` TTL 清陈旧设备外，新增清除“`browser` 型且无存活 `web_session`”的孤儿（会话已撤 / 过期但设备行滞留）；`DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices` 一条 SQL 完成，原生 / shortcut 设备无 `web_session` 属正常、仅受 TTL 清扫。即时路径（吊销）+ 周期路径（清扫）合起来让设备列表与会话列表持续对齐。 + --- ## 5. 账号密码 / Passkey 登录（委派 provider） @@ -196,7 +205,7 @@ CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_login_requests_expires ON login_requests (expires ## 6. 2FA（委派 + step-up 钩子，已实装） - **默认**：2FA 在 provider 完成（Casdoor TOTP / passkey-as-2FA），cdrop 不感知、不存密钥。 -- **step-up 钩子**（决策 C，默认关，`CDROP_STEP_UP_ENABLED`；新鲜度窗口 `CDROP_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS`，默认 300）：开启后，批准扫码设备（`qr/approve`）这类敏感动作要求一次**现场再认证**。机制：前端先跑一次带 `prompt=login` / `max_age=0` 的新鲜 PKCE，把拿到的授权码 + verifier 交给 `qr/approve`；后端**就地**用它向 IdP 换 `id_token`，JWKS 验签 + 校验 `sub` 等于调用者 + `auth_time` 在窗口内，方才放行（provider 若开了 2FA，即在这次 prompt=login 往返中强制）。失败返回 `403 step_up_required`。授权码一次性、不可重放；cdrop 不存任何第二因子，也不留 step-up 服务端状态——证明随这一次批准请求过期。 +- **step-up 钩子**（决策 C，默认关，`CDROP_STEP_UP_ENABLED`；新鲜度窗口 `CDROP_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS`，默认 300）：开启后，批准扫码设备（`qr/approve`）这类敏感动作要求一次**现场再认证**。机制：前端先跑一次带 `prompt=login` / `max_age=0` 的新鲜 PKCE，把拿到的授权码 + verifier 交给 `qr/approve`；后端**就地**用它向 IdP 换 `id_token`，JWKS 验签 + 校验 `sub` 等于调用者，方才放行（provider 若开了 2FA，即在这次 prompt=login 往返中强制）。`auth_time` 为**可选**——OIDC 仅在 IdP 选择遵循 `max_age` 时才要求它，**Casdoor 不下发**;有则强制 `StepUpMaxAgeSeconds` 窗口,无则以「单次短寿授权码刚换出」作为新鲜度界（否则会因缺 `auth_time` 而恒拒、陷死循环，2026-06-21 实测修正）。失败返回 `403 step_up_required`。授权码一次性、不可重放；cdrop 不存任何第二因子，也不留 step-up 服务端状态——证明随这一次批准请求过期。 - `qr/request` 响应回带 `step_up` 标志,供批准页判断是否需先再认证。 - passkey 作为“快速登录”的补充：陌生设备场景下扫码优于 passkey（passkey 设备绑定，陌生设备上没有），故 passkey 由 provider 承担、不进 cdrop 自建范围。 @@ -268,7 +277,7 @@ verify(token): ## 11. 安全要点 - **`id_token` 必须 exchange 时验签**——自签 access token 后，原“每请求 JWKS 兜底”消失，OIDC 信任收敛到这唯一一刻。 -- **自签 access token 短 TTL**（默认 900s），承载吊销时延上界；长效凭证只在 `web_sessions` 行，可吊销。 +- **吊销即时**：`verifySelfToken` 每请求按 `sid` 查 `web_sessions` 行，删行即当场拒绝，被吊销设备下一次请求即失效（不依赖 TTL）；前端据 401 + 续期失败回退登录页（§3.1）。自签 access token 短 TTL（默认 900s）只是续期节律，长效凭证只在 `web_sessions` 行。 - **扫码三密钥分离**：QR 仅含批准信息，会话只投私有 `poll_secret` 持有者；偷拍 QR 双重失败。 - **访客会话能力门**：`scope=guest` 服务端强制受限（§3.2），不依赖前端自律。 - **迁移标记受控**：跨源 `match_key` 关联仅在管理员显式开启时生效，非日常自动 link，规避 email 接管。 diff --git a/internal/db/bootstrap.go b/internal/db/bootstrap.go index 71675bd..8d01ce6 100644 --- a/internal/db/bootstrap.go +++ b/internal/db/bootstrap.go @@ -74,6 +74,10 @@ func Bootstrap(ctx context.Context, d *sql.DB) error { "ALTER TABLE web_sessions ADD COLUMN granted_by TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''"); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("migrate web_sessions.granted_by: %w", err) } + if err := ensureColumn(ctx, tx, "web_sessions", "stepped_up_at", + "ALTER TABLE web_sessions ADD COLUMN stepped_up_at INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0"); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("migrate web_sessions.stepped_up_at: %w", err) + } if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("commit bootstrap: %w", err) } diff --git a/internal/db/devices.sql.go b/internal/db/devices.sql.go index 72c4076..528ea91 100644 --- a/internal/db/devices.sql.go +++ b/internal/db/devices.sql.go @@ -27,6 +27,29 @@ func (q *Queries) DeleteDevice(ctx context.Context, arg DeleteDeviceParams) (int return result.RowsAffected() } +const deleteOrphanBrowserDevices = `-- name: DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices :execrows +DELETE FROM devices +WHERE type = 'browser' + AND NOT EXISTS ( + SELECT 1 FROM web_sessions ws + WHERE ws.user_id = devices.user_id + AND ws.device_name = devices.name + AND ws.expires_at > ? + ) +` + +// DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices removes browser device rows with no live web_session +// (the session was revoked or expired), keeping the device list aligned with the +// session list. The ? is the current epoch second. Native (macos/windows/linux/ios) +// and shortcut devices are left alone: they legitimately keep no web_session. +func (q *Queries) DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices(ctx context.Context, expiresAt int64) (int64, error) { + result, err := q.db.ExecContext(ctx, deleteOrphanBrowserDevices, expiresAt) + if err != nil { + return 0, err + } + return result.RowsAffected() +} + const deleteStaleDevices = `-- name: DeleteStaleDevices :exec DELETE FROM devices WHERE last_seen < ? diff --git a/internal/db/migrations/0001_init.sql b/internal/db/migrations/0001_init.sql index 22615c3..efe7ab7 100644 --- a/internal/db/migrations/0001_init.sql +++ b/internal/db/migrations/0001_init.sql @@ -73,7 +73,10 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS web_sessions ( -- 但不能改账号、不能再批准别的设备、不能签发长效 token（路由层 requireFullSession 守门）。 scope TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'full', -- granted_by＝扫码批准者的 session id，供审计与「吊销我批准过的借用设备」连带吊销。 - granted_by TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '' + granted_by TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '', + -- stepped_up_at＝本会话最近一次通过 step-up 再认证的 Unix 秒（AUTH.md §6）。在 + -- StepUpMaxAgeSeconds 窗口内，敏感动作不再重复要求再认证（避免每次都弹再登录）。 + stepped_up_at INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0 ); CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_web_sessions_expires ON web_sessions (expires_at); diff --git a/internal/db/models.go b/internal/db/models.go index 428f0fb..d102f73 100644 --- a/internal/db/models.go +++ b/internal/db/models.go @@ -101,4 +101,5 @@ type WebSession struct { Kind string `json:"kind"` Scope string `json:"scope"` GrantedBy string `json:"granted_by"` + SteppedUpAt int64 `json:"stepped_up_at"` } diff --git a/internal/db/queries/devices.sql b/internal/db/queries/devices.sql index 0dfa30f..ff6b14a 100644 --- a/internal/db/queries/devices.sql +++ b/internal/db/queries/devices.sql @@ -15,6 +15,20 @@ ORDER BY name; DELETE FROM devices WHERE last_seen < ?; +-- DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices removes browser device rows with no live web_session +-- (the session was revoked or expired), keeping the device list aligned with the +-- session list. The ? is the current epoch second. Native (macos/windows/linux/ios) +-- and shortcut devices are left alone: they legitimately keep no web_session. +-- name: DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices :execrows +DELETE FROM devices +WHERE type = 'browser' + AND NOT EXISTS ( + SELECT 1 FROM web_sessions ws + WHERE ws.user_id = devices.user_id + AND ws.device_name = devices.name + AND ws.expires_at > ? + ); + -- name: DeleteDevice :execrows DELETE FROM devices WHERE user_id = ? AND name = ?; diff --git a/internal/db/queries/web_sessions.sql b/internal/db/queries/web_sessions.sql index 633d3af..d41bb08 100644 --- a/internal/db/queries/web_sessions.sql +++ b/internal/db/queries/web_sessions.sql @@ -9,10 +9,17 @@ INSERT INTO web_sessions (id, user_id, refresh_token, device_name, user_agent, c VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?); -- name: GetWebSession :one -SELECT id, user_id, refresh_token, device_name, user_agent, created_at, last_used_at, expires_at, kind, scope, granted_by +SELECT id, user_id, refresh_token, device_name, user_agent, created_at, last_used_at, expires_at, kind, scope, granted_by, stepped_up_at FROM web_sessions WHERE id = ?; +-- SetSessionSteppedUp stamps the moment this session last passed step-up re-auth; +-- sensitive actions within the freshness window then skip re-auth (AUTH.md 6). +-- name: SetSessionSteppedUp :exec +UPDATE web_sessions +SET stepped_up_at = ? +WHERE id = ?; + -- name: RotateWebSession :exec UPDATE web_sessions SET refresh_token = ?, last_used_at = ?, expires_at = ? diff --git a/internal/db/web_sessions.sql.go b/internal/db/web_sessions.sql.go index 2ccd453..118ce67 100644 --- a/internal/db/web_sessions.sql.go +++ b/internal/db/web_sessions.sql.go @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ func (q *Queries) DeleteWebSessionForUser(ctx context.Context, arg DeleteWebSess } const getWebSession = `-- name: GetWebSession :one -SELECT id, user_id, refresh_token, device_name, user_agent, created_at, last_used_at, expires_at, kind, scope, granted_by +SELECT id, user_id, refresh_token, device_name, user_agent, created_at, last_used_at, expires_at, kind, scope, granted_by, stepped_up_at FROM web_sessions WHERE id = ? ` @@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ func (q *Queries) GetWebSession(ctx context.Context, id string) (WebSession, err &i.Kind, &i.Scope, &i.GrantedBy, + &i.SteppedUpAt, ) return i, err } @@ -230,6 +231,24 @@ func (q *Queries) RotateWebSession(ctx context.Context, arg RotateWebSessionPara return err } +const setSessionSteppedUp = `-- name: SetSessionSteppedUp :exec +UPDATE web_sessions +SET stepped_up_at = ? +WHERE id = ? +` + +type SetSessionSteppedUpParams struct { + SteppedUpAt int64 `json:"stepped_up_at"` + ID string `json:"id"` +} + +// SetSessionSteppedUp stamps the moment this session last passed step-up re-auth; +// sensitive actions within the freshness window then skip re-auth (AUTH.md 6). +func (q *Queries) SetSessionSteppedUp(ctx context.Context, arg SetSessionSteppedUpParams) error { + _, err := q.db.ExecContext(ctx, setSessionSteppedUp, arg.SteppedUpAt, arg.ID) + return err +} + const setWebSessionDevice = `-- name: SetWebSessionDevice :exec UPDATE web_sessions SET device_name = ? diff --git a/internal/httpapi/auth.go b/internal/httpapi/auth.go index 0c25fd9..f77ab6f 100644 --- a/internal/httpapi/auth.go +++ b/internal/httpapi/auth.go @@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ import ( // PROJECT_BRIEF.md §2 keeps the browser path on standard OIDC PKCE. Backend // proxies the token endpoint so the browser doesn't need a CORS-friendly OIDC -// provider; the access_token still flows back to the browser unchanged. +// provider. The browser is then handed a cdrop self-signed access token (sid-bound +// to its web_sessions row), not the IdP's RS256 token, so OIDC web sessions verify +// statefully and revoke immediately — unified with scan-login (AUTH.md §5). type authConfigResp struct { AuthMode string `json:"auth_mode"` @@ -120,33 +122,58 @@ func (s *Server) handleAuthExchange(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // Refresh the thin accounts row (display name / avatar / roles / match_key). s.upsertAccount(r.Context(), identity) - // Stash the refresh_token server-side and hand the browser an opaque, - // HttpOnly cookie instead. Guarded so a deploy without the encryption key (or - // an IdP that returned no refresh_token) still logs the user in — they just - // don't get passwordless re-login and re-auth on the next access-token expiry. + // By default the browser holds a cdrop self-signed access token (sid-bound), + // not the IdP's RS256 token — so the OIDC web session is verified statefully on + // every request (verifySelfToken → web_sessions lookup) and revoking the row + // logs this device out on its very next call, exactly like scan-login. We mint + // it only after stashing the refresh_token server-side (encrypted, behind an + // HttpOnly cookie) so the session is durable. The IdP RS256 token stays the + // fallback for degraded configs (no encryption key / no refresh_token / an + // id_token that fails verification) — it is still independently verified per + // request via JWKS (verifyRS256), and the next refresh upgrades the device to + // the unified self-token model. (AUTH.md §5; desktop keeps its RS256 token.) + accessToken, expiresIn := tr.AccessToken, tr.ExpiresIn if len(s.sessionKey) > 0 && tr.RefreshToken != "" { - if err := s.createWebSession(r, w, user.ID, tr.RefreshToken); err != nil { - slog.Error("create web session failed", "err", err) + id, cerr := s.createWebSession(r, w, user.ID, tr.RefreshToken) + if cerr != nil { + slog.Error("create web session failed", "err", cerr) + } else { + // The id_token is the SOLE trust anchor for the minted self token (the + // IdP RS256 token no longer reaches the browser to be re-verified), so + // its signature MUST validate here and its subject must match. On + // failure we keep the durable session but hand back the per-request- + // verified RS256 token; the next refresh upgrades this device to the + // self-token model. (Should not happen with a healthy IdP — warn ops.) + sub, _, verr := s.auth.VerifyIDToken(r.Context(), tr.IDToken) + if verr != nil || sub != user.ID { + slog.Warn("oidc id_token verification failed; using RS256 fallback", + "err", verr, "sub_match", sub == user.ID) + } else if tok, ein, merr := s.mintSessionToken(user.ID, id, "full"); merr != nil { + slog.Error("mint session token failed", "err", merr) + } else { + accessToken, expiresIn = tok, ein + } } } writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, exchangeResp{ - AccessToken: tr.AccessToken, - ExpiresIn: tr.ExpiresIn, + AccessToken: accessToken, + ExpiresIn: expiresIn, User: user, }) } // createWebSession encrypts the refresh_token, persists a new session row, and -// sets the session cookie on the response. -func (s *Server) createWebSession(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter, userID, refreshToken string) error { +// sets the session cookie on the response. Returns the session row id so the +// caller can bind a cdrop self-signed access token to it (sid). +func (s *Server) createWebSession(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter, userID, refreshToken string) (string, error) { raw, id, err := newSessionToken() if err != nil { - return err + return "", err } enc, err := s.encryptRefresh(refreshToken) if err != nil { - return err + return "", err } now := time.Now() if err := s.queries.CreateWebSession(r.Context(), db.CreateWebSessionParams{ @@ -159,10 +186,10 @@ func (s *Server) createWebSession(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter, userID LastUsedAt: now.Unix(), ExpiresAt: now.Add(webSessionTTL).Unix(), }); err != nil { - return err + return "", err } setSessionCookie(w, raw) - return nil + return id, nil } // refreshResp is what the browser sees: a fresh access_token plus the identity @@ -282,9 +309,23 @@ func (s *Server) handleAuthRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { } setSessionCookie(w, c.Value) + // Hand back a cdrop self-signed access token (sid-bound), not the IdP RS256 + // token: the browser holds one uniform token type and revoking the session row + // logs this device out on its next request. The IdP round-trip above still ran + // — it rotated the refresh_token and surfaced IdP-side revocation (a rejected + // refresh deletes the session above) — its access_token simply no longer ships. + // Mint from the row's canonical user_id; degrade to the IdP token only if the + // HS256 key is unconfigured. (AUTH.md §5.) + accessToken, expiresIn := tr.AccessToken, tr.ExpiresIn + if tok, ein, mErr := s.mintSessionToken(sess.UserID, id, "full"); mErr != nil { + slog.Error("mint session token failed", "err", mErr) + } else { + accessToken, expiresIn = tok, ein + } + writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, refreshResp{ - AccessToken: tr.AccessToken, - ExpiresIn: tr.ExpiresIn, + AccessToken: accessToken, + ExpiresIn: expiresIn, User: user, DeviceName: sess.DeviceName, }) @@ -369,10 +410,11 @@ type tokenIdentity struct { // extractIdentity parses {sub, preferred_username | name | email, avatar | picture, // matchClaim, groups} from the id_token if available, else the access_token. The -// signature is NOT verified here — for OIDC sessions the auth middleware verifies -// the access_token on every API call via JWKS, so any tamper surfaces there. (Once -// OIDC sessions migrate to cdrop self-signed access tokens, this becomes the only -// trust point and MUST then verify the id_token signature — AUTH.md §5.) +// signature is NOT verified here — callers verify separately around it: at login +// (handleAuthExchange) the id_token signature is checked via VerifyIDToken before +// the extracted subject is trusted to mint a self token; at refresh the IdP just +// authenticated the refresh_token over a TLS back-channel, so the token it returns +// is trusted by transport. Either way the extracted fields are sound. (AUTH.md §5.) func extractIdentity(idToken, accessToken, matchClaim string) (tokenIdentity, error) { pick := idToken if pick == "" { diff --git a/internal/httpapi/devices.go b/internal/httpapi/devices.go index 8316cc9..4aca861 100644 --- a/internal/httpapi/devices.go +++ b/internal/httpapi/devices.go @@ -44,7 +44,15 @@ func (s *Server) handleDevices(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // handleDeleteDevice 注销设备：删除 (user, name) 行 + Kick 在线 SSE + 立刻广播 // 新的 presence。