10cf36ecee
后端(委托 Auth Broker,路径 A): - 删自建鉴权(OIDC exchange / 自签会话 / step-up / shortcut / web_sessions / accounts),cdrop 不再存任何凭证;鉴权中间件改读边缘注入的 X-Auth-Subject/Scope/Meta/Name/Roles 头(dev 旁路保留);Claims 加 Tier() / Guest() - internal/brokerclient:mint / revoke(带 X-Broker-App)/ refresh / ListSessions(R1 列举),直连内网、吊销幂等 统一会话模型“委派设备会话”(Delegated Device Sessions): - 每个客户端(浏览器 / 桌面 / 扫码设备)=一条带 meta(device_id) + label 的 broker 机器会话;Broker 作设备会话唯一注册表(R1 按用户+app 列举 + R2 按 (user,app,meta) 幂等铸造),cdrop 退化为薄覆盖层、不再自存权威会话表 - 新增代铸端点 POST /api/auth/device-session:凭边缘已验明的 X-Auth-Subject 委托 broker 铸 / 轮换设备会话(meta=device_id、按调用方 tier 防越权、sameOrigin CSRF、per-IP 限流);R2 幂等保证同一 device_id 重登原地轮换、不堆重复设备 - 会话列表=R1 权威 + 叠加 type(本地缓存)/ online(Hub presence,按设备名)/ current(meta 匹配本请求 X-Auth-Meta)+ 过滤 meta=""(device-authorize 引导会话残留);devices 表降级为 type/presence 薄缓存(非会话权威),device_id 主键、upsert 按 user 限定 - 吊销按 device_id → 缓存优先 / R1 兜底解析 sid → broker 吊销 + X-Broker-App;扫码登录保留三密钥编排,collect 改委托 broker 铸 + 落缓存行 Web 前端: - 登录走 broker 全局 SSO 代跳(/api/auth/login 302);bootstrap 经 /api/me 注入身份后代铸设备会话(稳定 device_id 存 localStorage、Web Locks 跨 tab 串行防重复铸造);refresh 走 /api/auth/refresh - 设备管理按 device_id;改名=同 device_id 重代铸(R2 原地轮换换 label、不产生重复行);登录页反应式守卫修登录回环 - 去 OIDC PKCE / step-up(删 oauth.callback / stepUp) 桌面客户端(Wails): - loopback PKCE(RFC 8252)改指 broker 设备授权流(/device/authorize + /device/token)拿引导令牌,再代铸出带 meta 的托管设备会话——与浏览器同模型、同管理、同吊销;身份取自代铸响应(修“显示名显示为 UUID”);refresh 保留显示名;稳定 device_id 入桌面配置 iOS 客户端(arch A,原生 SwiftUI + 离屏无头 WebView 引擎 + 原生↔JS 桥): - 引擎 / 文件管理 / 设备管理 / 应用图标 / 本地化(此前实现,随本次落入版本库) - 鉴权=引擎自刷(boot 注入 refresh_token)+ broker 轮换经 sessionRotated 回报原生更新 Keychain;去 cookie 同步;Session 加 refreshToken / deviceId 实时 / 健壮性: - presence 走 Hub union(设备表行 ∪ 表外实时连接,按名去重、live-only 标在线) - Hub 通道 close 一律在写锁内、非阻塞 send 一律在读锁内,消除 close-vs-send 闭通道 send panic(revoke 每次 Kick 后该路径变热) 配置 / 删旧栈: - config 改 broker 接入(CDROP_BROKER_* / CDROP_PUBLIC_URL / 按档 TTL),prod 强校验 broker 配置 + PUBLIC_URL(CSRF Origin 守卫不失效) - 删 auth.go / selftoken.go / shortcut.go / jwks.go + 三表(web_sessions / accounts / shortcut_tokens)及验证链;.env.example / compose.snippet.yaml / Caddyfile.snippet 更新为 broker 模型(人机分流 + 公开端点放行 + X-Auth-Meta 透传) - 测试全重写:QR / 会话含 mock broker(R1 列举 + R2 幂等);hub 加 close-vs-send 并发回归;config 加 prod 必填校验
60 lines
2.2 KiB
Go
60 lines
2.2 KiB
Go
package httpapi
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import (
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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)
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type authConfigResp struct {
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AuthMode string `json:"auth_mode"`
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BrokerURL string `json:"broker_url"`
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BrokerApp string `json:"broker_app"`
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}
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// handleAuthConfig publishes the Auth Broker coordinates native clients (the desktop)
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// need to run the broker device-authorization flow: the broker's public URL + this
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// app's key in the broker apps registry. Public (it bootstraps native login).
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func (s *Server) handleAuthConfig(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, authConfigResp{
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AuthMode: s.cfg.AuthMode,
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BrokerURL: s.cfg.BrokerPublicURL,
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BrokerApp: s.cfg.BrokerAppOrDefault(),
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})
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}
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// handleAuthLogin 302-redirects the browser to the Auth Broker's public login page
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// for global SSO (the broker handles Casdoor and sets its domain cookie; on return the
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// edge injects X-Auth from that cookie). cdrop owns this redirect so the broker's
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// public URL lives in one server-side config. Public (it bootstraps login). The rd
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// (return target) is constrained to this deployment's own origin — an open-redirect
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// guard — defaulting to the site root.
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func (s *Server) handleAuthLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if s.cfg.BrokerPublicURL == "" {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, map[string]string{"error": "login redirect not configured"})
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return
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}
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rd := s.safeReturnTarget(r.URL.Query().Get("rd"))
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dest := strings.TrimRight(s.cfg.BrokerPublicURL, "/") + "/login?rd=" + url.QueryEscape(rd)
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http.Redirect(w, r, dest, http.StatusFound)
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}
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// safeReturnTarget validates a post-login return URL against this deployment's origin,
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// falling back to the site root. It blocks open redirects: only a same-origin absolute
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// URL (or, when no site origin is configured in dev, a site-relative path) is accepted.
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func (s *Server) safeReturnTarget(rd string) string {
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if s.siteOrigin == "" {
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// dev: accept only a site-relative path, never an absolute URL.
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if strings.HasPrefix(rd, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(rd, "//") {
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return rd
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}
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return "/"
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}
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if u, err := url.Parse(rd); err == nil && u.Scheme != "" && u.Host != "" {
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if u.Scheme+"://"+u.Host == s.siteOrigin {
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return rd
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}
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}
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return s.siteOrigin + "/"
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}
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