10cf36ecee
后端(委托 Auth Broker,路径 A): - 删自建鉴权(OIDC exchange / 自签会话 / step-up / shortcut / web_sessions / accounts),cdrop 不再存任何凭证;鉴权中间件改读边缘注入的 X-Auth-Subject/Scope/Meta/Name/Roles 头(dev 旁路保留);Claims 加 Tier() / Guest() - internal/brokerclient:mint / revoke(带 X-Broker-App)/ refresh / ListSessions(R1 列举),直连内网、吊销幂等 统一会话模型“委派设备会话”(Delegated Device Sessions): - 每个客户端(浏览器 / 桌面 / 扫码设备)=一条带 meta(device_id) + label 的 broker 机器会话;Broker 作设备会话唯一注册表(R1 按用户+app 列举 + R2 按 (user,app,meta) 幂等铸造),cdrop 退化为薄覆盖层、不再自存权威会话表 - 新增代铸端点 POST /api/auth/device-session:凭边缘已验明的 X-Auth-Subject 委托 broker 铸 / 轮换设备会话(meta=device_id、按调用方 tier 防越权、sameOrigin CSRF、per-IP 限流);R2 幂等保证同一 device_id 重登原地轮换、不堆重复设备 - 会话列表=R1 权威 + 叠加 type(本地缓存)/ online(Hub presence,按设备名)/ current(meta 匹配本请求 X-Auth-Meta)+ 过滤 meta=""(device-authorize 引导会话残留);devices 表降级为 type/presence 薄缓存(非会话权威),device_id 主键、upsert 按 user 限定 - 吊销按 device_id → 缓存优先 / R1 兜底解析 sid → broker 吊销 + X-Broker-App;扫码登录保留三密钥编排,collect 改委托 broker 铸 + 落缓存行 Web 前端: - 登录走 broker 全局 SSO 代跳(/api/auth/login 302);bootstrap 经 /api/me 注入身份后代铸设备会话(稳定 device_id 存 localStorage、Web Locks 跨 tab 串行防重复铸造);refresh 走 /api/auth/refresh - 设备管理按 device_id;改名=同 device_id 重代铸(R2 原地轮换换 label、不产生重复行);登录页反应式守卫修登录回环 - 去 OIDC PKCE / step-up(删 oauth.callback / stepUp) 桌面客户端(Wails): - loopback PKCE(RFC 8252)改指 broker 设备授权流(/device/authorize + /device/token)拿引导令牌,再代铸出带 meta 的托管设备会话——与浏览器同模型、同管理、同吊销;身份取自代铸响应(修“显示名显示为 UUID”);refresh 保留显示名;稳定 device_id 入桌面配置 iOS 客户端(arch A,原生 SwiftUI + 离屏无头 WebView 引擎 + 原生↔JS 桥): - 引擎 / 文件管理 / 设备管理 / 应用图标 / 本地化(此前实现,随本次落入版本库) - 鉴权=引擎自刷(boot 注入 refresh_token)+ broker 轮换经 sessionRotated 回报原生更新 Keychain;去 cookie 同步;Session 加 refreshToken / deviceId 实时 / 健壮性: - presence 走 Hub union(设备表行 ∪ 表外实时连接,按名去重、live-only 标在线) - Hub 通道 close 一律在写锁内、非阻塞 send 一律在读锁内,消除 close-vs-send 闭通道 send panic(revoke 每次 Kick 后该路径变热) 配置 / 删旧栈: - config 改 broker 接入(CDROP_BROKER_* / CDROP_PUBLIC_URL / 按档 TTL),prod 强校验 broker 配置 + PUBLIC_URL(CSRF Origin 守卫不失效) - 删 auth.go / selftoken.go / shortcut.go / jwks.go + 三表(web_sessions / accounts / shortcut_tokens)及验证链;.env.example / compose.snippet.yaml / Caddyfile.snippet 更新为 broker 模型(人机分流 + 公开端点放行 + X-Auth-Meta 透传) - 测试全重写:QR / 会话含 mock broker(R1 列举 + R2 幂等);hub 加 close-vs-send 并发回归;config 加 prod 必填校验
266 lines
8.9 KiB
Go
266 lines
8.9 KiB
Go
// Package platform implements cdrop desktop's native capabilities — the Go
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// shell that the shared web UI drives over Wails bindings.