请求方若注销的是自己当前设备，前端需同步调用 logout，否则 // 任何后续带 X-Device-Name 的认证请求都会被中间件再次 UPSERT 回来。 +// +// 这是登录会话列表里「原生客户端（桌面 / iOS）」一栏的登出路径——它们用 IdP 令牌、 +// 不入 web_sessions，故按设备名吊销（AUTH.md §4）。注销设备属敏感动作，与吊销网页 +// 会话同口径要求最近一次 step-up（403 step_up_required，前端据此发起再认证）。 func (s *Server) handleDeleteDevice(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + if s.cfg.StepUpEnabled && !s.sessionRecentlySteppedUp(r) { + writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{"error": "step_up_required"}) + return + } claims, _ := jwtauth.ClaimsFromContext(r.Context()) name := chi.URLParam(r, "name") if name == "" { diff --git a/internal/httpapi/qr.go b/internal/httpapi/qr.go index 4d181a2..36b2fa0 100644 --- a/internal/httpapi/qr.go +++ b/internal/httpapi/qr.go @@ -285,7 +285,9 @@ func (s *Server) handleQRRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { RequestIP: req.RequestIp, ExpiresAt: req.ExpiresAt, Status: req.Status, - StepUp: s.cfg.StepUpEnabled, + // Tell the approver UI to re-auth only if step-up is on AND this session + // hasn't recently stepped up (within the window) — no repeated prompts (#3). + StepUp: s.cfg.StepUpEnabled && !s.sessionRecentlySteppedUp(r), }) } @@ -309,10 +311,14 @@ func (s *Server) handleQRApprove(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // Step-up: approving a new device into your account is sensitive. When enabled, // require a fresh prompt=login re-auth (the provider's 2FA, if configured, is - // enforced during that exchange) within the freshness window (AUTH.md §6). - if s.cfg.StepUpEnabled && !s.verifyStepUp(r, claims.UserID, body.StepUpCode, body.StepUpVerifier) { - writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{"error": "step_up_required"}) - return + // enforced during that exchange) — UNLESS this session already stepped up within + // the freshness window, so the same session isn't re-prompted repeatedly (#3). + if s.cfg.StepUpEnabled && !s.sessionRecentlySteppedUp(r) { + if !s.verifyStepUp(r, claims.UserID, body.StepUpCode, body.StepUpVerifier) { + writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{"error": "step_up_required"}) + return + } + s.recordStepUp(r) } scope := "guest" // this milestone grants restricted guest sessions only @@ -367,6 +373,50 @@ func (s *Server) handleQRDeny(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent) } +// sessionFromCookie resolves the caller's web_session row from the cdrop_session +// cookie. The scan-approval endpoints live under /api/auth/*, which the cookie's +// Path covers, so both OIDC and self sessions can be located here. +func (s *Server) sessionFromCookie(r *http.Request) (db.WebSession, bool) { + c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName) + if err != nil || c.Value == "" { + return db.WebSession{}, false + } + sess, err := s.queries.GetWebSession(r.Context(), sessionID(c.Value)) + if err != nil { + return db.WebSession{}, false + } + return sess, true +} + +// sessionRecentlySteppedUp reports whether the caller's session passed step-up +// within StepUpMaxAgeSeconds — so a sensitive action skips re-auth and the same +// session isn't re-prompted repeatedly (#3, AUTH.md §6). +func (s *Server) sessionRecentlySteppedUp(r *http.Request) bool { + sess, ok := s.sessionFromCookie(r) + if !ok || sess.SteppedUpAt == 0 { + return false + } + window := int64(s.cfg.StepUpMaxAgeSeconds) + if window <= 0 { + window = 300 + } + return time.Now().Unix()-sess.SteppedUpAt <= window +} + +// recordStepUp stamps the caller's session as freshly stepped-up. +func (s *Server) recordStepUp(r *http.Request) { + sess, ok := s.sessionFromCookie(r) + if !ok { + return + } + if err := s.queries.SetSessionSteppedUp(r.Context(), db.SetSessionSteppedUpParams{ + SteppedUpAt: time.Now().Unix(), + ID: sess.ID, + }); err != nil { + slog.Warn("record step-up failed", "err", err) + } +} + // verifyStepUp exchanges a fresh prompt=login authorization code and confirms it // proves a recent interactive re-authentication by the same user: the id_token's // signature validates (JWKS), its sub matches the caller, and its auth_time is @@ -401,11 +451,19 @@ func (s *Server) verifyStepUp(r *http.Request, userID, code, verifier string) bo if sub != userID { return false } - maxAge := int64(s.cfg.StepUpMaxAgeSeconds) - if maxAge <= 0 { - maxAge = 300 + // Enforce the freshness window only when the IdP supplied auth_time (Casdoor + // omits it). When absent, the fresh single-use prompt=login code — exchanged + // once, just now — is itself the bound on how recent the re-auth was. + if authTime > 0 { + maxAge := int64(s.cfg.StepUpMaxAgeSeconds) + if maxAge <= 0 { + maxAge = 300 + } + if time.Now().Unix()-authTime > maxAge { + return false + } } - return time.Now().Unix()-authTime <= maxAge + return true } // lookupQRRequest fetches a request and verifies the approval_code in constant diff --git a/internal/httpapi/qr_test.go b/internal/httpapi/qr_test.go index ceb76d5..d799803 100644 --- a/internal/httpapi/qr_test.go +++ b/internal/httpapi/qr_test.go @@ -12,11 +12,13 @@ import ( "testing" "time" + "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5" "github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4" "github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4/jwt" "commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/config" "commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/db" + "commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/hub" "commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/jwtauth" ) @@ -35,6 +37,7 @@ func newQRTestServer(t *testing.T) *Server { if err := db.Bootstrap(context.Background(), conn); err != nil { t.Fatalf("bootstrap: %v", err) } + q := db.New(conn) return &Server{ cfg: &config.Config{ AuthMode: "prod", SessionSecret: qrTestSecret, @@ -42,7 +45,8 @@ func newQRTestServer(t *testing.T) *Server { QRGuestTTLSeconds: 3600, QRPersistTTLHours: 168, SessionTokenTTLSeconds: 900, }, - queries: db.New(conn), + queries: q, + hub: hub.New(q), sessionKey: deriveSessionKey(qrTestSecret), sessionTokenKey: jwtauth.DeriveSessionTokenKey(qrTestSecret), siteOrigin: "https://drop.example.net", @@ -222,6 +226,106 @@ func TestQRFlow_PendingLongPoll(t *testing.T) { } } +// noopAuthStore satisfies jwtauth.Store for middleware wiring in tests (no device +// upsert happens without an X-Device-Name header). +type noopAuthStore struct{} + +func (noopAuthStore) UpsertDevice(context.Context, db.UpsertDeviceParams) error { return nil } +func (noopAuthStore) GetShortcutToken(context.Context, string) (db.ShortcutToken, error) { + return db.ShortcutToken{}, fmt.Errorf("none") +} +func (noopAuthStore) TouchShortcutTokenUsed(context.Context, db.TouchShortcutTokenUsedParams) error { + return nil +} +func (noopAuthStore) GetWebSession(_ context.Context, id string) (db.WebSession, error) { + return db.WebSession{ID: id}, nil // session always live in these tests +} + +// End-to-end through the REAL chain (auth.Middleware → requireFullSession): a +// guest session token is rejected 403 on an account-management route, a full one +// passes. This is the backend enforcement behind AUTH.md §3.2 (guest can't approve +// devices / remove devices / mint tokens). +func TestRequireFullSession_GuestBlockedFullPasses(t *testing.T) { + secret := "test-session-secret-at-least-32-bytes-ok" + srv := &Server{ + cfg: &config.Config{SessionTokenTTLSeconds: 900}, + sessionTokenKey: jwtauth.DeriveSessionTokenKey(secret), + } + guest, _, err := srv.mintSessionToken("u", "sid", "guest") + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("mint guest: %v", err) + } + full, _, err := srv.mintSessionToken("u", "sid", "full") + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("mint full: %v", err) + } + + a := jwtauth.New(&config.Config{AuthMode: "prod", SessionSecret: secret}, noopAuthStore{}) + handler := a.Middleware(requireFullSession(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) { + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + }))) + probe := func(tok string) int { + r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/auth/qr/approve", nil) + r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok) + w := httptest.NewRecorder() + handler.ServeHTTP(w, r) + return w.Code + } + if c := probe(guest); c != http.StatusForbidden { + t.Errorf("guest token on requireFullSession route: got %d, want 403", c) + } + if c := probe(full); c != http.StatusOK { + t.Errorf("full token on requireFullSession route: got %d, want 200", c) + } +} + +// Revoking a session is sensitive: with step-up enabled it is refused (403 +// step_up_required) until the caller's session has recently stepped up, then it +// proceeds (here to 400 missing-id, i.e. past the gate). Step-up state is keyed on +// the cookie session, so it is per-device (AUTH.md §1/§6). +func TestSessionRevoke_RequiresStepUp(t *testing.T) { + s := newQRTestServer(t) + s.cfg.StepUpEnabled = true + s.cfg.StepUpMaxAgeSeconds = 300 + + raw, id, err := newSessionToken() + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("token: %v", err) + } + now := time.Now().Unix() + if err := s.queries.CreateSelfSession(context.Background(), db.CreateSelfSessionParams{ + ID: id, UserID: "u", DeviceName: "", UserAgent: "", Kind: "oidc", Scope: "full", + GrantedBy: "", CreatedAt: now, LastUsedAt: now, ExpiresAt: now + 3600, + }); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("create session: %v", err) + } + + revoke := func() int { + r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/auth/sessions/x", nil) + r.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: sessionCookieName, Value: raw}) + r = r.WithContext(jwtauth.ContextWithClaims(r.Context(), + &jwtauth.Claims{UserID: "u", SessionScope: "full"})) + w := httptest.NewRecorder() + s.handleSessionRevoke(w, r) + return w.Code + } + + // Not stepped up → blocked before any deletion. + if c := revoke(); c != http.StatusForbidden { + t.Fatalf("revoke without step-up: got %d, want 403", c) + } + // Record step-up on this (cookie) session → gate now passes (400 = missing id, + // reached past the step-up check). + if err := s.queries.SetSessionSteppedUp(context.Background(), db.SetSessionSteppedUpParams{ + SteppedUpAt: now, ID: id, + }); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("set stepped up: %v", err) + } + if c := revoke(); c == http.StatusForbidden { + t.Errorf("revoke after step-up still 403; gate did not honour stepped_up_at") + } +} + // selfTokenScope verifies a self-signed session token under the test's session // key (proving the signature) and returns its scope claim. func selfTokenScope(t *testing.T, token string) string { @@ -241,3 +345,192 @@ func selfTokenScope(t *testing.T, token string) string { scope, _ := custom["scope"].(string) return scope } + +// revokeByID drives handleSessionRevoke with the chi {id} param and full claims, +// step-up off (the gate is exercised separately). +func revokeByID(s *Server, id, userID string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder { + r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/auth/sessions/"+id, nil) + rctx := chi.NewRouteContext() + rctx.URLParams.Add("id", id) + ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx) + ctx = jwtauth.ContextWithClaims(ctx, &jwtauth.Claims{UserID: userID, SessionScope: "full"}) + w := httptest.NewRecorder() + s.handleSessionRevoke(w, r.WithContext(ctx)) + return w +} + +// Revoking a web session removes its device registration too, so a revoked device +// disappears from the device list at once (the user can no longer remove devices +// by hand). AUTH.md §4. +func TestSessionRevoke_DeletesDevice(t *testing.T) { + s := newQRTestServer(t) // step-up off by default + ctx := context.Background() + now := time.Now().Unix() + + _, id, err := newSessionToken() + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("token: %v", err) + } + if err := s.queries.CreateSelfSession(ctx, db.CreateSelfSessionParams{ + ID: id, UserID: "u", DeviceName: "Laptop", UserAgent: "", Kind: "oidc", Scope: "full", + GrantedBy: "", CreatedAt: now, LastUsedAt: now, ExpiresAt: now + 3600, + }); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("create session: %v", err) + } + if err := s.queries.UpsertDevice(ctx, db.UpsertDeviceParams{ + UserID: "u", Name: "Laptop", Type: "browser", LastSeen: now, + }); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("upsert device: %v", err) + } + + if w := revokeByID(s, id, "u"); w.Code != http.StatusNoContent { + t.Fatalf("revoke: got %d %s, want 204", w.Code, w.Body.String()) + } + if _, err := s.queries.GetWebSession(ctx, id); err == nil { + t.Errorf("session still present after revoke") + } + devs, _ := s.queries.ListDevicesByUser(ctx, "u") + for _, d := range devs { + if d.Name == "Laptop" { + t.Errorf("device 'Laptop' not deleted on session revoke") + } + } +} + +// The session list unifies web_sessions with native client devices (desktop / iOS) +// that have no web_session, while never double-listing a device that already has a +// session and excluding shortcut-token devices. AUTH.md §4. +func TestSessionsList_IncludesNativeDevices(t *testing.T) { + s := newQRTestServer(t) + ctx := context.Background() + now := time.Now().Unix() + + _, id, err := newSessionToken() + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("token: %v", err) + } + if err := s.queries.CreateSelfSession(ctx, db.CreateSelfSessionParams{ + ID: id, UserID: "u", DeviceName: "Web", UserAgent: "", Kind: "oidc", Scope: "full", + GrantedBy: "", CreatedAt: now, LastUsedAt: now, ExpiresAt: now + 3600, + }); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("create session: %v", err) + } + for _, d := range []struct{ name, typ string }{ + {"Web", "browser"}, // has a web_session — must not be double-listed + {"Desk", "macos"}, // native, no session — must appear as native + {"iShortcut", "shortcut"}, // scoped token — excluded from session list + } { + if err := s.queries.UpsertDevice(ctx, db.UpsertDeviceParams{ + UserID: "u", Name: d.name, Type: d.typ, LastSeen: now, + }); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("upsert device %s: %v", d.name, err) + } + } + + r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/auth/sessions", nil) + r = r.WithContext(jwtauth.ContextWithClaims(r.Context(), + &jwtauth.Claims{UserID: "u", SessionScope: "full"})) + w := httptest.NewRecorder() + s.handleSessionsList(w, r) + if w.Code != