Files
admin a2cad11224 后台/会话三诉求:子会话(一台设备一会话)+ 离线消息队列 + 被登出推送 + 后台唤醒层
- Req 1 子会话(iOS 多进程在用户视角=一台设备一会话,内部多条独立刷新逻辑会话):brokerclient 加 MintParams.Sub + SessionInfo.Sub + RevokeDeviceSessions(user,meta) 级联;device-session sub!="" 挂在主 device_id 之下、走 tier=clipboard 且不建第二个 device 行;handleSessionsList 按 meta 归并、隐藏 sub!=""(但保留“仅控件会话存活”的设备,不简单丢弃);revokeDevice 改走 meta 级联(移除设备连带吊控件子会话)。iOS provisionWidgetSessionIfNeeded 改用主 device_id + sub="widget"(弃用独立 dev_widget),控件令牌仍隔离持有、独立刷新——不碰引擎主会话,#7 隔离不变。蓝本 auth/docs/子会话方案.md(cdrop 提案 + Broker 评审接受 + cdrop 确认 6 点:用 sub、R1 cdrop 归并、scope 复用 tier=clipboard、级联 DELETE …?meta=)。
- Req 2a 离线消息队列:新增 pending_messages 表(0001_init + sqlc 查询);message.go 收件设备离线即入队(无论是否配推送都入队,恒 202),修“离线消息只随推送横幅一闪、不入收件列表”;GET /api/messages/pending 取即删(DELETE..RETURNING,单次投递);web hub.ts onOpen 每次 SSE 连接 / 重连即拉取补收、逐条 addMessage(全端受益,iOS 经桥推原生 + 累积未读);复用 login-request reaper 清 TTL。
- Req 3 被登出推送:push 加 KindSessionRevoked + 本地化文案,apns/web 双通道;revokeDevice 加 notifyRevoked 参(跨端 revoke=true、自登出=false),跨端移除时推送告知被踢设备;iOS AppDelegate 收 session:revoked 即清 Keychain 主会话 + 控件会话、发 .cdropSessionRevoked,前台经 AppRoot 即时回登录页、关闭态下次启动即登出。
- #6 后台唤醒层:apns apsEnvelope 加 content-available:1(服务端有消息时既弹可点横幅又短暂后台唤醒);iOS DeviceItem 加 Codable、presence 快照持久化(冷启即时显示设备列表,缓解“长时间重连”观感,SSE 一连即整组替换自校正);控件会话回前台补铸(scenePhase active)+ content-available 唤醒时刷新隔离的控件会话(剪贴板保活,绝不碰引擎主会话以免 #7 回归)。
- 测试:qr_test mock broker 加 sub 幂等键 + 级联吊销端点;bootstrap_test 期望表集加 pending_messages。
2026-06-27 17:42:53 +08:00

84 lines
2.6 KiB
Go

package httpapi
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"time"
"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/db"
)
// Shared HTTP helpers for the auth surface. After the Auth Broker migration (path A)
// cdrop no longer keeps server-side sessions, cookies, or refresh tokens — identity
// and session lifecycle live in the broker. What remains here is the CSRF origin
// check, the scan-login poll-secret hash, and the login-request reaper.
// deriveSiteOrigin extracts scheme://host from the configured public URL to give the
// CSRF Origin check a fixed expected value (and the scan-login QR its link origin).
// Empty / unparseable (dev) disables the origin check.
func deriveSiteOrigin(publicURL string) string {
if publicURL == "" {
return ""
}
u, err := url.Parse(publicURL)
if err != nil || u.Scheme == "" || u.Host == "" {
return ""
}
return u.Scheme + "://" + u.Host
}
// sessionID hashes an opaque token to its storage form (hex SHA-256). The scan-login
// poll_secret is stored as this hash — the new device holds the plaintext, so a leaked
// DB never yields a usable secret.
func sessionID(raw string) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(raw))
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
// sameOrigin is belt-and-suspenders CSRF defence: when the browser sends an Origin
// header (always, on fetch POST) it must match the deployment's own origin. Absent
// Origin (non-browser clients) is allowed, as is an unconfigured site origin (dev).
func (s *Server) sameOrigin(r *http.Request) bool {
origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
if origin == "" || s.siteOrigin == "" {
return true
}
return origin == s.siteOrigin
}
func truncate(s string, n int) string {
if len(s) <= n {
return s
}
return s[:n] + "…"
}
// RunLoginRequestReaper periodically reclaims expired scan-login request rows. They
// are short-lived (default 120s) and already rejected at use time; this sweeps the
// stragglers that are opened and never collected.
func RunLoginRequestReaper(ctx context.Context, q *db.Queries) {
ticker := time.NewTicker(1 * time.Hour)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-ticker.C:
now := time.Now().Unix()
if n, err := q.DeleteExpiredLoginRequests(ctx, now); err != nil {
slog.Warn("login request reaper failed", "err", err)
} else if n > 0 {
slog.Info("login requests reaped", "count", n)
}
// 顺带清陈旧未取走的离线消息(同 1h 节律,复用本 goroutine)。
if err := q.DeleteExpiredPendingMessages(ctx, now); err != nil {
slog.Warn("pending message reaper failed", "err", err)
}
}
}
}