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//
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// This file owns the login flow: the Auth Broker device-authorization flow (RFC
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// 8252 loopback redirect with PKCE, as a public client — no secret). The desktop
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// opens the system browser at the broker's consent page; on approval the broker
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// redirects to the loopback /callback with a one-time code, which Go exchanges
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// (with the PKCE verifier) for a broker machine token. The verifier and the
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// resulting tokens never enter the WebView / JS context — refresh is Go-driven.
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package platform
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"time"
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)
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// OAuthConfig carries the Auth Broker coordinates. BrokerURL is the broker's PUBLIC
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// origin (e.g. https://sso.commilitia.net); App is this app's key in the broker apps
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// registry ("cdrop"). The app's loopback redirect must be registered in the broker's
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// apps.json (redirect_uris) for the device flow to accept it.
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type OAuthConfig struct {
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BrokerURL string
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App string
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}
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// TokenResult is the subset of the broker token response the shell keeps. ExpiresIn
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// is derived from the broker's access_expires (unix) at parse time.
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type TokenResult struct {
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AccessToken string
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RefreshToken string
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ExpiresIn int
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}
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// Flow runs one interactive login. openURL is injected so production uses Wails'
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// runtime.BrowserOpenURL while tests substitute a fake user-agent.
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type Flow struct {
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cfg OAuthConfig
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openURL func(string)
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client *http.Client
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timeout time.Duration
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}
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// NewFlow builds a Flow with sane defaults: a 30s HTTP client for the token
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// exchange and a 3-minute ceiling on the whole interactive login.
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func NewFlow(cfg OAuthConfig, openURL func(string)) *Flow {
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return &Flow{
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cfg: cfg,
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openURL: openURL,
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client: &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second},
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timeout: 3 * time.Minute,
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}
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}
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// Login performs the broker device-authorization loopback PKCE flow and returns the
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// minted machine token.
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//
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// Steps: generate verifier/challenge/state → bind an ephemeral 127.0.0.1 listener →
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// open the system browser at the broker's /device/authorize (which sends the user
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// through broker SSO if needed, then shows a consent page) → wait for the browser to
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// hit the loopback /callback with the code → validate state → exchange code+verifier
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// at /device/token. The verifier never leaves Go.
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func (f *Flow) Login(ctx context.Context) (*TokenResult, error) {
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if f.cfg.BrokerURL == "" || f.cfg.App == "" {
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return nil, errors.New("oauth: incomplete config (broker_url / app)")
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}
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verifier, challenge, err := newPKCE()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("oauth: pkce: %w", err)
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}
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state, err := randString(24)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("oauth: state: %w", err)
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}
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// RFC 8252 §7.3: bind the IPv4 loopback literal (not "localhost") on an
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// OS-assigned ephemeral port.
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ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("oauth: loopback listen: %w", err)
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}
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defer ln.Close()
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redirectURI := fmt.Sprintf("http://127.0.0.1:%d/callback", ln.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr).Port)
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type cbResult struct {
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code string
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err error
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}
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resCh := make(chan cbResult, 1)
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send := func(r cbResult) {
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// non-blocking: only the first callback wins, later ones are dropped.
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select {
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case resCh <- r:
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default:
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}
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}
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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mux.HandleFunc("/callback", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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q := r.URL.Query()
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if e := q.Get("error"); e != "" {
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writeClosePage(w, false)
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send(cbResult{err: fmt.Errorf("oauth: authorization denied: %s", e)})
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return
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}
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if q.Get("state") != state {
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writeClosePage(w, false)
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send(cbResult{err: errors.New("oauth: state mismatch (possible CSRF)")})
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return
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}
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code := q.Get("code")
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if code == "" {
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writeClosePage(w, false)
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send(cbResult{err: errors.New("oauth: callback missing code")})
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return
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}
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writeClosePage(w, true)
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send(cbResult{code: code})
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})
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srv := &http.Server{Handler: mux}
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go func() { _ = srv.Serve(ln) }()
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defer srv.Close()
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authURL := strings.TrimRight(f.cfg.BrokerURL, "/") + "/device/authorize?" + url.Values{
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"app": {f.cfg.App},
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"redirect_uri": {redirectURI},
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"state": {state},
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"code_challenge": {challenge},
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"code_challenge_method": {"S256"},
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"description": {"cdrop 桌面客户端"},
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}.Encode()
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f.openURL(authURL)
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select {
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case <-ctx.Done():
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return nil, ctx.Err()
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case <-time.After(f.timeout):
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return nil, errors.New("oauth: login timed out")
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case res := <-resCh:
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if res.err != nil {
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return nil, res.err
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}
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return f.exchange(ctx, res.code, verifier, redirectURI)
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}
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}
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// exchange trades the authorization code + PKCE verifier (+ the same redirect_uri)
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// for the broker machine token at /device/token.