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("sessions list: got %d %s", w.Code, w.Body.String()) + } + var resp struct { + Sessions []sessionView `json:"sessions"` + } + if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err) + } + var web, webNativeDup, desk, shortcut bool + for _, v := range resp.Sessions { + switch { + case v.DeviceName == "Web" && !v.Native && v.Kind == "oidc": + web = true + case v.DeviceName == "Web" && v.Native: + webNativeDup = true + case v.DeviceName == "Desk" && v.Native && v.Kind == "macos": + desk = true + case v.DeviceName == "iShortcut": + shortcut = true + } + } + if !web { + t.Errorf("web session for 'Web' missing") + } + if webNativeDup { + t.Errorf("'Web' double-listed as a native device") + } + if !desk { + t.Errorf("native device 'Desk' missing from session list") + } + if shortcut { + t.Errorf("shortcut device leaked into session list") + } +} + +// The sweeper drops browser devices whose web_session is gone (orphans) while +// keeping browser devices that still have a live session and all native devices. +func TestDeleteOrphanBrowserDevices(t *testing.T) { + s := newQRTestServer(t) + ctx := context.Background() + now := time.Now().Unix() + + // Browser "Kept" has a live session; browser "Orphan" has none; native "Desk" + // (macos) legitimately has no session and must survive. + _, id, err := newSessionToken() + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("token: %v", err) + } + if err := s.queries.CreateSelfSession(ctx, db.CreateSelfSessionParams{ + ID: id, UserID: "u", DeviceName: "Kept", Kind: "oidc", Scope: "full", + CreatedAt: now, LastUsedAt: now, ExpiresAt: now + 3600, + }); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("create session: %v", err) + } + for _, d := range []struct{ name, typ string }{ + {"Kept", "browser"}, {"Orphan", "browser"}, {"Desk", "macos"}, + } { + if err := s.queries.UpsertDevice(ctx, db.UpsertDeviceParams{ + UserID: "u", Name: d.name, Type: d.typ, LastSeen: now, + }); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("upsert %s: %v", d.name, err) + } + } + + if _, err := s.queries.DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices(ctx, now); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("sweep: %v", err) + } + devs, _ := s.queries.ListDevicesByUser(ctx, "u") + got := map[string]bool{} + for _, d := range devs { + got[d.Name] = true + } + if !got["Kept"] { + t.Errorf("browser 'Kept' with a live session was wrongly swept") + } + if got["Orphan"] { + t.Errorf("orphan browser 'Orphan' was not swept") + } + if !got["Desk"] { + t.Errorf("native 'Desk' was wrongly swept (it keeps no web_session)") + } +} + +// Removing a native device (the session list's logout path for desktop / iOS) is +// sensitive and requires a recent step-up, mirroring web-session revocation. +func TestDeleteDevice_RequiresStepUp(t *testing.T) { + s := newQRTestServer(t) + s.cfg.StepUpEnabled = true + s.cfg.StepUpMaxAgeSeconds = 300 + + r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/devices/Desk", nil) + rctx := chi.NewRouteContext() + rctx.URLParams.Add("name", "Desk") + ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx) + ctx = jwtauth.ContextWithClaims(ctx, &jwtauth.Claims{UserID: "u", SessionScope: "full"}) + w := httptest.NewRecorder() + s.handleDeleteDevice(w, r.WithContext(ctx)) + if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden { + t.Fatalf("delete device without step-up: got %d, want 403", w.Code) + } +} diff --git a/internal/httpapi/server.go b/internal/httpapi/server.go index 91a4394..9a9abd5 100644 --- a/internal/httpapi/server.go +++ b/internal/httpapi/server.go @@ -176,6 +176,13 @@ func (s *Server) routes() { r.Get("/auth/qr/request", s.handleQRRequest) r.Post("/auth/qr/approve", s.handleQRApprove) r.Post("/auth/qr/deny", s.handleQRDeny) + // Session management: list logins with their permission level, + // really revoke one (logout), and the standalone step-up the + // revoke flow re-uses. All under /api/auth so the session cookie + // (Path=/api/auth) is available for step-up state. + r.Post("/auth/stepup", s.handleStepUp) + r.Get("/auth/sessions", s.handleSessionsList) + r.Delete("/auth/sessions/{id}", s.handleSessionRevoke) }) r.Route("/transfer", func(r chi.Router) { @@ -219,6 +226,10 @@ type meResp struct { UserID string `json:"user_id"` Groups []string `json:"groups"` DeviceName string `json:"device_name"` + // Scope is the session's capability level: "guest" (scan-login borrow, + // capability-limited) or "full" (normal login). The UI hides account-management + // affordances on guest sessions (AUTH.md §3.2). + Scope string `json:"scope"` } func (s *Server) handleMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { @@ -228,10 +239,15 @@ func (s *Server) handleMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { return } device, _ := jwtauth.DeviceNameFromContext(r.Context()) + scope := "full" + if claims.Guest() { + scope = "guest" + } writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, meResp{ UserID: claims.UserID, Groups: claims.Groups, DeviceName: device, + Scope: scope, }) } diff --git a/internal/httpapi/sessions.go b/internal/httpapi/sessions.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d1f25eb --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/httpapi/sessions.go @@ -0,0 +1,218 @@ +package httpapi + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "log/slog" + "net/http" + "time" + + "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5" + + "commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/db" + "commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/jwtauth" +) + +// Session management (AUTH.md §1, §6): list the caller's logins with their +// capability level, and really revoke one (delete the row → its access token can +// no longer refresh and dies within its short TTL). Revocation is a sensitive +// action, so it requires a recent step-up. A standalone step-up endpoint lets the +// UI establish that re-auth once (per session/device) and reuse it across actions +// within the window — the same session isn't re-prompted repeatedly (#3). + +type stepUpReq struct { + Code string `json:"code"` + Verifier string `json:"verifier"` +} + +// handleStepUp exchanges a fresh prompt=login code and, on success, stamps the +// caller's session as stepped-up (per-session, cookie-keyed). Sensitive actions +// within StepUpMaxAgeSeconds then skip re-auth. 403 on failure; 204 when step-up +// is disabled (nothing to establish). +func (s *Server) handleStepUp(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + if !s.cfg.StepUpEnabled { + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent) + return + } + claims, _ := jwtauth.ClaimsFromContext(r.Context()) + var body stepUpReq + if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 8192)).Decode(&body); err != nil { + writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "invalid json"}) + return + } + if !s.verifyStepUp(r, claims.UserID, body.Code, body.Verifier) { + writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{"error": "step_up_required"}) + return + } + s.recordStepUp(r) + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent) +} + +type sessionView struct { + ID string `json:"id"` + DeviceName string `json:"device_name"` + Kind string `json:"kind"` // oidc | self | guest | macos | windows | linux | ios + Scope string `json:"scope"` // full | guest + Current bool `json:"current"` + Online bool `json:"online"` // device currently connected (SSE) — UI sorts online first + // Native marks a device that authenticates with an IdP token and keeps no + // web_session row (desktop / iOS). It is surfaced from the devices registry so + // the session list covers every device; its "logout" routes to the device + // endpoint rather than the web-session one. + Native bool `json:"native"` + CreatedAt int64 `json:"created_at"` + LastUsedAt int64 `json:"last_used_at"` + ExpiresAt int64 `json:"expires_at"` +} + +// isNativeDeviceType reports whether a device type is a real native client (one +// that authenticates via the IdP and keeps no web_session). browser devices are +// expected to carry a web_session; "shortcut" tokens have their own panel. +func isNativeDeviceType(t string) bool { + switch t { + case "macos", "windows", "linux", "ios": + return true + default: + return false + } +} + +// handleSessionsList returns the caller's login sessions with their scope, so the +// UI can show the permission level (完整 / 受限访客) and offer real logout. The list +// is unified: web_sessions (browser / scan-login) PLUS native client devices +// (desktop / iOS) that have no web_session of their own — so every logged-in +// device appears in one place and orphaned device rows fall away (AUTH.md §4). +func (s *Server) handleSessionsList(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + claims, _ := jwtauth.ClaimsFromContext(r.Context()) + now := time.Now().Unix() + + rows, err := s.queries.ListWebSessionsByUser(r.Context(), claims.UserID) + if err != nil { + slog.Error("list sessions failed", "err", err, "user", claims.UserID) + writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{"error": "db"}) + return + } + current := "" + if c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName); err == nil && c.Value != "" { + current = sessionID(c.Value) + } + // Cookieless callers (native apps) can't match by cookie; fall back to their + // own device name to mark the "current" row. + callerDevice, _ := jwtauth.DeviceNameFromContext(r.Context()) + + out := make([]sessionView, 0, len(rows)) + named := make(map[string]struct{}, len(rows)) + for _, row := range rows { + if row.ExpiresAt < now { + continue // hide expired sessions (reaped separately) + } + if row.DeviceName != "" { + named[row.DeviceName] = struct{}{} + } + out = append(out, sessionView{ + ID: row.ID, + DeviceName: row.DeviceName, + Kind: row.Kind, + Scope: row.Scope, + Current: row.ID == current || (current == "" && row.DeviceName != "" && row.DeviceName == callerDevice), + Online: row.DeviceName != "" && s.hub.Online(claims.UserID, row.DeviceName), + CreatedAt: row.CreatedAt, + LastUsedAt: row.LastUsedAt, + ExpiresAt: row.ExpiresAt, + }) + } + + // Native clients keep no web_session — surface them from the devices registry, + // skipping any whose name already has a web_session (no double-listing). + if devs, derr := s.queries.ListDevicesByUser(r.Context(), claims.UserID); derr == nil { + for _, d := range devs { + if !isNativeDeviceType(d.Type) { + continue + } + if _, ok := named[d.Name]; ok { + continue + } + out = append(out, sessionView{ + ID: "device:" + d.Name, + DeviceName: d.Name, + Kind: d.Type, + Scope: "full", + Native: true, + Current: current == "" && d.Name != "" && d.Name == callerDevice, + Online: s.hub.Online(claims.UserID, d.Name), + CreatedAt: d.LastSeen, + LastUsedAt: d.LastSeen, + ExpiresAt: 0, + }) + } + } + + writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"sessions": out}) +} + +// deviceNameHasLiveSession reports whether the user still has a non-expired +// web_session bound to deviceName — used to avoid deleting a device that another +// live session (e.g. a re-login that left the old row) still depends on. +func (s *Server) deviceNameHasLiveSession(ctx context.Context, userID, deviceName string) bool { + rows, err := s.queries.ListWebSessionsByUser(ctx, userID) + if err != nil { + return false + } + now := time.Now().Unix() + for _, ws := range rows { + if ws.DeviceName == deviceName && ws.ExpiresAt >= now { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// handleSessionRevoke deletes a session row (scoped to its owner), really +// invalidating that login. Requires a recent step-up (403 step_up_required +// otherwise). Kicks the device's live SSE so it drops immediately. +func (s *Server) handleSessionRevoke(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + if s.cfg.StepUpEnabled && !s.sessionRecentlySteppedUp(r) { + writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{"error": "step_up_required"}) + return + } + claims, _ := jwtauth.ClaimsFromContext(r.Context()) + id := chi.URLParam(r, "id") + if id == "" { + writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "missing id"}) + return + } + // Read the device name before deletion so we can kick its SSE. + deviceName := "" + if sess, err := s.queries.GetWebSession(r.Context(), id); err == nil && sess.UserID == claims.UserID { + deviceName = sess.DeviceName + } + n, err := s.queries.DeleteWebSessionForUser(r.Context(), db.DeleteWebSessionForUserParams{ + ID: id, + UserID: claims.UserID, + }) + if err != nil { + slog.Error("revoke session failed", "err", err) + writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{"error": "db"}) + return + } + if n == 0 { + writeJSON(w, http.StatusNotFound, map[string]string{"error": "not found"}) + return + } + if deviceName != "" { + // Drop the device registration too, so a revoked device disappears from the + // device list at once (we no longer remove devices by hand) — unless another + // live session still uses this name. + if !s.deviceNameHasLiveSession(r.Context(), claims.UserID, deviceName) { + if _, derr := s.queries.DeleteDevice(r.Context(), db.DeleteDeviceParams{ + UserID: claims.UserID, + Name: deviceName, + }); derr != nil { + slog.Warn("delete device on session revoke failed", "err", derr) + } + } + s.hub.Kick(claims.UserID, deviceName) + s.hub.PublishPresence(r.Context(), claims.UserID) + } + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent) +} diff --git a/internal/jwtauth/devices.go b/internal/jwtauth/devices.go index 67d3609..4b283a5 100644 --- a/internal/jwtauth/devices.go +++ b/internal/jwtauth/devices.go @@ -11,10 +11,14 @@ import ( // DeviceSweepInterval is how often the device sweeper wakes up. const DeviceSweepInterval = 1 * time.Hour -// RunDeviceSweeper deletes devices whose last_seen is older than ttl. -// Per user requirement: device registration must not outlive the longest -// valid refresh_token (brief §2: 196h sliding window). Anything ≤ TTL is fine; -// 0 disables the sweeper. +// RunDeviceSweeper prunes the devices table on a timer so it stays aligned with +// the session list (AUTH.md §4): it drops (1) devices whose last_seen is older +// than ttl — registration must not outlive the longest valid refresh_token +// (brief §2: 196h sliding window) — and (2) browser devices whose web_session is +// gone (revoked or expired), which would otherwise linger until the stale cutoff +// now that users can no longer remove devices by hand. Native and shortcut +// devices keep no web_session and are pruned by the stale cutoff only. ttl ≤ 0 +// disables the sweeper. func RunDeviceSweeper(ctx context.Context, queries *db.Queries, ttl time.Duration) { if ttl <= 0 { slog.Info("device sweeper disabled (ttl <= 0)") @@ -29,10 +33,14 @@ func RunDeviceSweeper(ctx context.Context, queries *db.Queries, ttl time.Duratio case <-ctx.Done(): return case <-t.C: - cutoff := time.Now().Add(-ttl).Unix() + now := time.Now() + cutoff := now.Add(-ttl).Unix() if err := queries.DeleteStaleDevices(ctx, cutoff); err != nil { slog.Error("device sweeper failed", "err", err) } + if _, err := queries.DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices(ctx, now.Unix()); err != nil { + slog.Error("device sweeper: orphan browser cleanup failed", "err", err) + } } } } diff --git a/internal/jwtauth/middleware.go b/internal/jwtauth/middleware.go index 6ce5739..0b657d4 100644 --- a/internal/jwtauth/middleware.go +++ b/internal/jwtauth/middleware.go @@ -19,13 +19,16 @@ import ( "commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/db" ) -// Store is the subset of *db.Queries the auth middleware uses: device upserts -// plus the shortcut-token lookups needed to honour revocation. Declared as an -// interface so tests can swap in a fake. +// Store is the subset of *db.Queries the auth middleware uses: device upserts, +// the shortcut-token lookups needed to honour revocation, and the web_session +// lookup that makes a self-signed session token's revocation take effect at once +// (a deleted row → the token is rejected on its next request, not after TTL). +// Declared as an interface so tests can swap in a fake. type Store interface { UpsertDevice(ctx context.Context, arg db.UpsertDeviceParams) error GetShortcutToken(ctx context.Context, jti string) (db.ShortcutToken, error) TouchShortcutTokenUsed(ctx context.Context, arg db.TouchShortcutTokenUsedParams) error + GetWebSession(ctx context.Context, id string) (db.WebSession, error) } type Authenticator struct { @@ -108,7 +111,7 @@ func (a *Authenticator) verify(ctx context.Context, token string, r *http.Reques // cdrop self-signed session tokens first: distinct key + typ=session, so a // shortcut token (different key, requires jti) never validates here and a // session token never falls through to the shortcut path's DB lookup. - if c, err := a.verifySelfToken(token); err == nil { + if c, err := a.verifySelfToken(ctx, token); err == nil { return c, nil } if c, err := a.verifyHS256(ctx, token); err == nil { @@ -119,9 +122,13 @@ func (a *Authenticator) verify(ctx context.Context, token string, r *http.Reques // verifySelfToken validates a cdrop self-signed session access token (AUTH.md // §3.1): HS256 over DeriveSessionTokenKey, carrying typ=session and a full/guest -// scope. Stateless by design — no DB lookup, so it stays cheap on every request; -// revocation rides the short TTL (the session row is re-checked at /auth/refresh). -func (a *Authenticator) verifySelfToken(token string) (*Claims, error) { +// scope. This is the unified browser token — scan-login (self/guest) AND OIDC web +// logins both ride it now, so the browser holds one token type. After the cheap +// signature/exp/scope checks it does ONE indexed lookup of the token's sid against +// web_sessions: a deleted row means the session was revoked, and the token is +// rejected on its very next request (immediate "log out this device"). The IdP +// RS256 path (verifyRS256) remains only for the desktop client's loopback tokens. +func (a *Authenticator) verifySelfToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (*Claims, error) { if len(a.sessionTokenKey) == 0 { return nil, errors.New("session token key not configured") } @@ -147,6 +154,16 @@ func (a *Authenticator) verifySelfToken(token string) (*Claims, error) { if scope != "full" && scope != "guest" { return nil, errors.New("session token invalid scope") } + // Bind the token to its live web_session row (sid): once that row is revoked + // (deleted), the token is rejected on its very next request — "log out this + // device" takes effect immediately rather than after the access token's TTL. + sid, _ := custom["sid"].