鉴权并入 Auth Broker:委派设备会话统一模型 + 四端迁移

后端(委托 Auth Broker,路径 A):
- 删自建鉴权(OIDC exchange / 自签会话 / step-up / shortcut / web_sessions / accounts),cdrop 不再存任何凭证;鉴权中间件改读边缘注入的 X-Auth-Subject/Scope/Meta/Name/Roles 头(dev 旁路保留);Claims 加 Tier() / Guest()
- internal/brokerclient:mint / revoke(带 X-Broker-App)/ refresh / ListSessions(R1 列举),直连内网、吊销幂等

统一会话模型“委派设备会话”(Delegated Device Sessions):
- 每个客户端(浏览器 / 桌面 / 扫码设备)=一条带 meta(device_id) + label 的 broker 机器会话;Broker 作设备会话唯一注册表(R1 按用户+app 列举 + R2 按 (user,app,meta) 幂等铸造),cdrop 退化为薄覆盖层、不再自存权威会话表
- 新增代铸端点 POST /api/auth/device-session:凭边缘已验明的 X-Auth-Subject 委托 broker 铸 / 轮换设备会话(meta=device_id、按调用方 tier 防越权、sameOrigin CSRF、per-IP 限流);R2 幂等保证同一 device_id 重登原地轮换、不堆重复设备
- 会话列表=R1 权威 + 叠加 type(本地缓存)/ online(Hub presence,按设备名)/ current(meta 匹配本请求 X-Auth-Meta)+ 过滤 meta=""(device-authorize 引导会话残留);devices 表降级为 type/presence 薄缓存(非会话权威),device_id 主键、upsert 按 user 限定
- 吊销按 device_id → 缓存优先 / R1 兜底解析 sid → broker 吊销 + X-Broker-App;扫码登录保留三密钥编排,collect 改委托 broker 铸 + 落缓存行

Web 前端:
- 登录走 broker 全局 SSO 代跳(/api/auth/login 302);bootstrap 经 /api/me 注入身份后代铸设备会话(稳定 device_id 存 localStorage、Web Locks 跨 tab 串行防重复铸造);refresh 走 /api/auth/refresh
- 设备管理按 device_id;改名=同 device_id 重代铸(R2 原地轮换换 label、不产生重复行);登录页反应式守卫修登录回环
- 去 OIDC PKCE / step-up(删 oauth.callback / stepUp)

桌面客户端(Wails):
- loopback PKCE(RFC 8252)改指 broker 设备授权流(/device/authorize + /device/token)拿引导令牌,再代铸出带 meta 的托管设备会话——与浏览器同模型、同管理、同吊销;身份取自代铸响应(修“显示名显示为 UUID”);refresh 保留显示名;稳定 device_id 入桌面配置

iOS 客户端(arch A,原生 SwiftUI + 离屏无头 WebView 引擎 + 原生↔JS 桥):
- 引擎 / 文件管理 / 设备管理 / 应用图标 / 本地化(此前实现,随本次落入版本库)
- 鉴权=引擎自刷(boot 注入 refresh_token)+ broker 轮换经 sessionRotated 回报原生更新 Keychain;去 cookie 同步;Session 加 refreshToken / deviceId

实时 / 健壮性:
- presence 走 Hub union(设备表行 ∪ 表外实时连接,按名去重、live-only 标在线)
- Hub 通道 close 一律在写锁内、非阻塞 send 一律在读锁内,消除 close-vs-send 闭通道 send panic(revoke 每次 Kick 后该路径变热)

配置 / 删旧栈:
- config 改 broker 接入(CDROP_BROKER_* / CDROP_PUBLIC_URL / 按档 TTL),prod 强校验 broker 配置 + PUBLIC_URL(CSRF Origin 守卫不失效)
- 删 auth.go / selftoken.go / shortcut.go / jwks.go + 三表(web_sessions / accounts / shortcut_tokens)及验证链;.env.example / compose.snippet.yaml / Caddyfile.snippet 更新为 broker 模型(人机分流 + 公开端点放行 + X-Auth-Meta 透传)
- 测试全重写:QR / 会话含 mock broker(R1 列举 + R2 幂等);hub 加 close-vs-send 并发回归;config 加 prod 必填校验
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-26 02:07:11 +08:00
parent c79b176b87
commit 10cf36ecee
104 changed files with 7533 additions and 5318 deletions
+115 -540
View File
@@ -2,596 +2,171 @@ package jwtauth
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4/jwt"
"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/config"
"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/db"
)
// fakeDeviceUpserter records UpsertDevice calls without touching SQL and serves
// shortcut-token lookups from an in-memory map (empty → "not found", so plain
// device-only tests are unaffected).
