Files
Commilitia-Drop/internal/jwtauth/middleware_test.go
T
admin e51666c52e 浏览器免重登:HttpOnly cookie + 服务端 session 表 + 设备名持久化
- 新增 web_sessions 表(sqlc):refresh_token 以 AES-256-GCM 落盘,密钥取自
  CDROP_SESSION_SECRET(env、不在库内);cookie 仅存不透明随机串,表 id 存其
  SHA-256,故 DB 单独泄露既换不出可用 cookie、也解不出 token
- /auth/exchange 建 session 并下发 HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax; Path=/api/auth
  cookie,响应体不再回传 refresh_token
- /auth/refresh 改为 cookie 驱动(7 天滑动失活),同时即开机静默免重登;
  新增 /auth/logout(删 session + 清 cookie)、/auth/device(写设备名入 session)
- device_name 随 session 存,开机 refresh 带回前端,抗 iOS PWA 存储清除;
  setup / 改名时 syncWebDeviceName 推送服务端
- striped per-session 锁串行化同会话并发 refresh,防一次性 refresh_token 被
  花两次而把用户从所有 tab 登出
- 前端 store 移除 refreshToken 字段(长寿命凭据彻底不进 JS);main.tsx 首屏前
  bootstrapAuth 用 cookie 静默续期,命中直接进已登录态、避免登录页闪现
- config:prod 强制 CDROP_SESSION_SECRET,缺失拒启动
- 桌面端不受影响(自有 loopback flow + Go keyring,不碰这两个端点)
2026-06-16 00:54:40 +08:00

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package jwtauth
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4/jwt"
"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/config"
"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/db"
)
// fakeDeviceUpserter records UpsertDevice calls without touching SQL and serves
// shortcut-token lookups from an in-memory map (empty → "not found", so plain
// device-only tests are unaffected).
type fakeDeviceUpserter struct {
calls []db.UpsertDeviceParams
err error
tokens map[string]db.ShortcutToken
}
func (f *fakeDeviceUpserter) UpsertDevice(_ context.Context, arg db.UpsertDeviceParams) error {
f.calls = append(f.calls, arg)
return f.err
}
func (f *fakeDeviceUpserter) GetShortcutToken(_ context.Context, jti string) (db.ShortcutToken, error) {
if t, ok := f.tokens[jti]; ok {
return t, nil
}
return db.ShortcutToken{}, sql.ErrNoRows
}
// TouchShortcutTokenUsed is a no-op in tests: it runs on a detached goroutine
// (touchTokenAsync), so recording into the fake here would race the test body.
func (f *fakeDeviceUpserter) TouchShortcutTokenUsed(_ context.Context, _ db.TouchShortcutTokenUsedParams) error {
return nil
}
// echo handler that responds with the claims+device discovered in context.
func echoMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
claims, _ := ClaimsFromContext(r.Context())
dev, _ := DeviceNameFromContext(r.Context())
resp := map[string]any{
"user_id": claims.UserID,
"groups": claims.Groups,
"device": dev,
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp)
}
func TestDevMode_AcceptsTokenAndUsesXDevUser(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{AuthMode: "dev", DevToken: "secret-token"}
dev := &fakeDeviceUpserter{}
a := New(cfg, dev)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer secret-token")
req.Header.Set("X-Dev-User", "alice")
req.Header.Set("X-Device-Name", "tab-1")
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(echoMe)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 200; body=%s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
}
var got map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(rr.Body.Bytes(), &got); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
}
if got["user_id"] != "alice" {
t.Errorf("user_id: got %v, want alice", got["user_id"])
}
if got["device"] != "tab-1" {
t.Errorf("device: got %v, want tab-1", got["device"])
}
if len(dev.calls) != 1 {
t.Errorf("UpsertDevice calls: got %d, want 1", len(dev.calls))
}
}
func TestDevMode_DefaultsUserIDWhenHeaderMissing(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{AuthMode: "dev", DevToken: "t"}
a := New(cfg, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer t")
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(echoMe)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 200", rr.Code)
}
var got map[string]any
_ = json.Unmarshal(rr.Body.Bytes(), &got)
if got["user_id"] != "dev-user" {
t.Errorf("user_id: got %v, want dev-user", got["user_id"])
}
}
func TestDevMode_RejectsWrongToken(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{AuthMode: "dev", DevToken: "right"}
a := New(cfg, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer wrong")
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(echoMe)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 401", rr.Code)
}
}
func TestDevMode_RejectsMissingHeader(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{AuthMode: "dev", DevToken: "x"}
a := New(cfg, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(echoMe)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 401", rr.Code)
}
}
// --- prod RS256 path ---
func newRSAKey(t *testing.T) *rsa.PrivateKey {
t.Helper()
k, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rsa keygen: %v", err)
}
return k
}
func startJWKSServer(t *testing.T, kid string, pub *rsa.PublicKey) *httptest.Server {
t.Helper()
jwk := jose.JSONWebKey{Key: pub, KeyID: kid, Algorithm: "RS256", Use: "sig"}
set := jose.JSONWebKeySet{Keys: []jose.JSONWebKey{jwk}}
body, err := json.Marshal(set)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal jwks: %v", err)
}
return httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write(body)
}))
}
func signRS256(t *testing.T, priv *rsa.PrivateKey, kid string, claims jwt.Claims, custom map[string]any) string {