(string) + if sid == "" { + return nil, errors.New("session token missing sid") + } + if _, err := a.store.GetWebSession(ctx, sid); err != nil { + return nil, errors.New("session revoked") + } return &Claims{UserID: std.Subject, SessionScope: scope}, nil } @@ -265,8 +282,9 @@ func (a *Authenticator) verifyRS256(ctx context.Context, token string) (*Claims, // VerifyIDToken validates an OIDC id_token (RS256 via JWKS, issuer + audience) // from a fresh prompt=login exchange and returns its subject and auth_time (the -// epoch second of the actual end-user authentication). Used for step-up re-auth -// (AUTH.md §6): the caller checks sub matches and auth_time is recent enough. +// epoch second of the actual end-user authentication, or 0 when the IdP omits the +// claim — Casdoor does). Used for step-up re-auth (AUTH.md §6): the caller checks +// sub matches and, only when auth_time is present, that it is recent enough. func (a *Authenticator) VerifyIDToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (subject string, authTime int64, err error) { if a.jwks == nil { return "", 0, errors.New("JWKS not configured") @@ -300,10 +318,10 @@ func (a *Authenticator) VerifyIDToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (subjec if std.Subject == "" { return "", 0, errors.New("missing subject claim") } - at, ok := numericClaim(custom["auth_time"]) - if !ok { - return "", 0, errors.New("missing auth_time claim") - } + // auth_time is OPTIONAL: required by OIDC only when the IdP chooses to honour + // max_age, and Casdoor omits it entirely. Absent → 0; the caller treats the + // fresh single-use prompt=login code as the freshness bound instead. + at, _ := numericClaim(custom["auth_time"]) return std.Subject, at, nil } diff --git a/internal/jwtauth/middleware_test.go b/internal/jwtauth/middleware_test.go index 9f6592c..2d7aa67 100644 --- a/internal/jwtauth/middleware_test.go +++ b/internal/jwtauth/middleware_test.go @@ -22,9 +22,10 @@ import ( // shortcut-token lookups from an in-memory map (empty → "not found", so plain // device-only tests are unaffected). type fakeDeviceUpserter struct { - calls []db.UpsertDeviceParams - err error - tokens map[string]db.ShortcutToken + calls []db.UpsertDeviceParams + err error + tokens map[string]db.ShortcutToken + revokedSIDs map[string]bool } func (f *fakeDeviceUpserter) UpsertDevice(_ context.Context, arg db.UpsertDeviceParams) error { @@ -45,6 +46,15 @@ func (f *fakeDeviceUpserter) TouchShortcutTokenUsed(_ context.Context, _ db.Touc return nil } +// GetWebSession backs the self-token revocation check. revokedSIDs lets a test +// simulate a revoked session (deleted row); any other sid resolves to a live row. +func (f *fakeDeviceUpserter) GetWebSession(_ context.Context, id string) (db.WebSession, error) { + if f.revokedSIDs[id] { + return db.WebSession{}, sql.ErrNoRows + } + return db.WebSession{ID: id, UserID: "user-x"}, nil +} + // echo handler that responds with the claims+device discovered in context. func echoMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { claims, _ := ClaimsFromContext(r.Context()) @@ -489,6 +499,26 @@ func TestSanitizeDeviceName(t *testing.T) { } } +// A self-signed session token is bound to its web_session row: once the row is +// revoked (deleted), the token is rejected on its next request even though it is +// still cryptographically valid and unexpired — "log out this device" is immediate +// (AUTH.md §1/§3.1). +func TestSelfToken_RejectedAfterSessionRevoked(t *testing.T) { + secret := "test-session-secret-at-least-32-bytes-long" + exp := time.Now().Add(time.Hour) + + live := New(&config.Config{AuthMode: "prod", SessionSecret: secret}, &fakeDeviceUpserter{}) + if c, _ := serveBearer(live, signSelfToken(t, secret, "user-x", "session", "full", exp)); c != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("token with a live session: got %d, want 200", c) + } + + revoked := New(&config.Config{AuthMode: "prod", SessionSecret: secret}, + &fakeDeviceUpserter{revokedSIDs: map[string]bool{"test-sid": true}}) + if c, _ := serveBearer(revoked, signSelfToken(t, secret, "user-x", "session", "full", exp)); c != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Errorf("token whose session was revoked must be rejected, got %d", c) + } +} + // signSelfToken mints a cdrop self-signed session token the way httpapi.mintSessionToken // does: HS256 over DeriveSessionTokenKey, with typ + scope custom claims and no jti. func signSelfToken(t *testing.T, secret, sub, typ, scope string, exp time.Time) string { @@ -505,7 +535,7 @@ func signSelfToken(t *testing.T, secret, sub, typ, scope string, exp time.Time) IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()), Expiry: jwt.NewNumericDate(exp), } - tok, err := jwt.Signed(sig).Claims(std).Claims(map[string]any{"typ": typ, "scope": scope}).Serialize() + tok, err := jwt.Signed(sig).Claims(std).Claims(map[string]any{"typ": typ, "scope": scope, "sid": "test-sid"}).Serialize() if err != nil { t.Fatalf("serialize: %v", err) } diff --git a/web/package-lock.json b/web/package-lock.json index 3d26d22..ffd0f94 100644 --- a/web/package-lock.json +++ b/web/package-lock.json @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ "@mantine/notifications": "^7.13.5", "@tanstack/react-router": "^1.82.0", "@types/qrcode": "^1.5.6", + "jsqr": "^1.4.0", "lucide-react": "^0.460.0", "qrcode": "^1.5.4", "react": "^18.3.1", @@ -2433,6 +2434,12 @@ "node": ">=6" } }, + "node_modules/jsqr": { + "version": "1.4.0", + "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/jsqr/-/jsqr-1.4.0.tgz", + "integrity": "sha512-dxLob7q65Xg2DvstYkRpkYtmKm2sPJ9oFhrhmudT1dZvNFFTlroai3AWSpLey/w5vMcLBXRgOJsbXpdN9HzU/A==", + "license": "Apache-2.0" + }, "node_modules/lilconfig": { "version": "3.1.3", "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/lilconfig/-/lilconfig-3.1.3.tgz", diff --git a/web/package.json b/web/package.json index 3768ca3..dc060ef 100644 --- a/web/package.json +++ b/web/package.json @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ "@mantine/notifications": "^7.13.5", "@tanstack/react-router": "^1.82.0", "@types/qrcode": "^1.5.6", + "jsqr": "^1.4.0", "lucide-react": "^0.460.0", "qrcode": "^1.5.4", "react": "^18.3.1", diff --git a/web/src/features/auth/AuthShell.tsx b/web/src/features/auth/AuthShell.tsx index 0ec9ac2..d89fd30 100644 --- a/web/src/features/auth/AuthShell.tsx +++ b/web/src/features/auth/AuthShell.tsx @@ -20,13 +20,19 @@ export interface AuthShellProps * 跳转到主界面，跳转帧里顶栏 logo 会与主界面 header 的 logo 重叠成“两个 * logo”，隐藏即可消除。登录页是整页跳 IdP、无此重叠，保留 logo。 */ hideBrand?: boolean; + /** 整页跳过聚珍 CJK 处理（在 shell 根加 data-jz-skip）。状态机页面（扫码 / + * 批准 / 显码：mount 后即 getUserMedia/fetch → setState 频繁重渲染）必须用： + * 聚珍是渲染后 MutationObserver 改 DOM 的库，与 React 重渲染同一子树本质冲突， + * 会触发 insertBefore 崩溃。这些页以短 chrome 文本为主，跳过聚珍仅损失些微 + * 中西间距，远胜崩溃。 */ + skipAutospace?: boolean; } // 全屏外壳：登录、首次设置、OAuth 回调共用。带轻量品牌 + 主题切换， // 让用户在登录前也能调主题。 export function AuthShell(props: AuthShellProps) { - const { title, subtitle, children, footer, cardBrand, hideBrand } = props; + const { title, subtitle, children, footer, cardBrand, hideBrand, skipAutospace } = props; const theme = useAppStore((s) => s.theme); const setTheme = useAppStore((s) => s.setTheme); const next: ThemeMode = theme === "system" ? "light" : theme === "light" ? "dark" : "system"; @@ -38,7 +44,7 @@ export function AuthShell(props: AuthShellProps) const brandNode = cardBrand === undefined ? null : cardBrand; return ( -
+
{/* 空 span 占位保持 space-between，主题切换仍靠右。 */} {hideBrand ? : } diff --git a/web/src/features/auth/auth.ts b/web/src/features/auth/auth.ts index 21a3ab6..c12bcc9 100644 --- a/web/src/features/auth/auth.ts +++ b/web/src/features/auth/auth.ts @@ -2,7 +2,9 @@ import { useAppStore, type User } from "../../store"; import { t } from "../../i18n"; import { apiFetch } from "../../net/api"; import { isDesktop, desktopRefresh, clearDesktopSession } from "../../net/desktop"; +import { fetchMeScope } from "../../net/sessions"; import { stashStepUpPending } from "../qr/stepUp"; +import { toast } from "../../ui/feedback"; // ---- dev mode ------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -46,6 +48,29 @@ export function logout() if (isDesktop()) { clearDesktopSession(); } } +// forceLogout 在「服务端确证会话已失效」时清掉本地登录态——触发点仅一处： +// access token 401 后续期也被服务端以 401 拒绝（refreshTokens 返回 "invalid"， +// 即被远程吊销或已过期）。短期连接失败（网络抖动 / 5xx）绝不走到这里（见 +// net/api.ts）。与 logout() 不同，它不发任何服务端请求（会话已死，调用只会再次 +// 401），只就地清空 + 提示，让 __root 的反应式守卫把界面送回登录页 +// （离线设备「下一次使用即得知」）。 +// +// 幂等：靠「已登出即跳过」实现——首个 401 同步清空 user/accessToken 后，并发涌入 +// 的其余 401 看到已为空便直接返回，不会重复弹 toast、不重复清桌面 session。 +export function forceLogout(): void +{ + const st = useAppStore.getState(); + if (!st.user && !st.accessToken) + { + // 已被并发的某个 401 清空，或本就处于登出态：不重复处理（避免 toast 刷屏）。 + return; + } + st.clearAuth(); + // 桌面端：删除 Go 侧持久化 session，否则下次启动仍注入这枚已失效的登录态。 + if (isDesktop()) { clearDesktopSession(); } + toast.error(t("auth.sessionLost.title"), t("auth.sessionLost.body")); +} + // ---- prod (OIDC PKCE) ----------------------------------------------------- interface AuthConfig @@ -242,48 +267,69 @@ interface CookieRefreshResp device_name?: string; } +// CookieRefreshResult 区分「服务端确证会话失效」与「短期失败」，使上层只在前者 +// 清空登录态： +// ok —— 换到新 access token +// invalid —— /api/auth/refresh 返回 401：服务端查证会话已失效 / 被吊销 / 过期 +// （其处理器同时清掉 cookie），凭据确凿不可恢复 +// transient —— 5xx / 同源校验 403 / 响应残缺等非确证失败（网络层抛错则根本不进此 +// 函数、照常向上抛）——一律保留登录态，按短期错误处理 +type CookieRefreshResult = + | { kind: "ok"; accessToken: string; user: User; deviceName: string } + | { kind: "invalid" } + | { kind: "transient" }; + // cookieRefresh 用 HttpOnly session cookie 静默换一枚新 access_token。无 body—— -// cookie 自动随同源请求发出（Path=/api/auth）。成功返回 {accessToken, user, -// deviceName}；cookie 缺失 / 过期 / 被 IdP 拒绝 → null（调用方据此落到登录页）。 -async function cookieRefresh(): Promise<{ accessToken: string; user: User; deviceName: string } | null> +// cookie 自动随同源请求发出（Path=/api/auth）。返回见 CookieRefreshResult：只有 +// 服务端明确以 401 拒绝才算 invalid，短期失败一律 transient，不误伤登录态。 +async function cookieRefresh(): Promise { const r = await fetch("/api/auth/refresh", { method: "POST" }); - if (!r.ok) { return null; } + if (!r.ok) + { + return { kind: r.status === 401 ? "invalid" : "transient" }; + } const data = await r.json().catch(() => null) as CookieRefreshResp | null; - if (!data?.access_token || !data.user?.id) { return null; } + if (!data?.access_token || !data.user?.id) { return { kind: "transient" }; } return { + kind: "ok", accessToken: data.access_token, user: { id: data.user.id, name: data.user.name, avatar: data.user.avatar }, deviceName: data.device_name ?? "", }; } -// refreshTokens 换新 access_token；api.ts 在请求拿到 401 时惰性调用。返回是否成功。 -export async function refreshTokens(): Promise +// RefreshOutcome 是续期对上层的三态结论；只有 "invalid"（服务端确证失效）才允许 +// 上层 forceLogout，"transient" 必须保留登录态（短期连接失败不清状态）。 +export type RefreshOutcome = "refreshed" | "invalid" | "transient"; + +// refreshTokens 换新 access_token；api.ts 在请求拿到 401 时惰性调用。 +export async function refreshTokens(): Promise { const store = useAppStore.getState(); - if (store.authMode !== "prod") { return false; } + if (store.authMode !== "prod") { return "transient"; } // 桌面端：refresh 完全在 Go 内部完成（refresh_token 只在 Go，JS 不持有）， - // 直接无参调用。 + // 直接无参调用。Go 侧暂不区分「被吊销」与「短期失败」，故失败一律按 transient + // 处理（不清空登录态）——桌面端即时吊销留后续（AUTH.md §3.1）。 if (isDesktop()) { const res = await desktopRefresh(); - if (!res?.access_token) { return false; } + if (!res?.access_token) { return "transient"; } const cur = useAppStore.getState(); - if (!cur.user) { return false; } + if (!cur.user) { return "transient"; } cur.setAuth({ accessToken: res.access_token, user: cur.user }); - return true; + return "refreshed"; } // 浏览器端：走 HttpOnly cookie session（refresh_token 在服务端，JS 不持有）。 const res = await cookieRefresh(); - if (!res) { return false; } + if (res.kind !== "ok") { return res.kind; } // "invalid" | "transient"，透传给上层 const cur = useAppStore.getState(); cur.setAuth({ accessToken: res.accessToken, user: res.user }); // 设备名以服务端为权威；本地缺失（PWA 存储被清）时回填。 if (res.deviceName && !cur.selfDeviceName) { cur.setSelfDeviceName(res.deviceName); } - return true; + return "refreshed"; } // bootstrapAuth 在 App 挂载前尝试「免重登」：浏览器端若本会话尚无 access_token， @@ -297,12 +343,24 @@ export async function bootstrapAuth(): Promise if (store.accessToken && store.user) { return; } // 同会话已登录（sessionStorage 命中） const res = await cookieRefresh(); - if (!res) { return; } + if (res.kind !== "ok") { return; } // 开机水合失败（含 invalid / transient）→ 照常落登录页 const cur = useAppStore.getState(); cur.setAuth({ accessToken: res.accessToken, user: res.user }); if (res.deviceName && !cur.selfDeviceName) { cur.setSelfDeviceName(res.deviceName); } } +// refreshSessionScope 拉一次 /api/me 校正本会话权限级别（full / guest）并写进 +// store。在登录成功 / 开机水合后调用一次，使受限访客的账号管理入口被隐藏。失败 +// 静默回退 "full"——只多展示入口，后端仍 403 兜底。dev 模式无 guest 概念，跳过。 +export async function refreshSessionScope(): Promise +{ + const store = useAppStore.getState(); + if (store.authMode !== "prod") { return; } + if (!store.user || !store.accessToken) { return; } + const scope = await fetchMeScope(); + useAppStore.getState().setSessionScope(scope); +} + // syncWebDeviceName 把本机设备名推到服务端 session（cookie 鉴权），让 PWA 存储被清 // 后开机仍能从 cookie session 恢复设备名、不再误跳 /setup。仅浏览器 prod；桌面端走 // persistDesktopDeviceName（Go 持久化），dev 无 session。失败静默——只是体验降级。 diff --git a/web/src/features/desktop/DesktopSettings.tsx b/web/src/features/desktop/DesktopSettings.tsx index 9f1fd00..b4e6e38 100644 --- a/web/src/features/desktop/DesktopSettings.tsx +++ b/web/src/features/desktop/DesktopSettings.tsx @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ export function DesktopSettings() {t("settings.desktop.downloadDir")} - {t("settings.desktop.downloadDirHint")} + {t("settings.desktop.downloadDirHint")}
- + {t("settings.desktop.ttlNote")} @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ function ToggleRow(props: { {title} - {hint} + {hint} void; /** 拖拽文件落到设备卡上，跳过 composer 直接发送。 */ onDropFile?: (deviceName: string, file: File) => void; + /** 「扫码登录新设备」入口：应用内相机扫码把另一台设备接入账号。 */ + onLinkDevice?: () => void; } export function DeviceStrip(props: DeviceStripProps) { - const { devices, selfDeviceName, selectedDevice, onSelect, onDropFile } = props; + const { devices, selfDeviceName, selectedDevice, onSelect, onDropFile, onLinkDevice } = props; const [ showOffline, setShowOffline ] = useState(false); const peers = useMemo( @@ -42,17 +44,29 @@ export function DeviceStrip(props: DeviceStripProps) {t("home.deviceList.onlineSuffix", { count: onlineCount })}
- {offlineCount > 0 && ( - - )} +
+ {offlineCount > 0 && ( + + )} + {onLinkDevice && ( + + )} +