type fakeDeviceUpserter struct {
calls []db.UpsertDeviceParams
err error
tokens map[string]db.ShortcutToken
revokedSIDs map[string]bool
type fakeDeviceStore struct {
touched []db.TouchDeviceParams
}
func (f *fakeDeviceUpserter) UpsertDevice(_ context.Context, arg db.UpsertDeviceParams) error {
f.calls = append(f.calls, arg)
return f.err
}
func (f *fakeDeviceUpserter) GetShortcutToken(_ context.Context, jti string) (db.ShortcutToken, error) {
if t, ok := f.tokens[jti]; ok {
return t, nil
}
return db.ShortcutToken{}, sql.ErrNoRows
}
// TouchShortcutTokenUsed is a no-op in tests: it runs on a detached goroutine
// (touchTokenAsync), so recording into the fake here would race the test body.
func (f *fakeDeviceUpserter) TouchShortcutTokenUsed(_ context.Context, _ db.TouchShortcutTokenUsedParams) error {
func (f *fakeDeviceStore) TouchDevice(_ context.Context, arg db.TouchDeviceParams) error {
f.touched = append(f.touched, arg)
return nil
}
// GetWebSession backs the self-token revocation check. revokedSIDs lets a test
// simulate a revoked session (deleted row); any other sid resolves to a live row.
func (f *fakeDeviceUpserter) GetWebSession(_ context.Context, id string) (db.WebSession, error) {
if f.revokedSIDs[id] {
return db.WebSession{}, sql.ErrNoRows
}
return db.WebSession{ID: id, UserID: "user-x"}, nil
}
// echo handler that responds with the claims+device discovered in context.
func echoMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
claims, _ := ClaimsFromContext(r.Context())
dev, _ := DeviceNameFromContext(r.Context())
resp := map[string]any{
"user_id": claims.UserID,
"groups": claims.Groups,
"device": dev,
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp)
}
func TestDevMode_AcceptsTokenAndUsesXDevUser(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{AuthMode: "dev", DevToken: "secret-token"}
dev := &fakeDeviceUpserter{}
a := New(cfg, dev)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer secret-token")
req.Header.Set("X-Dev-User", "alice")
req.Header.Set("X-Device-Name", "tab-1")
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(echoMe)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 200; body=%s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
}
var got map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(rr.Body.Bytes(), &got); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
}
if got["user_id"] != "alice" {
t.Errorf("user_id: got %v, want alice", got["user_id"])
}
if got["device"] != "tab-1" {
t.Errorf("device: got %v, want tab-1", got["device"])
}
if len(dev.calls) != 1 {
t.Errorf("UpsertDevice calls: got %d, want 1", len(dev.calls))
}
}
func TestDevMode_DefaultsUserIDWhenHeaderMissing(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{AuthMode: "dev", DevToken: "t"}
a := New(cfg, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer t")
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(echoMe)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 200", rr.Code)
}
var got map[string]any
_ = json.Unmarshal(rr.Body.Bytes(), &got)
if got["user_id"] != "dev-user" {
t.Errorf("user_id: got %v, want dev-user", got["user_id"])
}
}
func TestDevMode_RejectsWrongToken(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{AuthMode: "dev", DevToken: "right"}
a := New(cfg, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer wrong")
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(echoMe)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 401", rr.Code)
}
}
func TestDevMode_RejectsMissingHeader(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{AuthMode: "dev", DevToken: "x"}
a := New(cfg, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(echoMe)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 401", rr.Code)
}
}
// --- prod RS256 path ---
func newRSAKey(t *testing.T) *rsa.PrivateKey {
t.Helper()
k, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rsa keygen: %v", err)
}
return k
}
func startJWKSServer(t *testing.T, kid string, pub *rsa.PublicKey) *httptest.Server {
t.Helper()
jwk := jose.JSONWebKey{Key: pub, KeyID: kid, Algorithm: "RS256", Use: "sig"}
set := jose.JSONWebKeySet{Keys: []jose.JSONWebKey{jwk}}
body, err := json.Marshal(set)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal jwks: %v", err)
}
return httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write(body)
// runMiddleware drives a request through the auth middleware and captures the claims
// the downstream handler sees (nil if the request was rejected before reaching it).