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func (f *Flow) exchange(ctx context.Context, code, verifier, redirectURI string) (*TokenResult, error) {
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return f.postJSON(ctx, strings.TrimRight(f.cfg.BrokerURL, "/")+"/device/token", map[string]string{
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"code": code,
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"code_verifier": verifier,
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"redirect_uri": redirectURI,
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})
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}
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// Refresh exchanges a refresh credential for a fresh access token (+ rotated refresh)
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// at the broker's /refresh. Call it when the access token nears expiry; the refresh
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// credential never leaves Go, so refresh is driven from the shell, not the WebView.
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func (f *Flow) Refresh(ctx context.Context, refreshToken string) (*TokenResult, error) {
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if f.cfg.BrokerURL == "" {
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return nil, errors.New("oauth: incomplete config (broker_url)")
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}
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if refreshToken == "" {
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return nil, errors.New("oauth: empty refresh token")
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}
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return f.postJSON(ctx, strings.TrimRight(f.cfg.BrokerURL, "/")+"/refresh", map[string]string{
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"refresh": refreshToken,
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})
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}
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// brokerTokenResp is the broker's response shape for /device/token and /refresh.
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type brokerTokenResp struct {
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Access string `json:"access"`
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Refresh string `json:"refresh"`
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AccessExpires int64 `json:"access_expires"`
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}
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// postJSON POSTs a JSON body to a broker token endpoint and decodes the response.
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// Shared by the device-token exchange and refresh.
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func (f *Flow) postJSON(ctx context.Context, endpoint string, body map[string]string) (*TokenResult, error) {
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buf, err := json.Marshal(body)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("oauth: marshal token request: %w", err)
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, endpoint, strings.NewReader(string(buf)))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("oauth: build token request: %w", err)
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}
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
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resp, err := f.client.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("oauth: token request: %w", err)
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("oauth: token endpoint status %d", resp.StatusCode)
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}
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var tr brokerTokenResp
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if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&tr); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("oauth: decode token: %w", err)
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}
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if tr.Access == "" {
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return nil, errors.New("oauth: token response missing access")
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}
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expiresIn := int(tr.AccessExpires - time.Now().Unix())
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if expiresIn < 0 {
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expiresIn = 0
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}
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return &TokenResult{AccessToken: tr.Access, RefreshToken: tr.Refresh, ExpiresIn: expiresIn}, nil
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}
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// --- PKCE (RFC 7636) ---
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func newPKCE() (verifier, challenge string, err error) {
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verifier, err = randString(64) // 43–128 chars required; 64 is comfortable
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", err
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}
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sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(verifier))
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challenge = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sum[:])
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return verifier, challenge, nil
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}
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// randString returns n characters of base64url-encoded crypto-random data. The
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// base64url alphabet (A–Z a–z 0–9 - _) is a subset of the PKCE unreserved set,
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// so the output is a valid code_verifier / state.
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func randString(n int) (string, error) {
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b := make([]byte, n)
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if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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s := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b)
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if len(s) > n {
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s = s[:n]
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}
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return s, nil
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}
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// writeClosePage is what the browser tab lands on after the redirect. The tab
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// usually can't be closed by script (it wasn't script-opened), so the text is
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// the real affordance; the close attempt is best-effort.
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func writeClosePage(w http.ResponseWriter, ok bool) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
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msg := "已登录,可关闭本页返回 cdrop。"
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if !ok {
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msg = "登录未完成,可关闭本页返回 cdrop 重试。"
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}
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fmt.Fprintf(w, `<!doctype html><html lang="zh-Hans"><head><meta charset="utf-8"><title>cdrop</title></head>`+
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`<body style="font-family:system-ui,sans-serif;text-align:center;margin-top:20vh">`+
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`<p>%s</p><script>setTimeout(function(){window.close();},800);</script></body></html>`, msg)
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}
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