{visible.length === 0 ? ( diff --git a/web/src/features/qr/stepUp.ts b/web/src/features/qr/stepUp.ts index 38908ca..4c47fcf 100644 --- a/web/src/features/qr/stepUp.ts +++ b/web/src/features/qr/stepUp.ts @@ -15,12 +15,24 @@ const PENDING_KEY = "cdrop.qr.stepup_pending"; // { verifier, returnTo } const STASH_KEY = "cdrop.qr.stepup_stash"; // { code, verifier } +// 登录会话登出的 step-up：跨整页跳转记住「要登出的是哪条会话」。回到设置页后取出， +// 重试那条 DELETE。批准页的 step-up 不用它（要批准的 request 已编在 returnTo 里）。 +const REVOKE_KEY = "cdrop.qr.stepup_revoke"; // sessionId（string） -// 仅允许站内 /link 路径回流，杜绝 open-redirect（外部 URL / 协议相对地址）。 -// 与 returnTo.ts 同口径——step-up 往返回来后的整页跳转目标只能是批准页。 -function isSafeLinkPath(path: string): boolean +// 仅允许两个站内回流目标，杜绝 open-redirect（外部 URL / 协议相对地址 / 任意路径）： +// - /link[?…] ——批准页（扫码登录的 step-up）； +// - /settings ——设置页（登录会话登出的 step-up）。 +// step-up 往返回来后的整页跳转目标只能是这两处之一；其余一律拒。校验 path 必须以 +// "/link" 或 "/settings" 起头且后随串只能是空或 "?…"，挡住 "/linkmalicious" / +// "//evil.com"（协议相对）/ "/settings/../x" 之类绕过。 +function isSafeReturnPath(path: string): boolean { - return path.startsWith("/link?") || path === "/link"; + for (const base of [ "/link", "/settings" ]) + { + if (path === base) { return true; } + if (path.startsWith(base + "?")) { return true; } + } + return false; } export interface StepUpPending @@ -40,7 +52,7 @@ export interface StepUpStash export function stashStepUpPending(pending: StepUpPending): boolean { if (typeof window === "undefined") { return false; } - if (!pending.verifier || !isSafeLinkPath(pending.returnTo)) { return false; } + if (!pending.verifier || !isSafeReturnPath(pending.returnTo)) { return false; } window.sessionStorage.setItem(PENDING_KEY, JSON.stringify(pending)); return true; } @@ -53,7 +65,7 @@ export function peekStepUpPending(): StepUpPending | null const raw = window.sessionStorage.getItem(PENDING_KEY); if (!raw) { return null; } const p = safeParse(raw); - if (!p?.verifier || !isSafeLinkPath(p.returnTo)) { return null; } + if (!p?.verifier || !isSafeReturnPath(p.returnTo)) { return null; } return p; } @@ -91,6 +103,24 @@ export function clearStepUpStash(): void window.sessionStorage.removeItem(STASH_KEY); } +// stashPendingRevoke 在发起会话登出的 step-up 再认证前记下待登出的 sessionId， +// 跨整页跳转留到回到设置页后取出重试。 +export function stashPendingRevoke(sessionId: string): void +{ + if (typeof window === "undefined") { return; } + if (!sessionId) { return; } + window.sessionStorage.setItem(REVOKE_KEY, sessionId); +} + +// consumePendingRevoke 取出并清除待登出的 sessionId（一次性，用完即清）。 +export function consumePendingRevoke(): string | null +{ + if (typeof window === "undefined") { return null; } + const id = window.sessionStorage.getItem(REVOKE_KEY); + window.sessionStorage.removeItem(REVOKE_KEY); + return id || null; +} + function safeParse(raw: string): T | null { try { return JSON.parse(raw) as T; } diff --git a/web/src/features/shortcut/ShortcutTokens.tsx b/web/src/features/shortcut/ShortcutTokens.tsx index d731a97..2c623e4 100644 --- a/web/src/features/shortcut/ShortcutTokens.tsx +++ b/web/src/features/shortcut/ShortcutTokens.tsx @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ export function ShortcutTokens() return ( - {t("settings.shortcut.intro")} + {t("settings.shortcut.intro")}
@@ -273,24 +273,24 @@ function IssuedReveal(props: { issued: IssueResp; base: string; onDismiss: () => {t("settings.shortcut.guideTitle")} - {t("settings.shortcut.guideIntro")} - {t("settings.shortcut.guideDeviceName")} + {t("settings.shortcut.guideIntro")} + {t("settings.shortcut.guideDeviceName")} {t("settings.shortcut.guidePullTitle")} - 1. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePull1")} - 2. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePull2")} - 3. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePull3")} + 1. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePull1")} + 2. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePull2")} + 3. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePull3")} {t("settings.shortcut.guidePushTitle")} - 1. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePush1")} - 2. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePush2")} - 3. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePush3")} + 1. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePush1")} + 2. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePush2")} + 3. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePush3")} - {t("settings.shortcut.guideToleranceNote")} + {t("settings.shortcut.guideToleranceNote")} diff --git a/web/src/i18n/locales/en-US.ts b/web/src/i18n/locales/en-US.ts index 65a7b75..daa4af8 100644 --- a/web/src/i18n/locales/en-US.ts +++ b/web/src/i18n/locales/en-US.ts @@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ export const enUS: Partial = { "app.disconnectedHint": "Lost connection to the server — retrying automatically. No need to refresh.", + // ---- session lost (revoked remotely / expired) ---------------------- + "auth.sessionLost.title": "Signed out", + "auth.sessionLost.body": + "This device's login was revoked or expired. Please sign in again.", + // ---- header / user menu --------------------------------------------- "nav.accountMenu": "Account menu", "nav.thisDeviceLabel": "This device: ", @@ -34,6 +39,7 @@ export const enUS: Partial = { "home.deviceList.title": "Devices", "home.deviceList.onlineSuffix": "({{count}} online)", "home.deviceList.showOffline": "Show offline ({{count}})", + "home.deviceList.hideOffline": "Hide offline", "home.deviceList.empty": "No peer devices yet. Open the app in another tab with a different device name (Settings → Device name) to see it here.", "home.tabs.file": "File", @@ -95,6 +101,20 @@ export const enUS: Partial = { // ---- QR sign-in · entry -------------------------------------------- "qr.entry.fromLogin": "Sign in with a QR code", + "qr.entry.scanNewDevice": "Scan to link a device", + + // In-app scanner: scan a new device's QR code from this signed-in device to link it. + "qr.scan.title": "Scan to link a device", + "qr.scan.subtitle": "Point the code shown on the other device at the frame. Approval stays on this signed-in device.", + "qr.scan.starting": "Starting the camera…", + "qr.scan.aiming": "Line the code up inside the frame", + "qr.scan.foreign": "That isn't a sign-in code for this site. Aim at the code from “Sign in with a QR code” on the new device.", + "qr.scan.noCamera": "This device has no camera available. Use a phone or tablet with a camera to scan instead.", + "qr.scan.denied": "Camera access was blocked. Allow the camera in your browser's site settings, then reopen this page.", + "qr.scan.error": "Couldn't open the camera. Try again, or scan from a device with a camera.", + "qr.scan.howto1": "On the new device, open “Sign in with a QR code” to show a code.", + "qr.scan.howto2": "Line that code up in the frame above — approval starts automatically.", + "qr.scan.back": "Back", // ---- QR sign-in · show page (new device) --------------------------- "qr.show.title": "Sign in with a QR code", @@ -109,6 +129,8 @@ export const enUS: Partial = { "qr.show.expired": "This code has expired. Generate a new one and scan again.", "qr.show.denied": "This request was declined. If that was you, generate a new code and try again.", "qr.show.regenerate": "Generate a new code", + "qr.show.back": "Back to home", + "qr.show.backToName": "Back", // ---- QR sign-in · approve page (phone) ----------------------------- "qr.approve.title": "Approve a new device", @@ -117,11 +139,12 @@ export const enUS: Partial = { "qr.approve.badLink": "This approval link is incomplete. Generate a new code on the device and scan it again.", "qr.approve.signInFirst": "Sign in to your account first, then approve this device.", "qr.approve.trustLabel": "Trust duration", - "qr.approve.trust.title": "Trust this device", + "qr.approve.trust.title": "Trust this device (7 days)", "qr.approve.trust.hint": "Skip approval for 7 days, renewed on each use.", - "qr.approve.once.title": "Just this once", + "qr.approve.once.title": "Just this once (1 hour)", "qr.approve.once.hint": "Signed in for 1 hour, then scan again.", - "qr.approve.scopeGuest": "This device signs in as a limited guest: it can send and receive files and messages, but can't change your account or approve other devices.", + "qr.approve.scopeFull": "This device signs fully into your account for 7 days: it can send and receive files and messages, and manage your account and devices.", + "qr.approve.scopeGuest": "Signs in as a limited guest — it can send and receive files and messages, but can't change your account or approve other devices; expires after 1 hour.", "qr.approve.approve": "Approve sign-in", "qr.approve.stepUp.notice": "For security, verify your identity before approving — the button below takes you through a fresh sign-in.", "qr.approve.stepUp.button": "Verify and approve", @@ -151,16 +174,38 @@ export const enUS: Partial = { "Removes this device's registration and signs you out.", "settings.unregister.currentConfirm": "Unregistering this device will remove its registration and sign you out. Continue?", - "settings.unregister.peerConfirm": "Remove device \"{{name}}\"?", - "settings.peers.title": "Other devices", - "settings.peers.empty": "No other devices.", - "settings.peers.remove": "Remove", - "settings.peers.removing": "Removing…", "settings.error.delete": "Action failed: {{message}}", + + // ---- Limited-guest badge -------------------------------------------- + "settings.guest.badge": "Limited guest", + "settings.guest.title": "This device is a limited guest", + "settings.guest.body": "This device is signed in as a limited guest: it can send and receive files, messages, and clipboard, but cannot manage the account, remove devices, or authorize new ones. To get full access, sign in again on your main device.", + + // ---- Login sessions / device management ----------------------------- + "settings.sessions.title": "Login sessions", + "settings.sessions.hint": "Every device currently signed in to this account — browser, desktop, and mobile clients; online ones are listed first. Signing a device out ends its session immediately; it must sign in again on that device to continue.", + "settings.sessions.guestNote": "Limited guests can't manage login sessions. To manage them, sign in fully on your main device.", + "settings.sessions.empty": "No other login sessions.", + "settings.sessions.loadError": "Failed to load login sessions.", + "settings.sessions.retry": "Retry", + "settings.sessions.current": "This device", + "settings.sessions.scopeFull": "Full", + "settings.sessions.scopeGuest": "Limited guest", + "settings.sessions.kind.oidc": "Account login", + "settings.sessions.kind.self": "Local account", + "settings.sessions.kind.guest": "Scanned guest", + "settings.sessions.lastUsed": "Last active {{time}}", + "settings.sessions.neverUsed": "Not active yet", + "settings.sessions.signOut": "Sign out", + "settings.sessions.signingOut": "Signing out…", + "settings.sessions.signOutCurrent": "Sign out this device", + "settings.sessions.confirmOther": "Sign out device \"{{name}}\"? Its session will be invalidated immediately and it must sign in again.", + "settings.sessions.confirmCurrent": "Signing out this device is the same as logging out. Continue?", + "settings.sessions.revoked": "Signed that device out", + "settings.sessions.stepUpRejected": "Identity verification failed or expired. Please try again.", "settings.online": "Online", "settings.offline": "Offline", "settings.lastSeen": "Last seen {{time}}", - "settings.lastSeenNever": "Never connected", "settings.push.title": "Push notifications", "settings.push.hint": "When this page is closed, new files, messages, and transfer results arrive as system notifications; while it's open, you'll see in-app alerts instead.", "settings.push.enable": "Enable push", diff --git a/web/src/i18n/locales/zh-CN.ts b/web/src/i18n/locales/zh-CN.ts index 51bfd07..4e2f309 100644 --- a/web/src/i18n/locales/zh-CN.ts +++ b/web/src/i18n/locales/zh-CN.ts @@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ export const zhCN = { "app.disconnectedTitle": "正在重连", "app.disconnectedHint": "与服务器的连接已断开，正在自动重连，无需刷新页面。", + // ---- 会话失效（被远程吊销 / 过期）------------------------------------ + "auth.sessionLost.title": "登录已失效", + "auth.sessionLost.body": "此设备的登录凭据已被注销或过期，请重新登录。", + // ---- 顶部栏 / 用户菜单 ------------------------------------------------ "nav.accountMenu": "账号菜单", "nav.thisDeviceLabel": "本机：", @@ -32,6 +36,7 @@ export const zhCN = { "home.deviceList.title": "设备", "home.deviceList.onlineSuffix": "（{{count}} 台在线）", "home.deviceList.showOffline": "显示离线设备（{{count}}）", + "home.deviceList.hideOffline": "隐藏离线设备", "home.deviceList.empty": "暂无其他设备。在另一标签页或设备上以相同账户登录，并设置一个不同的设备名（设置 → 设备名称），即可在此处看到它。", "home.tabs.file": "文件", @@ -93,6 +98,20 @@ export const zhCN = { // ---- 扫码登录 · 入口 ------------------------------------------------- "qr.entry.fromLogin": "扫码登录此设备", + "qr.entry.scanNewDevice": "扫码登录新设备", + + // 应用内扫码器：在已登录设备上扫新设备的二维码，把它接入账号。 + "qr.scan.title": "扫码登录新设备", + "qr.scan.subtitle": "把另一台设备显示的二维码对准取景框。批准全程留在这台已登录设备上。", + "qr.scan.starting": "正在启动相机…", + "qr.scan.aiming": "把二维码对准取景框", + "qr.scan.foreign": "这不是本站的登录二维码。请对准新设备上“扫码登录此设备”生成的码。", + "qr.scan.noCamera": "这台设备没有可用的摄像头。请改用带相机的手机或平板扫码。", + "qr.scan.denied": "相机权限被拒绝。请在浏览器站点设置里允许使用相机，再重新打开此页。", + "qr.scan.error": "无法打开相机。请重试，或改用带相机的设备扫码。", + "qr.scan.howto1": "在新设备上打开“扫码登录此设备”，生成一张二维码。", + "qr.scan.howto2": "把那张二维码对准上方取景框，识别后会自动进入批准。", + "qr.scan.back": "返回", // ---- 扫码登录 · 显码页（新设备）------------------------------------- "qr.show.title": "扫码登录此设备", @@ -107,20 +126,23 @@ export const zhCN = { "qr.show.expired": "二维码已过期。重新生成一张再扫。", "qr.show.denied": "这次接入被拒绝。如确为你本人操作，重新生成二维码再试。", "qr.show.regenerate": "重新生成二维码", + "qr.show.back": "返回主页", + "qr.show.backToName": "返回上一步", // ---- 扫码登录 · 批准页（手机）------------------------------------- "qr.approve.title": "批准新设备", - "qr.approve.subtitle": "确认让这台设备登入你的账号。请核对设备与来源无误。", + "qr.approve.subtitle": "确认让这台设备登录你的账号。请核对设备与来源无误。", "qr.approve.loading": "正在读取设备信息…", "qr.approve.badLink": "这个批准链接不完整。请在新设备上重新生成二维码再扫。", "qr.approve.signInFirst": "先登录你的账号，再批准这台设备接入。", "qr.approve.trustLabel": "信任时长", - "qr.approve.trust.title": "信任此设备", + "qr.approve.trust.title": "信任此设备（7 天）", "qr.approve.trust.hint": "7 天内免再次批准，每次使用自动续期。", - "qr.approve.once.title": "仅此一次", + "qr.approve.once.title": "仅此一次（1 小时）", "qr.approve.once.hint": "登录有效 1 小时，到期需重新扫码。", - "qr.approve.scopeGuest": "这台设备将以受限访客身份登入：可收发文件与消息，但不能更改账号、不能批准其他设备。", - "qr.approve.approve": "批准登入", + "qr.approve.scopeFull": "这台设备将完整登录你的账号、7 天内有效：可正常收发文件与消息，并能管理账号与设备。", + "qr.approve.scopeGuest": "以受限访客身份登录——可收发文件与消息，但不能更改账号、不能批准其他设备；1 小时后失效。", + "qr.approve.approve": "批准登录", "qr.approve.stepUp.notice": "为安全起见，批准前需先验证你的身份——点下方按钮会引导你重新登录一次。", "qr.approve.stepUp.button": "验证并批准", "qr.approve.stepUp.rejected": "身份验证未通过或已过期。请再验证一次，确认是你本人后即可批准。", @@ -128,7 +150,7 @@ export const zhCN = { "qr.approve.doneApprovedTitle": "已批准", "qr.approve.doneApproved": "这台设备已接入你的账号，现在即可在它上面收发文件。", "qr.approve.doneDeniedTitle": "已拒绝", - "qr.approve.doneDenied": "这次接入已被拒绝，那台设备不会登入你的账号。", + "qr.approve.doneDenied": "这次接入已被拒绝，那台设备不会登录你的账号。", "qr.approve.expiredTitle": "二维码已过期", "qr.approve.expired": "这张二维码已失效。请在新设备上重新生成再扫。", "qr.approve.errorTitle": "出错了", @@ -148,16 +170,38 @@ export const zhCN = { "settings.unregister.currentHint": "将退出登录并移除此设备的注册。", "settings.unregister.currentConfirm": "注销当前设备会移除此设备的注册并退出登录，确认继续？", - "settings.unregister.peerConfirm": "确认要移除设备“{{name}}”？", - "settings.peers.title": "其他设备", - "settings.peers.empty": "暂无其他设备。", - "settings.peers.remove": "移除", - "settings.peers.removing": "正在移除…", "settings.error.delete": "操作失败：{{message}}", + + // ---- 受限访客标识 ---------------------------------------------------- + "settings.guest.badge": "受限访客", + "settings.guest.title": "这台设备是受限访客", + "settings.guest.body": "本设备以受限访客身份登录：可正常收发文件、消息与剪贴板，但不能管理账号、移除设备或授权新设备。需要完整权限，请在你的主设备上重新登录。", + + // ---- 登录会话 / 设备管理 --------------------------------------------- + "settings.sessions.title": "登录会话", + "settings.sessions.hint": "这里列出当前登录此账号的所有设备，含浏览器、桌面与移动客户端；在线的排在上方。登出某台设备会立即结束它的登录，需在该设备上重新登录才能继续使用。", + "settings.sessions.guestNote": "受限访客无法管理登录会话；如需管理，请在你的主设备上完整登录。", + "settings.sessions.empty": "暂无其他登录会话。", + "settings.sessions.loadError": "登录会话加载失败。", + "settings.sessions.retry": "重试", + "settings.sessions.current": "本机", + "settings.sessions.scopeFull": "完整", + "settings.sessions.scopeGuest": "受限访客", + "settings.sessions.kind.oidc": "账号登录", + "settings.sessions.kind.self": "本地账号", + "settings.sessions.kind.guest": "扫码访客", + "settings.sessions.lastUsed": "最近活跃 {{time}}", + "settings.sessions.neverUsed": "尚未活跃", + "settings.sessions.signOut": "登出", + "settings.sessions.signingOut": "正在登出…", + "settings.sessions.signOutCurrent": "登出本机", + "settings.sessions.confirmOther": "确认登出设备“{{name}}”？