func runMiddleware(a *Authenticator, r *http.Request) (*httptest.ResponseRecorder, *Claims) {
var captured *Claims
h := a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, rr *http.Request) {
if c, ok := ClaimsFromContext(rr.Context()); ok {
captured = c
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return w, captured
}
func signRS256(t *testing.T, priv *rsa.PrivateKey, kid string, claims jwt.Claims, custom map[string]any) string {
t.Helper()
signer, err := jose.NewSigner(
jose.SigningKey{Algorithm: jose.RS256, Key: priv},
(&jose.SignerOptions{}).WithType("JWT").WithHeader("kid", kid),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new signer: %v", err)
}
tok, err := jwt.Signed(signer).Claims(claims).Claims(custom).Serialize()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sign: %v", err)
}
return tok
}
func TestMiddleware_ProdReadsAuthHeaders(t *testing.T) {
a := New(&config.Config{AuthMode: "prod"}, &fakeDeviceStore{})
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
r.Header.Set("X-Auth-Subject", "user-1")
r.Header.Set("X-Auth-Scope", "app:cdrop:guest")
r.Header.Set("X-Auth-Meta", "dev_abc")
r.Header.Set("X-Auth-Name", "Alice")
r.Header.Set("X-Auth-Roles", "admin, user")
func TestProdMode_AcceptsValidRS256(t *testing.T) {
priv := newRSAKey(t)
kid := "key-1"
srv := startJWKSServer(t, kid, &priv.PublicKey)
defer srv.Close()
cfg := &config.Config{
AuthMode: "prod",
OIDCJWKSURL: srv.URL,
OIDCIssuer: "https://oauth.example/",
OIDCAudience: "cdrop",
w, c := runMiddleware(a, r)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 200", w.Code)
}
a := New(cfg, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
now := time.Now()
std := jwt.Claims{
Issuer: "https://oauth.example/",
Subject: "user-bob",
Audience: jwt.Audience{"cdrop"},
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
Expiry: jwt.NewNumericDate(now.Add(time.Hour)),
if c == nil {
t.Fatal("claims missing from context")
}
tok := signRS256(t, priv, kid, std, map[string]any{"groups": []any{"users"}})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(echoMe)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 200; body=%s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
if c.UserID != "user-1" || c.DeviceID != "dev_abc" || c.Name != "Alice" {
t.Errorf("claims wrong: %+v", c)
}
var got map[string]any
_ = json.Unmarshal(rr.Body.Bytes(), &got)
if got["user_id"] != "user-bob" {
t.Errorf("user_id: got %v, want user-bob", got["user_id"])
if !c.Guest() {
t.Error("app:cdrop:guest scope should mark Guest()")
}
if len(c.Groups) != 2 || c.Groups[0] != "admin" || c.Groups[1] != "user" {
t.Errorf("groups: got %v", c.Groups)
}
}
func TestProdMode_RejectsExpiredRS256(t *testing.T) {
priv := newRSAKey(t)
kid := "key-1"
srv := startJWKSServer(t, kid, &priv.PublicKey)
defer srv.Close()
cfg := &config.Config{
AuthMode: "prod",
OIDCJWKSURL: srv.URL,
OIDCIssuer: "https://oauth.example/",
OIDCAudience: "cdrop",
func TestMiddleware_ProdMissingSubjectRejected(t *testing.T) {
a := New(&config.Config{AuthMode: "prod"}, &fakeDeviceStore{})
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
w, c := runMiddleware(a, r)
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("no X-Auth-Subject: got %d, want 401", w.Code)
}
a := New(cfg, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
past := time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)
std := jwt.Claims{
Issuer: "https://oauth.example/",
Subject: "user-bob",
Audience: jwt.Audience{"cdrop"},
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(past),
Expiry: jwt.NewNumericDate(past.Add(time.Minute)), // already 59min stale
}
tok := signRS256(t, priv, kid, std, nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(echoMe)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 401; body=%s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
if c != nil {
t.Error("handler must not run on rejected request")
}
}
func TestProdMode_RejectsWrongIssuer(t *testing.T) {
priv := newRSAKey(t)
kid := "key-1"
srv := startJWKSServer(t, kid, &priv.PublicKey)
defer srv.Close()
cfg := &config.Config{
AuthMode: "prod",
OIDCJWKSURL: srv.URL,
OIDCIssuer: "https://oauth.example/",
OIDCAudience: "cdrop",