t.Helper()
signer, err := jose.NewSigner(
jose.SigningKey{Algorithm: jose.RS256, Key: priv},
(&jose.SignerOptions{}).WithType("JWT").WithHeader("kid", kid),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new signer: %v", err)
}
tok, err := jwt.Signed(signer).Claims(claims).Claims(custom).Serialize()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sign: %v", err)
}
return tok
}
func TestProdMode_AcceptsValidRS256(t *testing.T) {
priv := newRSAKey(t)
kid := "key-1"
srv := startJWKSServer(t, kid, &priv.PublicKey)
defer srv.Close()
cfg := &config.Config{
AuthMode: "prod",
OIDCJWKSURL: srv.URL,
OIDCIssuer: "https://oauth.example/",
OIDCAudience: "cdrop",
}
a := New(cfg, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
now := time.Now()
std := jwt.Claims{
Issuer: "https://oauth.example/",
Subject: "user-bob",
Audience: jwt.Audience{"cdrop"},
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
Expiry: jwt.NewNumericDate(now.Add(time.Hour)),
}
tok := signRS256(t, priv, kid, std, map[string]any{"groups": []any{"users"}})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(echoMe)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 200; body=%s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
}
var got map[string]any
_ = json.Unmarshal(rr.Body.Bytes(), &got)
if got["user_id"] != "user-bob" {
t.Errorf("user_id: got %v, want user-bob", got["user_id"])
}
}
func TestProdMode_RejectsExpiredRS256(t *testing.T) {
priv := newRSAKey(t)
kid := "key-1"
srv := startJWKSServer(t, kid, &priv.PublicKey)
defer srv.Close()
cfg := &config.Config{
AuthMode: "prod",
OIDCJWKSURL: srv.URL,
OIDCIssuer: "https://oauth.example/",
OIDCAudience: "cdrop",
}
a := New(cfg, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
past := time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)
std := jwt.Claims{
Issuer: "https://oauth.example/",
Subject: "user-bob",
Audience: jwt.Audience{"cdrop"},
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(past),
Expiry: jwt.NewNumericDate(past.Add(time.Minute)), // already 59min stale
}
tok := signRS256(t, priv, kid, std, nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(echoMe)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 401; body=%s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
}
}
func TestProdMode_RejectsWrongIssuer(t *testing.T) {
priv := newRSAKey(t)
kid := "key-1"
srv := startJWKSServer(t, kid, &priv.PublicKey)
defer srv.Close()
cfg := &config.Config{
AuthMode: "prod",
OIDCJWKSURL: srv.URL,
OIDCIssuer: "https://oauth.example/",
OIDCAudience: "cdrop",
}
a := New(cfg, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
now := time.Now()
std := jwt.Claims{
Issuer: "https://attacker.example/",
Subject: "user-bob",
Audience: jwt.Audience{"cdrop"},
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
Expiry: jwt.NewNumericDate(now.Add(time.Hour)),
}
tok := signRS256(t, priv, kid, std, nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(echoMe)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 401; body=%s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
}
}
// Multi-audience (R1): one backend serving web + desktop clients. A desktop
// token carries aud=<desktop client_id>; it must pass when OIDCAudience lists
// both client_ids comma-separated, and still be rejected when its aud is in
// neither.
func TestProdMode_AcceptsSecondAudienceInList(t *testing.T) {
priv := newRSAKey(t)
kid := "key-1"
srv := startJWKSServer(t, kid, &priv.PublicKey)
defer srv.Close()
cfg := &config.Config{
AuthMode: "prod",
OIDCJWKSURL: srv.URL,
OIDCIssuer: "https://oauth.example/",
OIDCAudience: "cdrop-web , cdrop-desktop", // spaces trimmed
}
a := New(cfg, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
now := time.Now()
std := jwt.Claims{
Issuer: "https://oauth.example/",
Subject: "user-bob",
Audience: jwt.Audience{"cdrop-desktop"}, // the desktop client's aud
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
Expiry: jwt.NewNumericDate(now.Add(time.Hour)),
}
tok := signRS256(t, priv, kid, std, nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(echoMe)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 200; body=%s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
}
}
func TestProdMode_RejectsAudienceNotInList(t *testing.T) {
priv := newRSAKey(t)
kid := "key-1"
srv := startJWKSServer(t, kid, &priv.PublicKey)
defer srv.Close()
cfg := &config.Config{
AuthMode: "prod",
OIDCJWKSURL: srv.URL,
OIDCIssuer: "https://oauth.example/",
OIDCAudience: "cdrop-web,cdrop-desktop",
}
a := New(cfg, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
now := time.Now()
std := jwt.Claims{
Issuer: "https://oauth.example/",
Subject: "user-bob",
Audience: jwt.Audience{"some-other-client"},
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
Expiry: jwt.NewNumericDate(now.Add(time.Hour)),
}
tok := signRS256(t, priv, kid, std, nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(echoMe)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 401; body=%s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
}
}
// A nameless request (no X-Device-Name) must NOT register a device — preventing
// the random-fallback "Unknown Device" flood from polling clients.