该会话将立即失效，需重新登录。", + "settings.sessions.confirmCurrent": "登出本机会等同于退出登录，确认继续？", + "settings.sessions.revoked": "已登出该设备", + "settings.sessions.stepUpRejected": "身份验证未通过或已过期，请再试一次。", "settings.online": "在线", "settings.offline": "离线", "settings.lastSeen": "上次活跃 {{time}}", - "settings.lastSeenNever": "尚未上线", "settings.push.title": "推送通知", "settings.push.hint": "页面关闭时，新文件、消息和传输结果会以系统通知提醒；页面打开时仍走应用内提示。", "settings.push.enable": "启用推送", diff --git a/web/src/i18n/locales/zh-TW.ts b/web/src/i18n/locales/zh-TW.ts index 9c2dc41..f53f6c4 100644 --- a/web/src/i18n/locales/zh-TW.ts +++ b/web/src/i18n/locales/zh-TW.ts @@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ export const zhTW: Partial = { "app.disconnectedTitle": "正在重新連線", "app.disconnectedHint": "與伺服器的連線已中斷，正在自動重新連線，無需重新整理頁面。", + // ---- 工作階段失效（被遠端撤銷 / 逾期）------------------------------- + "auth.sessionLost.title": "登入已失效", + "auth.sessionLost.body": "此裝置的登入憑證已被撤銷或逾期，請重新登入。", + // ---- 頂部列 / 使用者選單 --------------------------------------------- "nav.accountMenu": "帳號選單", "nav.thisDeviceLabel": "本機：", @@ -36,6 +40,7 @@ export const zhTW: Partial = { "home.deviceList.title": "裝置", "home.deviceList.onlineSuffix": "（{{count}} 部線上）", "home.deviceList.showOffline": "顯示離線裝置（{{count}}）", + "home.deviceList.hideOffline": "隱藏離線裝置", "home.deviceList.empty": "尚無其他裝置。在另一個分頁或裝置上以同一帳號登入，並設定一個不同的裝置名稱（設定 → 裝置名稱），即可在此處看到它。", "home.tabs.file": "檔案", @@ -97,6 +102,20 @@ export const zhTW: Partial = { // ---- 掃碼登入 · 入口 ------------------------------------------------- "qr.entry.fromLogin": "掃碼登入此裝置", + "qr.entry.scanNewDevice": "掃碼登入新裝置", + + // 應用內掃碼器：在已登入裝置上掃新裝置的 QR 碼，把它接入帳號。 + "qr.scan.title": "掃碼登入新裝置", + "qr.scan.subtitle": "把另一部裝置顯示的 QR 碼對準取景框。批准全程留在這部已登入裝置上。", + "qr.scan.starting": "正在啟動相機…", + "qr.scan.aiming": "把 QR 碼對準取景框", + "qr.scan.foreign": "這不是本站的登入 QR 碼。請對準新裝置上「掃碼登入此裝置」產生的碼。", + "qr.scan.noCamera": "這部裝置沒有可用的相機。請改用有相機的手機或平板掃碼。", + "qr.scan.denied": "相機權限被拒絕。請在瀏覽器網站設定裡允許使用相機，再重新開啟此頁。", + "qr.scan.error": "無法開啟相機。請重試，或改用有相機的裝置掃碼。", + "qr.scan.howto1": "在新裝置上開啟「掃碼登入此裝置」，產生一張 QR 碼。", + "qr.scan.howto2": "把那張 QR 碼對準上方取景框，辨識後會自動進入批准。", + "qr.scan.back": "返回", // ---- 掃碼登入 · 顯碼頁（新裝置）------------------------------------- "qr.show.title": "掃碼登入此裝置", @@ -111,6 +130,8 @@ export const zhTW: Partial = { "qr.show.expired": "QR 碼已逾時。重新產生一張再掃。", "qr.show.denied": "這次接入被拒絕。如確為你本人操作，重新產生 QR 碼再試。", "qr.show.regenerate": "重新產生 QR 碼", + "qr.show.back": "返回首頁", + "qr.show.backToName": "返回上一步", // ---- 掃碼登入 · 批准頁（手機）------------------------------------- "qr.approve.title": "批准新裝置", @@ -119,11 +140,12 @@ export const zhTW: Partial = { "qr.approve.badLink": "這個批准連結不完整。請在新裝置上重新產生 QR 碼再掃。", "qr.approve.signInFirst": "先登入你的帳號，再批准這部裝置接入。", "qr.approve.trustLabel": "信任時長", - "qr.approve.trust.title": "信任此裝置", + "qr.approve.trust.title": "信任此裝置（7 天）", "qr.approve.trust.hint": "7 天內免再次批准，每次使用自動續期。", - "qr.approve.once.title": "僅此一次", + "qr.approve.once.title": "僅此一次（1 小時）", "qr.approve.once.hint": "登入有效 1 小時，逾時需重新掃碼。", - "qr.approve.scopeGuest": "這部裝置將以受限訪客身分登入：可收發檔案與訊息，但不能變更帳號、不能批准其他裝置。", + "qr.approve.scopeFull": "這部裝置將完整登入你的帳號、7 天內有效：可正常收發檔案與訊息，並能管理帳號與裝置。", + "qr.approve.scopeGuest": "以受限訪客身分登入——可收發檔案與訊息，但不能變更帳號、不能批准其他裝置；1 小時後失效。", "qr.approve.approve": "批准登入", "qr.approve.stepUp.notice": "為安全起見，批准前需先驗證你的身分——點下方按鈕會引導你重新登入一次。", "qr.approve.stepUp.button": "驗證並批准", @@ -152,16 +174,38 @@ export const zhTW: Partial = { "settings.unregister.currentHint": "將登出並移除本裝置的註冊。", "settings.unregister.currentConfirm": "解除註冊本裝置會移除其註冊並登出，確認繼續？", - "settings.unregister.peerConfirm": "確認要移除裝置「{{name}}」？", - "settings.peers.title": "其他裝置", - "settings.peers.empty": "尚無其他裝置。", - "settings.peers.remove": "移除", - "settings.peers.removing": "正在移除…", "settings.error.delete": "操作失敗：{{message}}", + + // ---- 受限訪客標識 ---------------------------------------------------- + "settings.guest.badge": "受限訪客", + "settings.guest.title": "這部裝置是受限訪客", + "settings.guest.body": "本裝置以受限訪客身分登入：可正常收發檔案、訊息與剪貼簿，但不能管理帳號、移除裝置或授權新裝置。需要完整權限，請在你的主裝置上重新登入。", + + // ---- 登入工作階段 / 裝置管理 ------------------------------------------ + "settings.sessions.title": "登入工作階段", + "settings.sessions.hint": "這裡列出目前登入此帳號的所有裝置，含瀏覽器、桌面與行動用戶端；線上的排在上方。登出某台裝置會立即結束它的登入，需在該裝置上重新登入才能繼續使用。", + "settings.sessions.guestNote": "受限訪客無法管理登入工作階段；如需管理，請在你的主裝置上完整登入。", + "settings.sessions.empty": "尚無其他登入工作階段。", + "settings.sessions.loadError": "登入工作階段載入失敗。", + "settings.sessions.retry": "重試", + "settings.sessions.current": "本機", + "settings.sessions.scopeFull": "完整", + "settings.sessions.scopeGuest": "受限訪客", + "settings.sessions.kind.oidc": "帳號登入", + "settings.sessions.kind.self": "本機帳號", + "settings.sessions.kind.guest": "掃碼訪客", + "settings.sessions.lastUsed": "最近活躍 {{time}}", + "settings.sessions.neverUsed": "尚未活躍", + "settings.sessions.signOut": "登出", + "settings.sessions.signingOut": "正在登出…", + "settings.sessions.signOutCurrent": "登出本機", + "settings.sessions.confirmOther": "確認登出裝置「{{name}}」？該工作階段將立即失效，需重新登入。", + "settings.sessions.confirmCurrent": "登出本機等同於登出帳號，確認繼續？", + "settings.sessions.revoked": "已登出該裝置", + "settings.sessions.stepUpRejected": "身分驗證未通過或已過期，請再試一次。", "settings.online": "線上", "settings.offline": "離線", "settings.lastSeen": "上次活躍 {{time}}", - "settings.lastSeenNever": "尚未上線", "settings.push.title": "推播通知", "settings.push.hint": "頁面關閉時，新檔案、訊息與傳輸結果會以系統通知提醒；頁面開啟時仍走應用內提示。", "settings.push.enable": "啟用推播", diff --git a/web/src/net/api.ts b/web/src/net/api.ts index 574e02a..53e6f3a 100644 --- a/web/src/net/api.ts +++ b/web/src/net/api.ts @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ import { useAppStore } from "../store"; -import { refreshTokens } from "../features/auth/auth"; +import { refreshTokens, forceLogout } from "../features/auth/auth"; import { readInjectedApiBase, readInjectedDeviceType } from "../store/helpers"; import { toAsciiDeviceName } from "../utils/format"; import { t } from "../i18n"; @@ -26,19 +26,35 @@ function withBase(input: RequestInfo): RequestInfo // - always sets X-Device-Name from the store // - in prod, on a 401 response transparently refreshes the access token via // /api/auth/refresh and retries once +// - in prod, ONLY if the server authoritatively confirms the session is gone +// (refresh → HTTP 401), forces a local logout so the app returns to login // // Returns the fetch Response untouched so callers can drive streaming bodies // (SSE, relay GET stream) themselves. +// +// State is cleared ONLY on server-confirmed credential invalidation. Short-term +// failures never clear it: a transient refresh response (5xx / same-origin 403) +// yields "transient", and a network error during refresh THROWS out of here — +// both keep the session, leaving the original 401 for the caller as a retryable +// error. So a flaky network or a server blip can't log the user out; only a +// genuine revoke/expire (refresh → 401) does. export async function apiFetch(input: RequestInfo, init?: RequestInit): Promise { let r = await doFetch(input, init); if (r.status === 401 && useAppStore.getState().authMode === "prod") { - const ok = await refreshTokens(); - if (ok) + const outcome = await refreshTokens(); + if (outcome === "refreshed") { r = await doFetch(input, init); } + else if (outcome === "invalid") + { + // 服务端确证会话已失效（/auth/refresh 返回 401，已被吊销 / 过期）→ + // 清空本地登录态，由 __root 守卫把界面送回登录页。返回这次 401 让调用 + // 方照常收尾。"transient"（5xx / 网络抖动）不进此分支：保留登录态。 + forceLogout(); + } } return r; } diff --git a/web/src/net/qr.ts b/web/src/net/qr.ts index 909e99a..0c972be 100644 --- a/web/src/net/qr.ts +++ b/web/src/net/qr.ts @@ -217,8 +217,9 @@ export class StepUpRequiredError extends Error } } -// qrApprove 批准该设备登入本账号。scope 本期固定 guest（受限访客）；persist 决定 -// 信任时长（persist=7 天滑动 / once=1 小时）。成功 204。 +// qrApprove 批准该设备登入本账号。scope 决定授予的会话级别：full=完整登录、 +// guest=受限访客；与 persist 时长一一对应（full+persist=7 天滑动、guest+once=1 小时）。 +// 成功 204。 // // step_up 开启时须带上一次新鲜 prompt=login 再认证拿到的 stepUpCode + stepUpVerifier， // 后端就地向 IdP 换 id_token、验签 + 校 auth_time 新鲜 + sub 匹配；缺失 / 过期 → @@ -278,3 +279,34 @@ function sleep(ms: number): Promise { return new Promise((resolve) => { window.setTimeout(resolve, ms); }); } + +// ---- 应用内扫码：批准链接解析 -------------------------------------------------- + +export interface LinkParams +{ + requestId: string; + code: string; +} + +// parseLinkApprovalUrl 把扫到的二维码内容解析成批准页参数，严格校验后才放行—— +// 这是应用内扫码器的安全闸门，决定扫到的码能否在已登录会话内被导航。 +// 只接受「本站 origin + /link 路径 + 同时带 r 与 c」的 URL： +// - 同源（origin 严格等于当前页 origin）——挡开放重定向 / 钓鱼站二维码； +// - 路径恰为 /link——挡指向本站其他页的码； +// - r/c 皆非空——挡残缺码。 +// 任一不满足返回 null（调用方据此提示「继续对准」，不导航）。 +export function parseLinkApprovalUrl(raw: string): LinkParams | null +{ + let url: URL; + try { url = new URL(raw); } + catch { return null; } + + if (url.origin !== window.location.origin) { return null; } + if (url.pathname !== "/link") { return null; } + + const requestId = url.searchParams.get("r"); + const code = url.searchParams.get("c"); + if (!requestId || !code) { return null; } + + return { requestId, code }; +} diff --git a/web/src/net/sessions.ts b/web/src/net/sessions.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..91946c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/web/src/net/sessions.ts @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +import { apiFetch, apiJSON } from "./api"; + +// 登录会话 / 设备的网络封装。全部走 apiFetch（带 Bearer + 401 自动续期）； +// refresh_token 永不进 JS——吊销由后端令短 TTL 的 access_token 随之失效完成。 + +// ---- /api/me：本会话权限级别 ------------------------------------------------ + +export type SessionScopeValue = "full" | "guest"; + +interface MeRaw +{ + // /api/me 现回传本会话的 scope（full=完整登录、guest=受限访客）。旧后端 / 异常 + // 缺字段时按 "full" 解析（只多展示入口，后端仍 403 兜底）。 + scope?: string; +} + +// fetchMeScope 拉取 /api/me 并解析本会话权限级别。失败 / 缺字段回退 "full"。 +export async function fetchMeScope(): Promise +{ + try + { + const data = await apiJSON("/api/me"); + return data.scope === "guest" ? "guest" : "full"; + } + catch + { + return "full"; + } +} + +// ---- 登录会话列表 / 吊销 / step-up ------------------------------------------ + +// 会话「种类」：oidc / self / guest 为网页 / 扫码会话；macos / windows / linux / ios +// 为原生客户端（桌面 / 移动）——它们用 IdP 令牌、不入 web_sessions，由设备登记表呈现。 +export type SessionKind = + | "oidc" | "self" | "guest" + | "macos" | "windows" | "linux" | "ios"; + +const KNOWN_KINDS: readonly SessionKind[] = [ + "oidc", "self", "guest", "macos", "windows", "linux", "ios", +]; + +export interface AuthSession +{ + id: string; + deviceName: string; + kind: SessionKind; + scope: SessionScopeValue; + // current=true：这条就是本机当前会话（登出它等价于退出登录）。 + current: boolean; + // online=true：该设备当前在线（有活跃 SSE 连接）。用于列表排序与在线指示。 + online: boolean; + // native=true：原生客户端（无 web_session），登出走设备登记端点而非会话端点。 + native: boolean; + createdAt: number; + lastUsedAt: number; + expiresAt: number; +} + +interface AuthSessionRaw +{ + id: string; + device_name?: string; + kind?: string; + scope?: string; + current?: boolean; + online?: boolean; + native?: boolean; + created_at?: number; + last_used_at?: number; + expires_at?: number; +} + +interface SessionsResp +{ + sessions: AuthSessionRaw[]; +} + +function normalizeKind(kind: string | undefined): SessionKind +{ + return KNOWN_KINDS.includes(kind as SessionKind) ? (kind as SessionKind) : "oidc"; +} + +// listSessions 拉取当前账号下的全部登录会话（含本机），每条带 online（当前是否在线）。 +// 受限访客无权管理登录会话、后端会 403，故调用方（SessionsPanel）在 guest 时根本不发 +// 此请求、直接展示克制说明，不会走到这里。 +export async function listSessions(): Promise +{ + const data = await apiJSON("/api/auth/sessions"); + const rows = Array.isArray(data.sessions) ? data.sessions : []; + return rows.map((r) => ( + { + id: r.id, + deviceName: r.device_name ?? "", + kind: normalizeKind(r.kind), + scope: r.scope === "guest" ? "guest" : "full", + current: r.current === true, + online: r.online === true, + native: r.native === true, + createdAt: r.created_at ?? 0, + lastUsedAt: r.last_used_at ?? 0, + expiresAt: r.expires_at ?? 0, + })); +} + +// StepUpRequiredError：DELETE /api/auth/sessions/{id} 因再认证缺失 / 过期被后端拒 +// （403 {error:"step_up_required"}）。调用方据此发起一次 step-up 再认证而非当成 +// 普通错误。 +export class StepUpRequiredError extends Error +{ + constructor() + { + super("step_up_required"); + this.name = "StepUpRequiredError"; + } +} + +// revokeSession 真正吊销一条登录会话。网页 / 扫码会话走 /auth/sessions/{id}（删会话 +// 行 + 连带删设备）；原生客户端（id 形如 "device:设备名"）无 web_session，改走 +// /devices/{name} 按设备名注销。两者均：成功 204；后端要求再认证时抛 +// StepUpRequiredError（403 step_up_required），其余非 2xx 抛普通错误。 +const NATIVE_ID_PREFIX = "device:"; + +export async function revokeSession(id: string): Promise +{ + const path = id.startsWith(NATIVE_ID_PREFIX) + ? `/api/devices/${encodeURIComponent(id.slice(NATIVE_ID_PREFIX.length))}` + : `/api/auth/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`; + const r = await apiFetch(path, { method: "DELETE" }); + if (!r.ok) + { + const text = await r.text().catch(() => r.statusText); + if (r.status === 403 && /step_up_required/.test(text)) + { + throw new StepUpRequiredError(); + } + throw new Error(`revoke session ${r.status}: ${text}`); + } +} + +// postStepUp 把一次新鲜 prompt=login 再认证拿到的 {code, verifier} 交给后端就地 +// 核验，成功后服务端在本会话记下 stepped_up_at（5 分钟窗口内复用，不再反复要求）。 +// 成功 204；step-up 未开后端亦 204（视作通过）；失败 403。 +export async function postStepUp(code: string, verifier: string): Promise +{ + const r = await apiFetch("/api/auth/stepup", { + method: "POST", + headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }, + body: JSON.stringify({ code, verifier }), + }); + if (!r.ok) + { + const text = await r.text().catch(() => r.statusText); + throw new Error(`step-up ${r.status}: ${text}`); + } +} diff --git a/web/src/routes/__root.tsx b/web/src/routes/__root.tsx index 8a41394..8ab44e5 100644 --- a/web/src/routes/__root.tsx +++ b/web/src/routes/__root.tsx @@ -11,14 +11,14 @@ import { Outlet, Link, createRootRoute, useLocation, useNavigate } from "@tansta import { Check, ChevronDown, LogOut, Monitor, Moon, Settings, Sun, Wifi, WifiOff } from "lucide-react"; import { useEffect, useState, type ReactNode } from "react"; import { useAppStore, type ThemeMode } from "../store"; -import { logout } from "../features/auth/auth"; +import { logout, refreshSessionScope } from "../features/auth/auth"; import { uploadClipboard } from "../features/clipboard/clipboard"; import { onNativeClipboard } from "../net/desktop"; import { startHub } from "../features/transfer/hub"; import { resyncPush } from "../net/push"; import { refreshICEServers, stopICEServerRefresh } from "../features/transfer/iceServers"; import { t, type Locale } from "../i18n"; -import { Callout, IconButton, Tooltip } from "../ui/primitives"; +import { Badge, Callout, IconButton, Tooltip } from "../ui/primitives"; import { Wordmark } from "../ui/brand"; export const Route = createRootRoute({ component: RootLayout }); @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ export const Route = createRootRoute({ component: RootLayout }); function RootLayout() { const user = useAppStore((s) => s.user); + const authMode = useAppStore((s) => s.authMode); + const sessionScope = useAppStore((s) => s.sessionScope); const selfDeviceName = useAppStore((s) => s.selfDeviceName); const sseConnected = useAppStore((s) => s.sseConnected); const sseReconnecting = useAppStore((s) => s.sseReconnecting); @@ -39,6 +41,19 @@ function RootLayout() // 这里只渲染 ，不包 AppShell，从而隐去顶栏。 const fullscreen = isAuthRoute(location.pathname); + // 反应式登出守卫：当登录态在运行中被清空（access token 被远程吊销 / 过期 → + // apiFetch 触发 forceLogout，见 net/api.ts），把界面送回登录页。路由的 + // beforeLoad 只在导航时跑，停在当前页时不会自动重定向，故这里补一道反应式跳转。 + // 仅 prod：dev 无远程吊销概念，登录态由 loginDev 同步建立。已在认证类路由上则 + // 不跳（避免与 /login 自身、扫码显码 / 批准页打架）。 + useEffect(() => + { + if (authMode !== "prod") { return; } + if (user) { return; } + if (isAuthRoute(location.pathname)) { return; } + navigate({ to: "/login", search: { dev_user: undefined } }); + }, [ authMode, user, location.pathname, navigate ]); + // SSE 在登录后立即开启；user.id 或 selfDeviceName 任一变化即重连 // （改名后会自动以新设备名重新注册）。 useEffect(() => @@ -46,6 +61,9 @@ function RootLayout() if (!user || !selfDeviceName) { return; } const ctrl = new AbortController(); startHub(ctrl.signal); + // 校正本会话权限级别（/api/me 的 scope）：受限访客据此隐藏账号管理入口。 + // 覆盖所有登录路径（OAuth / 扫码新设备 / 开机水合 / dev），一处搞定。 + void refreshSessionScope(); // 预取 Cloudflare TURN 凭据（或 STUN 回退），首次 WebRTC 同步可用。 void refreshICEServers(); // 已开启推送的浏览器：登录后把订阅重新登记到当前用户名下（自愈换用户 / @@ -125,7 +143,12 @@ function RootLayout() - {user.name} + + {user.name} + {sessionScope === "guest" && ( + {t("settings.guest.badge")} + )} + {t("nav.thisDeviceLabel")} {selfDeviceName} @@ -316,6 +339,7 @@ function isAuthRoute(pathname: string): boolean || pathname === "/setup" || pathname === "/link" || pathname === "/link/new" + || pathname === "/link/scan" || pathname.startsWith("/oauth/"); } diff --git a/web/src/routes/index.tsx b/web/src/routes/index.tsx index 6c4acd4..05e5375 100644 --- a/web/src/routes/index.tsx +++ b/web/src/routes/index.tsx @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ import { useEffect, useMemo } from "react"; import { Container } from "@mantine/core"; -import { createFileRoute, redirect } from "@tanstack/react-router"; +import { createFileRoute, redirect, useNavigate } from "@tanstack/react-router"; import { useAppStore } from "../store"; import { consumeLinkReturn } from "../features/qr/returnTo"; import { DeviceStrip } from "../features/devices/DeviceStrip"; @@ -33,7 +33,9 @@ void CLIPBOARD_MAX_BYTES; function HomePage() { + const navigate = useNavigate(); const user = useAppStore((s) => s.user); + const sessionScope = useAppStore((s) => s.sessionScope); const devices = useAppStore((s) => s.devices); const selfDeviceName = useAppStore((s) => s.selfDeviceName); const activeTransfers = useAppStore((s) => s.activeTransfers); @@ -96,6 +98,13 @@ function HomePage() selectedDevice={selectedDevice} onSelect={setSelectedDevice} onDropFile={handleDropFile} + // 受限访客不能授权新设备：不传 onLinkDevice，DeviceStrip 据此 + // 隐藏「扫码登录新设备」入口（条件渲染已在组件内）。 + onLinkDevice={ + sessionScope === "guest" + ? undefined + : () => navigate({ to: "/link/scan" }) + } />