func TestMiddleware_TouchesManagedDevice(t *testing.T) {
fs := &fakeDeviceStore{}
a := New(&config.Config{AuthMode: "prod"}, fs)
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
r.Header.Set("X-Auth-Subject", "user-1")
r.Header.Set("X-Auth-Scope", "app:cdrop:full")
r.Header.Set("X-Auth-Meta", "dev_x")
runMiddleware(a, r)
if len(fs.touched) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("touch count: got %d, want 1", len(fs.touched))
}
a := New(cfg, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
now := time.Now()
std := jwt.Claims{
Issuer: "https://attacker.example/",
Subject: "user-bob",
Audience: jwt.Audience{"cdrop"},
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
Expiry: jwt.NewNumericDate(now.Add(time.Hour)),
}
tok := signRS256(t, priv, kid, std, nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(echoMe)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 401; body=%s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
if fs.touched[0].DeviceID != "dev_x" || fs.touched[0].Tier != "full" || fs.touched[0].UserID != "user-1" {
t.Errorf("touch params: %+v", fs.touched[0])
}
}
// Multi-audience (R1): one backend serving web + desktop clients. A desktop
// token carries aud=<desktop client_id>; it must pass when OIDCAudience lists
// both client_ids comma-separated, and still be rejected when its aud is in
// neither.
func TestProdMode_AcceptsSecondAudienceInList(t *testing.T) {
priv := newRSAKey(t)
kid := "key-1"
srv := startJWKSServer(t, kid, &priv.PublicKey)
defer srv.Close()
cfg := &config.Config{
AuthMode: "prod",
OIDCJWKSURL: srv.URL,
OIDCIssuer: "https://oauth.example/",
OIDCAudience: "cdrop-web , cdrop-desktop", // spaces trimmed
}
a := New(cfg, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
now := time.Now()
std := jwt.Claims{
Issuer: "https://oauth.example/",
Subject: "user-bob",
Audience: jwt.Audience{"cdrop-desktop"}, // the desktop client's aud
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
Expiry: jwt.NewNumericDate(now.Add(time.Hour)),
}
tok := signRS256(t, priv, kid, std, nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(echoMe)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 200; body=%s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
func TestMiddleware_SkipsTouchWhenUnmanaged(t *testing.T) {
fs := &fakeDeviceStore{}
a := New(&config.Config{AuthMode: "prod"}, fs)
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
r.Header.Set("X-Auth-Subject", "user-1")
r.Header.Set("X-Auth-Scope", "full")
// no X-Auth-Meta → unmanaged caller (e.g. a global SSO browser)
runMiddleware(a, r)
if len(fs.touched) != 0 {
t.Errorf("unmanaged caller should not touch a device row; got %d", len(fs.touched))
}
}
func TestProdMode_RejectsAudienceNotInList(t *testing.T) {
priv := newRSAKey(t)
kid := "key-1"
srv := startJWKSServer(t, kid, &priv.PublicKey)
defer srv.Close()
cfg := &config.Config{
AuthMode: "prod",
OIDCJWKSURL: srv.URL,
OIDCIssuer: "https://oauth.example/",
OIDCAudience: "cdrop-web,cdrop-desktop",
func TestMiddleware_DevMode(t *testing.T) {
a := New(&config.Config{AuthMode: "dev", DevToken: "devtok"}, &fakeDeviceStore{})
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer devtok")
r.Header.Set("X-Dev-User", "dev-alice")
r.Header.Set("X-Dev-Scope", "guest")
w, c := runMiddleware(a, r)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK || c == nil {
t.Fatalf("dev auth failed: %d", w.Code)
}
a := New(cfg, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
now := time.Now()
std := jwt.Claims{
Issuer: "https://oauth.example/",
Subject: "user-bob",
Audience: jwt.Audience{"some-other-client"},
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
Expiry: jwt.NewNumericDate(now.Add(time.Hour)),
}
tok := signRS256(t, priv, kid, std, nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(echoMe)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 401; body=%s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
if c.UserID != "dev-alice" || !c.Guest() {
t.Errorf("dev claims wrong: %+v", c)
}
}
// A nameless request (no X-Device-Name) must NOT register a device — preventing
// the random-fallback "Unknown Device" flood from polling clients.