func TestNamelessRequestSkipsDeviceUpsert(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{AuthMode: "dev", DevToken: "t"}
store := &fakeDeviceUpserter{}
a := New(cfg, store)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/clipboard/version", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer t") // no X-Device-Name
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want 200", rr.Code)
}
if len(store.calls) != 0 {
t.Errorf("nameless request must not upsert a device, got %d calls", len(store.calls))
}
}
func signHS256(t *testing.T, secret, sub, jti, scope string, exp time.Time) string {
t.Helper()
sig, err := jose.NewSigner(
jose.SigningKey{Algorithm: jose.HS256, Key: DeriveHS256Key(secret)},
(&jose.SignerOptions{}).WithType("JWT"),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("signer: %v", err)
}
std := jwt.Claims{
Subject: sub,
ID: jti,
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
Expiry: jwt.NewNumericDate(exp),
}
tok, err := jwt.Signed(sig).Claims(std).Claims(map[string]any{"scope": scope}).Serialize()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("serialize: %v", err)
}
return tok
}
func serveBearer(a *Authenticator, tok string) (int, *Claims) {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/clipboard", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
req.Header.Set("X-Device-Name", "iPhone")
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
var got *Claims
a.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
got, _ = ClaimsFromContext(r.Context())
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
return rr.Code, got
}
// A valid HS256 shortcut token authenticates and carries its jti + stored scope;
// revocation, an unknown jti, and a subject/owner mismatch are all rejected even
// though the signature is valid — the store is the authority.
func TestShortcutToken_HS256VerifyRevokeAndScope(t *testing.T) {
secret := "test-hs256-secret-at-least-32-bytes-long" // HS256 needs >= 32 bytes
cfg := &config.Config{AuthMode: "prod", HS256Secret: secret}
exp := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
store := &fakeDeviceUpserter{tokens: map[string]db.ShortcutToken{
"jti-1": {Jti: "jti-1", UserID: "user-x", Scopes: "clipboard", ExpiresAt: exp.Unix()},
}}
a := New(cfg, store)
tok := signHS256(t, secret, "user-x", "jti-1", "clipboard", exp)
code, claims := serveBearer(a, tok)
if code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("valid token: got %d, want 200", code)
}
if claims == nil || !claims.Scoped() || claims.JTI != "jti-1" || !claims.HasScope("clipboard") {
t.Fatalf("claims not populated as scoped clipboard token: %+v", claims)
}
// The device registers under the (ASCII) X-Device-Name the request carried.
if len(store.calls) == 0 || store.calls[len(store.calls)-1].Name != "iPhone" {
t.Errorf("expected device name from header, got %+v", store.calls)
}
// Subject mismatch: stored row owned by a different user than the token's sub.
store.tokens["jti-1"] = db.ShortcutToken{Jti: "jti-1", UserID: "someone-else", Scopes: "clipboard", ExpiresAt: exp.Unix()}
if code, _ := serveBearer(a, tok); code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("subject mismatch: got %d, want 401", code)
}
// Revoked row → reject.
store.tokens["jti-1"] = db.ShortcutToken{Jti: "jti-1", UserID: "user-x", Scopes: "clipboard", Revoked: 1, ExpiresAt: exp.Unix()}
if code, _ := serveBearer(a, tok); code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("revoked token: got %d, want 401", code)
}
// Unknown jti (signed but no stored row) → reject.
ghost := signHS256(t, secret, "user-x", "ghost", "clipboard", exp)
if code, _ := serveBearer(a, ghost); code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("unknown jti: got %d, want 401", code)
}
}
// An HS256 token WITHOUT a jti must be rejected outright (G1): the HS256 path
// only ever signs scoped shortcut tokens, which always carry a jti. A jti-less
// but validly-signed token would otherwise fall through as a full, unscoped
// account session with a self-declared subject — so a leaked HS256 secret could
// mint arbitrary-subject sessions far beyond the clipboard scope. Requiring the
// jti pins a leaked secret's blast radius to clipboard-only.
func TestShortcutToken_HS256RejectsMissingJTI(t *testing.T) {
secret := "test-hs256-secret-at-least-32-bytes-long"
cfg := &config.Config{AuthMode: "prod", HS256Secret: secret}
a := New(cfg, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
tok := signHS256(t, secret, "user-x", "", "clipboard", time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
if code, _ := serveBearer(a, tok); code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("jti-less HS256 token must be rejected, got %d", code)
}
}
func TestSanitizeDeviceName(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct{ in, want string }{
{"iPhone", "iPhone"},
{" My iPad ", "My iPad"},
{"我的iPhone", "iPhone"}, // CJK stripped
{"我的电脑", ""}, // all non-ASCII → empty (caller falls back)
{"Mac Book", "MacBook"}, // NBSP dropped
}
for _, c := range cases {
if got := SanitizeDeviceName(c.in); got != c.want {
t.Errorf("SanitizeDeviceName(%q) = %q, want %q", c.in, got, c.want)
}
}
}