diff --git a/web/src/routes/link.module.css b/web/src/routes/link.module.css index 7be5267..edb2364 100644 --- a/web/src/routes/link.module.css +++ b/web/src/routes/link.module.css @@ -77,27 +77,34 @@ width: 100%; text-align: left; padding: var(--space-3) var(--space-4); - background: var(--surface); + /* 未选中态明显更轻：sunken 底 + 细分隔线左条，与选中态拉开对比。 */ + background: var(--surface-sunken); border: 1px solid var(--divider); border-left: 3px solid var(--divider); border-radius: var(--radius-control); cursor: pointer; - color: var(--text); + color: var(--text-muted); transition: border-color var(--dur-fast) var(--ease-out), - background-color var(--dur-fast) var(--ease-out); + background-color var(--dur-fast) var(--ease-out), + box-shadow var(--dur-fast) var(--ease-out); } .choice:hover { border-color: var(--divider-strong); } -/* 选中态：accent 左色条 + soft 底（同 Callout / Activity 的状态编码语汇）。 */ +/* 选中态：实心 accent 边框 + 加粗左色条 + accent 描边环 + soft 底（同 + DeviceStrip.portSelected 的强选中语汇），与未选中态形成明显对比。 */ .choiceOn { - background: var(--accent-softer); - border-color: var(--accent-ring); - border-left-color: var(--accent); + background: var(--accent-soft); + border-color: var(--accent); + border-left: 4px solid var(--accent); + color: var(--text); + box-shadow: 0 0 0 1px var(--accent); } +.choiceOn:hover { border-color: var(--accent); } + .choice:focus-visible { outline: 2px solid var(--accent-ring); @@ -130,6 +137,9 @@ font-weight: 600; } +/* 选中项标题着 accent 色，进一步强化「当前选的是这个」。 */ +.choiceOn .choiceTitle { color: var(--accent); } + .choiceHint { font-size: var(--fs-12); @@ -137,6 +147,9 @@ color: var(--text-muted); } +/* 选中项说明文字恢复常规对比（未选中时整块被压暗）。 */ +.choiceOn .choiceHint { color: var(--text-muted); } + /* 批准 / 拒绝：批准是主色行动，拒绝是安静的 ghost。 */ .actions { diff --git a/web/src/routes/link.tsx b/web/src/routes/link.tsx index 19b9abe..3c8bd78 100644 --- a/web/src/routes/link.tsx +++ b/web/src/routes/link.tsx @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ export const Route = createFileRoute("/link")({ ({ r: typeof search.r === "string" ? search.r : undefined, c: typeof search.c === "string" ? search.c : undefined, + // p：信任时长选择（persist/once）。step-up 整页跳转回来后据此恢复，避免选择丢失。 + p: typeof search.p === "string" ? search.p : undefined, }), }); @@ -31,12 +33,14 @@ type Outcome = "approved" | "denied" | "expired" | "error" | null; function LinkApprovePage() { const navigate = useNavigate(); - const { r: requestId, c: code } = Route.useSearch(); + const { r: requestId, c: code, p: persistParam } = Route.useSearch(); const user = useAppStore((s) => s.user); const [ info, setInfo ] = useState(null); const [ loadError, setLoadError ] = useState(null); - const [ persist, setPersist ] = useState("persist"); + // 初值优先取 URL 的 p（step-up 跳转回来后恢复选择），否则默认更安全的「仅此次」 + // （受限访客）——避免一路默认到完整会话（full）。 + const [ persist, setPersist ] = useState(persistParam === "persist" ? "persist" : "once"); const [ submitting, setSubmitting ] = useState(false); const [ outcome, setOutcome ] = useState(null); const [ actionError, setActionError ] = useState(null); @@ -92,7 +96,10 @@ function LinkApprovePage() setStepUpRejected(false); try { - await qrApprove(requestId, code, "guest", persist, stash?.code, stash?.verifier); + // persist=「信任此设备」→ 完整会话（scope=full）；once=「仅此次」→ 受限访客 + // （scope=guest）。后端按 scope 决定授予的会话级别，二者与 persist 时长一一对应。 + const scope = persist === "persist" ? "full" : "guest"; + await qrApprove(requestId, code, scope, persist, stash?.code, stash?.verifier); setOutcome("approved"); } catch (e) @@ -124,7 +131,15 @@ function LinkApprovePage() setSubmitting(true); setActionError(null); setStepUpRejected(false); - try { await startStepUpReauth(window.location.pathname + window.location.search); } + try + { + // 把当前「信任时长」选择编进 returnTo：step-up 整页跳转回来后页面重载、 + // React state 复位，必须从 URL 恢复 persist，否则会回落默认、令本应受限 + // 的设备被建成完整会话（#2 根因）。 + const back = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search); + back.set("p", persist); + await startStepUpReauth(window.location.pathname + "?" + back.toString()); + } catch (e) { setActionError(e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)); @@ -155,10 +170,13 @@ function LinkApprovePage() if (!requestId || !code) { return ( - + }> {t("qr.approve.badLink")} + ); } @@ -170,6 +188,7 @@ function LinkApprovePage() title={t("qr.approve.title")} subtitle={t("qr.approve.signInFirst")} hideBrand + skipAutospace > ); } @@ -198,12 +220,12 @@ function LinkApprovePage() if (!info) { return ( - + ); } return ( - + {/* 待批准设备：单行身份块——图标 + 名字 + 来源 IP（monospace 元数据）。 */}
@@ -237,9 +259,12 @@ function LinkApprovePage() />
- {/* 权限范围说明：本期固定受限访客，明确告知边界（非装饰）。 */} + {/* 权限范围说明：随选中项切换——信任=完整登录、仅此次=受限访客，明确告知 + 这台设备将以什么身份登录（非装饰）。 */} }> - {t("qr.approve.scopeGuest")} + {persist === "persist" + ? t("qr.approve.scopeFull") + : t("qr.approve.scopeGuest")} {/* step-up：批准前的明确安全步骤——需先验证身份（provider 2FA 即此处过）。 */} @@ -332,7 +357,7 @@ function OutcomeView(props: { outcome: Exclude; onHome: () => voi title: t("qr.approve.errorTitle"), body: t("qr.approve.error") }, }[outcome]; return ( - + {map.body} + ); } return ( - + {error && ( }>{error} )} @@ -189,6 +209,19 @@ function LinkNewPage() {t("qr.show.regenerate")} )} + + {/* 始终给一个明确退出口：回到命名步骤，避免卡在显码 / 终态页。 */} + {phase !== "approved" && ( + + )} ); } diff --git a/web/src/routes/link_.scan.module.css b/web/src/routes/link_.scan.module.css new file mode 100644 index 0000000..36de9bc --- /dev/null +++ b/web/src/routes/link_.scan.module.css @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +/* 应用内扫码器：取景框是这一屏的签名时刻——与显码页的 QrCanvas 互为镜像。 + 显码页把一枚码托在四角定位记号里给人看，扫码页则在同一组记号里「找」一枚码。 + 同一套 accent L 形角标，同一套 recessed plate 语汇，零新全局样式。 */ + +.stage +{ + display: flex; + flex-direction: column; + align-items: center; + gap: var(--space-4); + padding: var(--space-2) 0 var(--space-1); +} + +/* 取景框：方形 viewport，下沉 plate 把相机画面托成「一个对准的对象」。 */ +.viewport +{ + position: relative; + width: 248px; + height: 248px; + max-width: 100%; + overflow: hidden; + background: var(--surface-sunken); + border: 1px solid var(--divider); + border-radius: var(--radius-card); +} + +/* 视频铺满取景框，居中裁切。镜像关闭——后置 / 外接相机扫码不应翻转。 */ +.video +{ + display: block; + width: 100%; + height: 100%; + object-fit: cover; +} + +/* 四角定位记号：与 QrCanvas 同款 accent L 形角标，内缩到取景框内沿。 */ +.tick +{ + position: absolute; + width: 22px; + height: 22px; + border: 2px solid var(--accent); + pointer-events: none; +} + +.tl { top: var(--space-3); left: var(--space-3); + border-right: none; border-bottom: none; border-top-left-radius: 4px; } +.tr { top: var(--space-3); right: var(--space-3); + border-left: none; border-bottom: none; border-top-right-radius: 4px; } +.bl { bottom: var(--space-3); left: var(--space-3); + border-right: none; border-top: none; border-bottom-left-radius: 4px; } +.br { bottom: var(--space-3); right: var(--space-3); + border-left: none; border-top: none; border-bottom-right-radius: 4px; } + +/* 扫描线：唯一的动效「时刻」，accent 横线在取景框内上下扫动，传达「正在找」。 + reduced-motion 下归零（见底部 media query）。 */ +.beam +{ + position: absolute; + left: var(--space-3); + right: var(--space-3); + top: var(--space-3); + height: 2px; + background: var(--accent); + box-shadow: 0 0 8px 0 var(--accent-ring); + opacity: 0.85; + animation: scan-beam 2.4s var(--ease-in-out) infinite; + pointer-events: none; +} + +@keyframes scan-beam +{ + 0% { transform: translateY(0); } + 50% { transform: translateY(202px); } + 100% { transform: translateY(0); } +} + +/* 命中过渡：解出有效码后取景框整体淡出，承接导航到批准页。 */ +.viewportHit +{ + border-color: var(--accent-ring); +} + +.statusLine +{ + display: inline-flex; + align-items: center; + gap: var(--space-2); + font-size: var(--fs-13); + color: var(--text-muted); +} + +/* 两步指引：与显码页同款语义序号列表。 */ +.steps +{ + margin: 0; + padding-left: var(--space-5); + display: flex; + flex-direction: column; + gap: var(--space-2); + font-size: var(--fs-13); + line-height: var(--lh-body); + color: var(--text-muted); +} + +.steps li::marker +{ + color: var(--accent); + font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums; +} + +.actions +{ + display: flex; + flex-direction: column; + gap: var(--space-2); +} + +@media (prefers-reduced-motion: reduce) +{ + .beam { animation: none; opacity: 0; } +} diff --git a/web/src/routes/link_.scan.tsx b/web/src/routes/link_.scan.tsx new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4f41d41 --- /dev/null +++ b/web/src/routes/link_.scan.tsx @@ -0,0 +1,259 @@ +import { createFileRoute, redirect, useNavigate } from "@tanstack/react-router"; +import { AlertTriangle, ArrowLeft, Camera, CameraOff, ScanLine } from "lucide-react"; +import jsQR from "jsqr"; +import { useCallback, useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react"; +import { AuthShell } from "../features/auth/AuthShell"; +import { parseLinkApprovalUrl } from "../net/qr"; +import { useAppStore } from "../store"; +import { t } from "../i18n"; +import { Button, Callout } from "../ui/primitives"; +import s from "./link_.scan.module.css"; + +// 应用内扫码器：在已登录的 cdrop 里直接调相机扫码，解出 /link?r=&c= 后在同一已鉴权 +// 会话内导航到批准页——绕开「系统相机打开链接落到未登录浏览器」的断流。批准走既有 +// /link 页（step-up 开启时该页会自动要求再认证），本组件只负责「扫到合法码 → 导航」。 +export const Route = createFileRoute("/link_/scan")({ + component: LinkScanPage, + // 守卫：受限访客（scope=guest）不能授权新设备（后端 approve 亦 403），故连扫码 + // 授权页都不让进——直接弹回首页，避免误触。未登录交由批准页处理，这里只挡访客。 + beforeLoad: () => + { + if (useAppStore.getState().sessionScope === "guest") + { + throw redirect({ to: "/" }); + } + }, +}); + +// 扫码器的几种态：请求相机中 / 正在扫 / 命中（淡出过渡）/ 无摄像头 / 权限被拒 / 其他错误。 +type ScanState = "starting" | "scanning" | "hit" | "noCamera" | "denied" | "error"; + +function LinkScanPage() +{ + const navigate = useNavigate(); + const videoRef = useRef(null); + // 解码用的离屏 canvas，逐帧把视频画上去再喂给 jsQR。 + const canvasRef = useRef(null); + const streamRef = useRef(null); + const rafRef = useRef(null); + // 命中后置位：阻止 rAF 循环继续解码 / 重复导航。 + const doneRef = useRef(false); + + const [ state, setState ] = useState("starting"); + const [ errorMsg, setErrorMsg ] = useState(null); + // 扫到无关 / 非本站二维码：提示「继续对准」，但相机继续扫，不打断。 + const [ sawForeignCode, setSawForeignCode ] = useState(false); + + // stop 释放相机：停轨道 + 取消 rAF。卸载、命中、出错时都调用，确保相机指示灯熄灭。 + const stop = useCallback(() => + { + if (rafRef.current !== null) { cancelAnimationFrame(rafRef.current); rafRef.current = null; } + const stream = streamRef.current; + if (stream) { stream.getTracks().forEach((tr) => tr.stop()); streamRef.current = null; } + }, []); + + // tick：单帧解码循环。把当前视频帧画到离屏 canvas，jsQR 解一次；解出有效本站 + // /link 码即停机 + 应用内导航，否则下一帧继续。 + const tick = useCallback(() => + { + if (doneRef.current) { return; } + const video = videoRef.current; + const canvas = canvasRef.current; + if (!video || !canvas || video.readyState < video.HAVE_ENOUGH_DATA) + { + rafRef.current = requestAnimationFrame(tick); + return; + } + + const w = video.videoWidth; + const h = video.videoHeight; + if (!w || !h) + { + rafRef.current = requestAnimationFrame(tick); + return; + } + + canvas.width = w; + canvas.height = h; + const ctx = canvas.getContext("2d", { willReadFrequently: true }); + if (!ctx) + { + rafRef.current = requestAnimationFrame(tick); + return; + } + + ctx.drawImage(video, 0, 0, w, h); + const image = ctx.getImageData(0, 0, w, h); + const result = jsQR(image.data, w, h, { inversionAttempts: "dontInvert" }); + + if (result && result.data) + { + const link = parseLinkApprovalUrl(result.data); + if (link) + { + // 命中合法本站码：停机、淡出，应用内导航到批准页（留在已登录 SPA 会话）。 + doneRef.current = true; + stop(); + setState("hit"); + // p 不带：批准页会回落到更安全的默认「仅此次」（受限访客）。 + navigate({ to: "/link", search: { r: link.requestId, c: link.code, p: undefined } }); + return; + } + // 扫到了码，但不是本站 /link 码（别的二维码 / 钓鱼链接）：提示继续对准。 + setSawForeignCode(true); + } + + rafRef.current = requestAnimationFrame(tick); + }, [ navigate, stop ]); + + // 进页面即请求相机并起解码循环。无摄像头 / 权限被拒分别落到清晰的引导态。 + useEffect(() => + { + doneRef.current = false; + let cancelled = false; + + const start = async () => + { + if (!navigator.mediaDevices?.getUserMedia) + { + setState("noCamera"); + return; + } + try + { + const stream = await navigator.mediaDevices.getUserMedia({ + // 优先后置相机（手机扫码自然朝外）；桌面无后置则退到任意可用相机。 + video: { facingMode: { ideal: "environment" } }, + audio: false, + }); + if (cancelled) { stream.getTracks().forEach((tr) => tr.stop()); return; } + streamRef.current = stream; + const video = videoRef.current; + if (video) + { + video.srcObject = stream; + // iOS Safari 要求 playsInline + 显式 play()，否则不出画面。 + await video.play().catch(() => { /* 自动播放被拦：画面仍随轨道更新 */ }); + } + setState("scanning"); + rafRef.current = requestAnimationFrame(tick); + } + catch (e) + { + if (cancelled) { return; } + const name = e instanceof DOMException ? e.name : ""; + if (name === "NotAllowedError" || name === "SecurityError") + { + setState("denied"); + } + else if (name === "NotFoundError" || name === "OverconstrainedError") + { + setState("noCamera"); + } + else + { + setErrorMsg(e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)); + setState("error"); + } + } + }; + + void start(); + return () => { cancelled = true; stop(); }; + }, [ tick, stop ]); + + const goBack = () => navigate({ to: "/" }); + + // ---- 渲染分支 -------------------------------------------------------- + + // 无摄像头（桌面常见）：优雅降级，引导改用手机扫，不报错。 + if (state === "noCamera") + { + return ( + + }> + {t("qr.scan.noCamera")} + + + + ); + } + + // 权限被拒：明确告诉用户去哪儿改回来。 + if (state === "denied") + { + return ( + + }> + {t("qr.scan.denied")} + + + + ); + } + + if (state === "error") + { + return ( + + }> + {errorMsg ?? t("qr.scan.error")} + + + + ); + } + + return ( + +
+
+
+ + +
+ {state === "starting" + ? <>{t("qr.scan.starting")} + : <>{t("qr.scan.aiming")}} +
+
+ + {/* 扫到非本站码：安静提示继续对准，相机不中断。 */} + {sawForeignCode && state === "scanning" && ( + }> + {t("qr.scan.foreign")} + + )} + +
    +
  1. {t("qr.scan.howto1")}
    2. +
  2. {t("qr.scan.howto2")}
    3. +
+ +
+ +