func TestNamelessRequestSkipsDeviceUpsert(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{AuthMode: "dev", DevToken: "t"}
store := &fakeDeviceUpserter{}
a := New(cfg, store)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/clipboard/version", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer t") // no X-Device-Name
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 200", rr.Code)
}
if len(store.calls) != 0 {
t.Errorf("nameless request must not upsert a device, got %d calls", len(store.calls))
func TestMiddleware_DevModeBadToken(t *testing.T) {
a := New(&config.Config{AuthMode: "dev", DevToken: "devtok"}, &fakeDeviceStore{})
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer wrong")
w, _ := runMiddleware(a, r)
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("bad dev token: got %d, want 401", w.Code)
}
}
func signHS256(t *testing.T, secret, sub, jti, scope string, exp time.Time) string {
t.Helper()
sig, err := jose.NewSigner(
jose.SigningKey{Algorithm: jose.HS256, Key: DeriveHS256Key(secret)},
(&jose.SignerOptions{}).WithType("JWT"),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("signer: %v", err)
func TestClaimsTier(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
scope string
tier string
guest bool
}{
{"app:cdrop:guest", "guest", true},
{"app:cdrop:full", "full", false},
{"full", "full", false},
{"app:cdrop", "cdrop", false},
{"", "", false},
}
std := jwt.Claims{
Subject: sub,
ID: jti,
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
Expiry: jwt.NewNumericDate(exp),
}
tok, err := jwt.Signed(sig).Claims(std).Claims(map[string]any{"scope": scope}).Serialize()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("serialize: %v", err)
}
return tok
}
func serveBearer(a *Authenticator, tok string) (int, *Claims) {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/clipboard", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
req.Header.Set("X-Device-Name", "iPhone")
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
var got *Claims
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
got, _ = ClaimsFromContext(r.Context())
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
return rr.Code, got
}
// A valid HS256 shortcut token authenticates and carries its jti + stored scope;
// revocation, an unknown jti, and a subject/owner mismatch are all rejected even
// though the signature is valid — the store is the authority.
func TestShortcutToken_HS256VerifyRevokeAndScope(t *testing.T) {
secret := "test-hs256-secret-at-least-32-bytes-long" // HS256 needs >= 32 bytes
cfg := &config.Config{AuthMode: "prod", HS256Secret: secret}
exp := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
store := &fakeDeviceUpserter{tokens: map[string]db.ShortcutToken{
"jti-1": {Jti: "jti-1", UserID: "user-x", Scopes: "clipboard", ExpiresAt: exp.Unix()},
}}
a := New(cfg, store)
tok := signHS256(t, secret, "user-x", "jti-1", "clipboard", exp)
code, claims := serveBearer(a, tok)
if code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("valid token: got %d, want 200", code)
}
if claims == nil || !claims.Scoped() || claims.JTI != "jti-1" || !claims.HasScope("clipboard") {
t.Fatalf("claims not populated as scoped clipboard token: %+v", claims)
}
// The device registers under the (ASCII) X-Device-Name the request carried.
if len(store.calls) == 0 || store.calls[len(store.calls)-1].Name != "iPhone" {
t.Errorf("expected device name from header, got %+v", store.calls)
}
// Subject mismatch: stored row owned by a different user than the token's sub.