+ + ); +} diff --git a/web/src/routes/login.tsx b/web/src/routes/login.tsx index 0c80350..bb73131 100644 --- a/web/src/routes/login.tsx +++ b/web/src/routes/login.tsx @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -import { createFileRoute, Link, useNavigate } from "@tanstack/react-router"; +import { createFileRoute, useNavigate } from "@tanstack/react-router"; import { AlertTriangle, LogIn, QrCode } from "lucide-react"; import { useEffect, useState } from "react"; import { fetchAuthConfig, loginDev, loginProd } from "../features/auth/auth"; @@ -131,25 +131,18 @@ function LoginPage() > {t("login.prod.button")} - {/* 扫码登录入口：从已登录的另一台设备批准本机接入，无需在此重登。 - 克制——一行带图标的次级链接，不与主 CTA 争重。 */} - } + onClick={() => navigate({ to: "/link/new" })} > - - {t("qr.entry.fromLogin")} - + {t("qr.entry.fromLogin")} + )} diff --git a/web/src/routes/settings.tsx b/web/src/routes/settings.tsx index e53fecb..649b217 100644 --- a/web/src/routes/settings.tsx +++ b/web/src/routes/settings.tsx @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -import { useEffect, useMemo, useState } from "react"; +import { useCallback, useEffect, useState } from "react"; import { Anchor, Container, @@ -8,9 +8,12 @@ import { Title, } from "@mantine/core"; import { createFileRoute, Link, redirect, useNavigate } from "@tanstack/react-router"; -import { Bell, LogOut, Trash2 } from "lucide-react"; -import { logout, syncWebDeviceName } from "../features/auth/auth"; +import { AlertTriangle, Bell, LogOut, ShieldAlert, Trash2 } from "lucide-react"; +import { logout, startStepUpReauth, syncWebDeviceName } from "../features/auth/auth"; import { DesktopSettings } from "../features/desktop/DesktopSettings"; +import { + consumePendingRevoke, consumeStepUpCode, stashPendingRevoke, +} from "../features/qr/stepUp"; import { isDesktop, persistDesktopDeviceName } from "../net/desktop"; import { apiFetch } from "../net/api"; import { @@ -20,25 +23,15 @@ import { pushSupported, type PushState, } from "../net/push"; -import { useAppStore, type DeviceInfo } from "../store"; +import { + listSessions, postStepUp, revokeSession, StepUpRequiredError, + type AuthSession, +} from "../net/sessions"; +import { useAppStore } from "../store"; import { t } from "../i18n"; import { formatRelative, isAsciiDeviceName } from "../utils/format"; -import { Badge, Button, Panel, TextField } from "../ui/primitives"; +import { Badge, Button, Callout, Panel, TextField } from "../ui/primitives"; import { StateDot } from "../ui/glyphs"; - -// deviceTypeLabel 把后端存的设备类型本地化展示（浏览器 / macOS 客户端 / …）。 -// 容错匹配（与 DeviceStrip 的 mapKind 一致），未知类型回退原值。 -function deviceTypeLabel(type: string): string -{ - const k = type.toLowerCase(); - if (k.includes("mac") || k === "darwin") { return t("deviceType.macos"); } - if (k.includes("win")) { return t("deviceType.windows"); } - if (k.includes("linux")) { return t("deviceType.linux"); } - if (k === "shortcut") { return t("deviceType.shortcut"); } - if (k.includes("ios") || k === "iphone" || k === "ipad") { return t("deviceType.ios"); } - if (k === "browser") { return t("deviceType.browser"); } - return type; -} import { toast } from "../ui/feedback"; export const Route = createFileRoute("/settings")({ @@ -55,19 +48,14 @@ function SettingsPage() { const navigate = useNavigate(); const user = useAppStore((s) => s.user); + const sessionScope = useAppStore((s) => s.sessionScope); + const isGuest = sessionScope === "guest"; const selfDeviceName = useAppStore((s) => s.selfDeviceName); const setSelfDeviceName = useAppStore((s) => s.setSelfDeviceName); - const storeDevices = useAppStore((s) => s.devices); const [ pendingName, setPendingName ] = useState(selfDeviceName ?? ""); - const [ removing, setRemoving ] = useState>(new Set()); const [ renaming, setRenaming ] = useState(false); - const peerDevices = useMemo( - () => storeDevices.filter((d) => d.name !== selfDeviceName), - [ storeDevices, selfDeviceName ], - ); - const trimmedName = pendingName.trim(); const canSaveName = !!trimmedName && trimmedName !== selfDeviceName; @@ -118,48 +106,6 @@ function SettingsPage() } }; - const handleRemovePeer = async (name: string) => - { - if (!window.confirm(t("settings.unregister.peerConfirm", { name }))) { return; } - - setRemoving((prev) => - { - const next = new Set(prev); - next.add(name); - return next; - }); - try - { - const r = await apiFetch( - `/api/devices/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`, - { method: "DELETE" }, - ); - if (!r.ok) - { - const text = await r.text().catch(() => r.statusText); - throw new Error(`${r.status}: ${text}`); - } - // 服务端的 publishPresence 会通过 SSE 推送新的设备列表，store - // 会随之更新，这里不需要手动 setDevices。 - toast.ok("设备已移除", name); - } - catch (e) - { - toast.error(t("settings.error.delete", { - message: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e), - })); - } - finally - { - setRemoving((prev) => - { - const next = new Set(prev); - next.delete(name); - return next; - }); - } - }; - const handleUnregisterSelf = async () => { if (!selfDeviceName) { return; } @@ -194,12 +140,27 @@ function SettingsPage() - {t("settings.title")} + + {t("settings.title")} + {isGuest && {t("settings.guest.badge")}} + {t("nav.backToHome")} + {/* 受限访客标识：说明这台设备不能管理账号 / 授权设备，要完整权限请在 + 主设备上重新登录。放在最显眼处（标题下第一块）。 */} + {isGuest && ( + } + title={t("settings.guest.title")} + > + {t("settings.guest.body")} + + )} +
- + {t("settings.unregister.currentHint")} @@ -245,22 +206,10 @@ function SettingsPage() {pushSupported() && } - - {peerDevices.length === 0 ? ( - {t("settings.peers.empty")} - ) : ( - - {peerDevices.map((d) => ( - handleRemovePeer(d.name)} - /> - ))} - - )} - + @@ -335,9 +284,9 @@ function PushPanel() return ( - {t("settings.push.hint")} + {t("settings.push.hint")} {denied && !subscribed && ( - + {t("settings.push.deniedHint")} )} @@ -371,37 +320,270 @@ function PushPanel() ); } -function PeerRow(props: { device: DeviceInfo; removing: boolean; onRemove: () => void }) +// sortSessions 把会话排成「在线在上、未活跃（offline）在下」，组内按最近活跃时间降序 +// （活跃越近越靠前）。不改变原数组，返回新数组。 +function sortSessions(list: AuthSession[]): AuthSession[] { - const { device, removing, onRemove } = props; - const lastSeenText = device.lastSeen - ? t("settings.lastSeen", { time: formatRelative(device.lastSeen) }) - : t("settings.lastSeenNever"); + return [ ...list ].sort((a, b) => + { + if (a.online !== b.online) { return a.online ? -1 : 1; } + return b.lastUsedAt - a.lastUsedAt; + }); +} + +// SessionsPanel：登录会话管理——浏览器 / 扫码登录的设备会话。每条显示在线状态点 + +// 设备名 + 权限级别 Badge + 「本机」标记 + 最近活跃，并提供「登出」（真正吊销该登录 +// 的访问令牌）。在线会话排在上、未活跃（offline）的排在下；离线会话仍可登出。 +// +// step-up：DELETE 返回 403 step_up_required 时，把待登出的 sessionId 暂存 → 发起 +// 一次 prompt=login 再认证（returnTo=/settings）→ 整页跳走 → 回来后由本组件 mount +// effect 取出暂存的 {code, verifier} + sessionId，POST /auth/stepup 记录窗口，再 +// 重试那条 DELETE。step-up 窗口内（后端 5 分钟）后续登出不再 403、直接成功。 +// +// 受限访客（isGuest）：无权管理登录会话、后端 GET 会 403，故根本不发该请求，直接展示 +// 一句克制的说明 Callout（不出现任何加载 / 失败态）。 +function SessionsPanel(props: { isGuest: boolean; onSignedOutSelf: () => void }) +{ + const { isGuest, onSignedOutSelf } = props; + const [ sessions, setSessions ] = useState(null); + const [ loadError, setLoadError ] = useState(false); + const [ busyId, setBusyId ] = useState(null); + const [ stepUpRejected, setStepUpRejected ] = useState(false); + + // reload 拉取并写入列表，同时把结果回传给调用方（step-up 重试路径需在 revoke + // 前从这份列表里查出 current，不能在 revoke 之后再拉——若登出的正是本机会话， + // 令牌已失效、那次 listSessions 会 401）。在线会话排前、未活跃的排后，组内按最近 + // 活跃时间降序。失败回 null。受限访客不会走到这里（调用方在 guest 分支直接返回）。 + const reload = useCallback(async (): Promise => + { + setLoadError(false); + try + { + const list = sortSessions(await listSessions()); + setSessions(list); + return list; + } + catch { setLoadError(true); setSessions(null); return null; } + }, []); + + // doRevoke 真正执行一条登出。current（本机）会话登出后清本地 auth、回登录页 + // （等价退出登录）；其余刷新列表。403 step_up_required 由调用方分流，不入此处。 + const finishRevoke = useCallback((sess: AuthSession) => + { + if (sess.current) { onSignedOutSelf(); return; } + toast.ok(t("settings.sessions.revoked")); + void reload(); + }, [ onSignedOutSelf, reload ]); + + // 进页面拉一次。返回时若检测到 step-up 往返暂存（{code, verifier} + 待登出 id）， + // 先 POST /auth/stepup 记录窗口，再重试那条 DELETE——一次性串起整页跳转两端。 + // 受限访客无权管理会话、后端 GET 会 403，故根本不发请求、直接走说明态。 + useEffect(() => + { + if (isGuest) { return; } + let cancelled = false; + + const run = async () => + { + // step-up 往返恢复：取出暂存（一次性）。无暂存则普通进页只拉列表。 + const stash = consumeStepUpCode(); + const pendingId = consumePendingRevoke(); + const list = await reload(); + if (cancelled) { return; } + + if (stash && pendingId) + { + // 在 revoke 前就从这份列表里查出待登出的那条（尤其 current 标记）： + // 若登出的正是本机会话，revoke 后令牌即失效，不能再 listSessions。 + const target = list?.find((x) => x.id === pendingId); + setBusyId(pendingId); + try + { + await postStepUp(stash.code, stash.verifier); + await revokeSession(pendingId); + if (cancelled) { return; } + if (target) { finishRevoke(target); } + else { toast.ok(t("settings.sessions.revoked")); await reload(); } + } + catch (e) + { + if (cancelled) { return; } + if (e instanceof StepUpRequiredError) { setStepUpRejected(true); } + else + { + toast.error(t("settings.error.delete", { + message: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e), + })); + } + void reload(); + } + finally { if (!cancelled) { setBusyId(null); } } + } + }; + + void run(); + return () => { cancelled = true; }; + }, [ isGuest, reload, finishRevoke ]); + + const handleRevoke = async (sess: AuthSession) => + { + const confirmMsg = sess.current + ? t("settings.sessions.confirmCurrent") + : t("settings.sessions.confirmOther", { name: sess.deviceName }); + if (!window.confirm(confirmMsg)) { return; } + + setBusyId(sess.id); + setStepUpRejected(false); + try + { + await revokeSession(sess.id); + finishRevoke(sess); + } + catch (e) + { + if (e instanceof StepUpRequiredError) + { + // 需再认证：暂存待登出 id，发起 prompt=login 往返，回到 /settings 后 + // 由 mount effect 接力重试。成功则整页跳走、本组件卸载。 + stashPendingRevoke(sess.id); + try + { + await startStepUpReauth("/settings"); + return; // 跳转去 provider，不再 setBusyId。 + } + catch (reauthErr) + { + toast.error(t("settings.error.delete", { + message: reauthErr instanceof Error ? reauthErr.message : String(reauthErr), + })); + } + } + else + { + toast.error(t("settings.error.delete", { + message: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e), + })); + } + } + finally { setBusyId(null); } + }; + + // 受限访客：不展示列表 / 加载 / 失败态，只给一句克制的说明——管理登录会话需在主设备 + // 上完整登录。后端 GET 本就 403，前面 effect 也已跳过请求，这里纯文案分支。 + if (isGuest) + { + return ( + + }> + {t("settings.sessions.guestNote")} + + + ); + } + + return ( + + + {t("settings.sessions.hint")} + {stepUpRejected && ( + }> + {t("settings.sessions.stepUpRejected")} + + )} + {loadError ? ( + + + {t("settings.sessions.loadError")} + + + + ) : sessions === null ? ( + // 仍在加载（首屏闪一帧）：不渲染占位文案，避免「暂无」误闪。 + null + ) : sessions.length === 0 ? ( + {t("settings.sessions.empty")} + ) : ( + + {sessions.map((sess) => ( + handleRevoke(sess)} + /> + ))} + + )} + + + ); +} + +// 会话种类标签：网页 / 扫码会话用 settings.sessions.kind.*；原生客户端 +// （macos / windows / linux / ios）复用设备类型标签（「macOS 客户端」等）。 +function sessionKindLabel(kind: AuthSession["kind"]): string +{ + if (kind === "oidc" || kind === "self" || kind === "guest") + { + return t(`settings.sessions.kind.${kind}` as const); + } + return t(`deviceType.${kind}` as const); +} + +function SessionRow(props: { session: AuthSession; busy: boolean; onRevoke?: () => void }) +{ + const { session, busy, onRevoke } = props; + const lastUsedText = session.lastUsedAt + ? t("settings.sessions.lastUsed", { time: formatRelative(session.lastUsedAt) }) + : t("settings.sessions.neverUsed"); + const kindLabel = sessionKindLabel(session.kind); + const onlineLabel = t(session.online ? "settings.online" : "settings.offline"); return ( - - {device.name} - - {t(device.online ? "settings.online" : "settings.offline")} + + + {session.deviceName || kindLabel} + + + {session.scope === "guest" + ? t("settings.sessions.scopeGuest") + : t("settings.sessions.scopeFull")} + {session.current && ( + {t("settings.sessions.current")} + )} - {deviceTypeLabel(device.type)} · {lastSeenText} + {onlineLabel} · {kindLabel} · {lastUsedText} - + {onRevoke && ( + + )} ); } + diff --git a/web/src/store/helpers.ts b/web/src/store/helpers.ts index 84dd479..62fff8e 100644 --- a/web/src/store/helpers.ts +++ b/web/src/store/helpers.ts @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -import type { TransferRecord, ThemeMode, User } from "./types"; +import type { TransferRecord, ThemeMode, User, SessionScope } from "./types"; // DONE 是"全部数据已交付"的语义终态，把进行时遥测残留归一到这一事实，避免 // history 行还显示"传输中字节 / 待发送 X MB"等错觉。FAILED / CANCELLED 不归 @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ export function normalizeTerminal(cur: TransferRecord, finalState: string): Tran export const ACCESS_TOKEN_KEY = "cdrop.access_token"; export const USER_KEY = "cdrop.user"; +export const SESSION_SCOPE_KEY = "cdrop.session_scope"; export const SELF_DEVICE_KEY = "cdrop.self_device"; export const THEME_KEY = "cdrop.theme"; @@ -125,6 +126,16 @@ export function readSessionUser(): User | null } } +// 本会话权限级别随 access_token 一并持久化（sessionStorage，同 tab 刷新存活、 +// 关标签即清）。缺失 / 非法回退 "full"——/api/me 会在登录 / 水合后校正它，回退到 +// 完整态只会多展示入口（后端仍 403），不会把受限态误升级。 +export function readSessionScope(): SessionScope +{ + if (typeof window === "undefined") { return "full"; } + const raw = window.sessionStorage.getItem(SESSION_SCOPE_KEY); + return raw === "guest" ? "guest" : "full"; +} + export function readSelfDevice(): string | null { if (typeof window === "undefined") { return null; } diff --git a/web/src/store/index.ts b/web/src/store/index.ts index 76f5abd..26825a5 100644 --- a/web/src/store/index.ts +++ b/web/src/store/index.ts @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ export const useAppStore = create()((...a) => export type { AppState, AuthMode, + SessionScope, ThemeMode, User, DeviceInfo, diff --git a/web/src/store/slices/auth.ts b/web/src/store/slices/auth.ts index 8a7fac5..7e98d93 100644 --- a/web/src/store/slices/auth.ts +++ b/web/src/store/slices/auth.ts @@ -1,15 +1,18 @@ import type { StateCreator } from "zustand"; -import type { AppState, AuthMode } from "../types"; +import type { AppState, AuthMode, SessionScope } from "../types"; import { ACCESS_TOKEN_KEY, + SESSION_SCOPE_KEY, USER_KEY, readSessionAccess, + readSessionScope, readSessionUser, } from "../helpers"; export type AuthSlice = Pick< AppState, - "authMode" | "accessToken" | "user" | "setAuth" | "clearAuth" + "authMode" | "accessToken" | "user" | "sessionScope" + | "setAuth" | "setSessionScope" | "clearAuth" >; const initialAuthMode: AuthMode = import.meta.env.DEV ? "dev" : "prod"; @@ -23,6 +26,7 @@ export const createAuthSlice: StateCreator = (set) authMode: initialAuthMode, accessToken: readSessionAccess(), user: readSessionUser(), + sessionScope: readSessionScope(), setAuth: (a) => { @@ -37,13 +41,27 @@ export const createAuthSlice: StateCreator = (set) }); }, + // setSessionScope 由 /api/me 解析结果驱动（登录成功 / 开机水合后调用）。 + // 持久化到 sessionStorage，使同 tab 刷新沿用，不必再次往返 /api/me 才能正确 + // 隐藏受限入口。 + setSessionScope: (scope: SessionScope) => + { + if (typeof window !== "undefined") + { + window.sessionStorage.setItem(SESSION_SCOPE_KEY, scope); + } + set({ sessionScope: scope }); + }, + clearAuth: () => { if (typeof window !== "undefined") { window.sessionStorage.removeItem(ACCESS_TOKEN_KEY); window.sessionStorage.removeItem(USER_KEY); + window.sessionStorage.removeItem(SESSION_SCOPE_KEY); } - set({ accessToken: null, user: null }); + // scope 回 "full"：登出后下一个登录者默认完整态，再由其自己的 /api/me 校正。 + set({ accessToken: null, user: null, sessionScope: "full" }); }, }); diff --git a/web/src/store/types.ts b/web/src/store/types.ts index 3c7dce1..0b817fb 100644 --- a/web/src/store/types.ts +++ b/web/src/store/types.ts @@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ export interface DeviceInfo export type AuthMode = "dev" | "prod"; +// 本会话的权限级别（来自 /api/me 的 scope）：full=完整登录、guest=受限访客。 +// 受限访客不能管理账号 / 授权设备——前端据此隐藏相关入口（后端亦 403 兜底）。 +export type SessionScope = "full" | "guest"; + export type ThemeMode = "light" | "dark" | "system"; // 客户端侧细颗粒度阶段，与服务端的 state（PENDING/ACCEPTED/...）正交； @@ -118,7 +122,12 @@ export interface AppState authMode: AuthMode; accessToken: string | null; user: User | null; + // 本会话权限级别（/api/me 的 scope）。默认 "full"；登录成功 / 开机水合后据 + // /api/me 校正为 "guest" 时，UI 隐藏「扫码登录新设备」「移除设备」「登出他人」 + // 等账号管理入口，并展示「受限访客」标识。 + sessionScope: SessionScope; setAuth: (a: { accessToken: string; user: User }) => void; + setSessionScope: (scope: SessionScope) => void; clearAuth: () => void; // ---- device slice ----