store.tokens["jti-1"] = db.ShortcutToken{Jti: "jti-1", UserID: "someone-else", Scopes: "clipboard", ExpiresAt: exp.Unix()}
if code, _ := serveBearer(a, tok); code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("subject mismatch: got %d, want 401", code)
}
// Revoked row → reject.
store.tokens["jti-1"] = db.ShortcutToken{Jti: "jti-1", UserID: "user-x", Scopes: "clipboard", Revoked: 1, ExpiresAt: exp.Unix()}
if code, _ := serveBearer(a, tok); code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("revoked token: got %d, want 401", code)
}
// Unknown jti (signed but no stored row) → reject.
ghost := signHS256(t, secret, "user-x", "ghost", "clipboard", exp)
if code, _ := serveBearer(a, ghost); code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("unknown jti: got %d, want 401", code)
}
}
// An HS256 token WITHOUT a jti must be rejected outright (G1): the HS256 path
// only ever signs scoped shortcut tokens, which always carry a jti. A jti-less
// but validly-signed token would otherwise fall through as a full, unscoped
// account session with a self-declared subject — so a leaked HS256 secret could
// mint arbitrary-subject sessions far beyond the clipboard scope. Requiring the
// jti pins a leaked secret's blast radius to clipboard-only.
func TestShortcutToken_HS256RejectsMissingJTI(t *testing.T) {
secret := "test-hs256-secret-at-least-32-bytes-long"
cfg := &config.Config{AuthMode: "prod", HS256Secret: secret}
a := New(cfg, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
tok := signHS256(t, secret, "user-x", "", "clipboard", time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
if code, _ := serveBearer(a, tok); code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("jti-less HS256 token must be rejected, got %d", code)
}
}
func TestSanitizeDeviceName(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct{ in, want string }{
{"iPhone", "iPhone"},
{" My iPad ", "My iPad"},
{"我的iPhone", "iPhone"}, // CJK stripped
{"我的电脑", ""}, // all non-ASCII → empty (caller falls back)
{"Mac Book", "MacBook"}, // NBSP dropped
}
for _, c := range cases {
if got := SanitizeDeviceName(c.in); got != c.want {
t.Errorf("SanitizeDeviceName(%q) = %q, want %q", c.in, got, c.want)
for _, tc := range cases {
c := &Claims{Scope: tc.scope}
if c.Tier() != tc.tier {
t.Errorf("Tier(%q): got %q, want %q", tc.scope, c.Tier(), tc.tier)
}
if c.Guest() != tc.guest {
t.Errorf("Guest(%q): got %v, want %v", tc.scope, c.Guest(), tc.guest)
}
}
}
// A self-signed session token is bound to its web_session row: once the row is
// revoked (deleted), the token is rejected on its next request even though it is
// still cryptographically valid and unexpired — "log out this device" is immediate
// (AUTH.md §1/§3.1).
func TestSelfToken_RejectedAfterSessionRevoked(t *testing.T) {
secret := "test-session-secret-at-least-32-bytes-long"
exp := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
live := New(&config.Config{AuthMode: "prod", SessionSecret: secret}, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
if c, _ := serveBearer(live, signSelfToken(t, secret, "user-x", "session", "full", exp)); c != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("token with a live session: got %d, want 200", c)
func TestSanitizeDeviceName(t *testing.T) {
if got := SanitizeDeviceName(" Alice's Mac "); got != "Alice's Mac" {
t.Errorf("trim: got %q", got)
}
revoked := New(&config.Config{AuthMode: "prod", SessionSecret: secret},
&fakeDeviceUpserter{revokedSIDs: map[string]bool{"test-sid": true}})
if c, _ := serveBearer(revoked, signSelfToken(t, secret, "user-x", "session", "full", exp)); c != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("token whose session was revoked must be rejected, got %d", c)
// Non-ASCII is stripped (the name rides an HTTP header).
if got := SanitizeDeviceName("名字abc"); got != "abc" {
t.Errorf("non-ascii strip: got %q", got)
}
}
// signSelfToken mints a cdrop self-signed session token the way httpapi.mintSessionToken
// does: HS256 over DeriveSessionTokenKey, with typ + scope custom claims and no jti.
func signSelfToken(t *testing.T, secret, sub, typ, scope string, exp time.Time) string {
t.Helper()
sig, err := jose.NewSigner(
jose.SigningKey{Algorithm: jose.HS256, Key: DeriveSessionTokenKey(secret)},
(&jose.SignerOptions{}).WithType("JWT"),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("signer: %v", err)
func TestNormalizeDeviceType(t *testing.T) {
for _, in := range []string{"macos", "windows", "linux", "ios", "browser"} {
if got := normalizeDeviceType(in); got != in {
t.Errorf("normalizeDeviceType(%q): got %q", in, got)
}
}
std := jwt.Claims{
Subject: sub,
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
Expiry: jwt.NewNumericDate(exp),
}
tok, err := jwt.Signed(sig).Claims(std).Claims(map[string]any{"typ": typ, "scope": scope, "sid": "test-sid"}).Serialize()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("serialize: %v", err)
}
return tok
}
// A cdrop self-signed session token authenticates as a full or guest session;
// guest is capability-limited (Guest() true). A wrong typ or an unknown scope is
// rejected, and the SessionSecret-derived key is domain-isolated from the HS256
// shortcut key so the two token families never cross-validate (AUTH.md §3.1).
func TestSelfToken_ScopeAndKeyIsolation(t *testing.T) {
secret := "test-session-secret-at-least-32-bytes-long"
a := New(&config.Config{AuthMode: "prod", SessionSecret: secret}, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
exp := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
// Full session: authenticates, not scoped, not guest.
code, claims := serveBearer(a, signSelfToken(t, secret, "user-x", "session", "full", exp))
if code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("full session token: got %d, want 200", code)
}
if claims == nil || claims.UserID != "user-x" || claims.SessionScope != "full" || claims.Scoped() || claims.Guest() {
t.Fatalf("full session claims wrong: %+v", claims)
}
// Guest session: authenticates and is marked guest (capability-limited).
code, claims = serveBearer(a, signSelfToken(t, secret, "user-x", "session", "guest", exp))
if code != http.StatusOK || claims == nil || !claims.Guest() || claims.Scoped() {
t.Fatalf("guest session: code=%d claims=%+v", code, claims)
}
// Wrong typ (not "session") signed with the session key → rejected.
if c, _ := serveBearer(a, signSelfToken(t, secret, "user-x", "other", "full", exp)); c != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("wrong typ: got %d, want 401", c)
}
// Unknown scope → rejected (no privilege-by-typo).
if c, _ := serveBearer(a, signSelfToken(t, secret, "user-x", "session", "admin", exp)); c != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("invalid scope: got %d, want 401", c)
}
// Key-domain isolation: with BOTH secrets set, the two families stay disjoint —
// a session token never becomes scoped, a shortcut token never becomes a session.
hsSecret := "test-hs256-secret-at-least-32-bytes-long"
store := &fakeDeviceUpserter{tokens: map[string]db.ShortcutToken{
"jti-1": {Jti: "jti-1", UserID: "user-x", Scopes: "clipboard", ExpiresAt: exp.Unix()},
}}
ab := New(&config.Config{AuthMode: "prod", SessionSecret: secret, HS256Secret: hsSecret}, store)
if _, sc := serveBearer(ab, signSelfToken(t, secret, "user-x", "session", "guest", exp)); sc == nil || sc.Scoped() || !sc.Guest() {
t.Errorf("session token leaked into scoped path: %+v", sc)
}
if _, hc := serveBearer(ab, signHS256(t, hsSecret, "user-x", "jti-1", "clipboard", exp)); hc == nil || !hc.Scoped() || hc.SessionScope != "" {
t.Errorf("shortcut token leaked into session path: %+v", hc)
}
// No SessionSecret on the server → self tokens are unverifiable (key nil).
noSecret := New(&config.Config{AuthMode: "prod", HS256Secret: hsSecret}, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
if c, _ := serveBearer(noSecret, signSelfToken(t, secret, "user-x", "session", "full", exp)); c != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("self token without server SessionSecret must be rejected, got %d", c)
if got := normalizeDeviceType("rogue"); got != "browser" {
t.Errorf("unknown type should fall back to browser; got %q", got)
}
}