登录子系统：OIDC 统一自签 token + 吊销即时生效 + 设备并入会话列表 + 应用内扫码 + 禁则修复

接续 90a3790（扫码 A0+A1+B + step-up 雏形）。蓝本见 AUTH.md。

OIDC 统一到 cdrop 自签 token
- /auth/exchange 先 JWKS 验 id_token 签名（自签 token 的唯一信任锚）再签 cdrop
  自签 HS256 access token（绑 sid），不再把 IdP RS256 下发浏览器；验签失败仅告警
  并回退 RS256（会话仍建、下次 refresh 自愈），登录不中断
- /auth/refresh oidc 路径仍打 IdP 轮换 refresh_token + 探测 IdP 侧吊销，但同样回
  自签 token；createWebSession 改返回行 id
- verify 链保留 RS256 分支仅供桌面端 loopback（其即时吊销留后续）

吊销即时生效 + 被吊销设备自知回退
- verifySelfToken 每请求按 sid 查 web_sessions 行，行删即拒 → 吊销在被吊销设备
  下一次请求即生效（不等 TTL），oidc / self / guest 一致
- 前端仅在「服务端以 401 确证会话失效」时 forceLogout 清登录态、回登录页；短期连接
  失败（5xx / 网络）一律保留登录态（refreshTokens 改三态 refreshed/invalid/transient，
  cookieRefresh 改 discriminated 结果）
- __root 反应式守卫：prod 下失登录态且非认证路由即跳登录页；新增 auth.sessionLost.* 三语

设备列表并入会话列表 + 孤儿自动清除
- GET /api/auth/sessions 统一 web_sessions 与原生客户端设备（桌面 / iOS，自 devices
  登记表呈现，native=true，离线也列）；同名不重复列出，排除 shortcut 与无会话 browser
- 吊销网页会话连带删其设备登记（无同名在用会话时）；原生「登出」走
  DELETE /api/devices/{name}（同要求 step-up）
- 新增 DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices（browser 型且无存活 web_session），接入设备清扫器（1h）

应用内扫码 + 聚珍崩溃 / CJK 禁则修复
- 登录页内置 getUserMedia + jsqr 扫码，不再外跳系统应用（避免开错浏览器）
- 修聚珍（cjk-autospace）MutationObserver 与 React 重渲染同子树冲突致的 insertBefore
  崩溃：扫码 / 显码 / 批准三状态机页整页跳过聚珍（data-jz-skip）
- 修流动正文未跑 CJK 禁则（jinze 为段落级、须 opt-in）：设置 / 快捷指令 / 桌面页一批
  hint 补 data-jz-level="paragraph" + justify，短标签 / 状态仍留文本级

step-up 完善
- auth_time 改可选（Casdoor 不下发，原强制致死循环）；stepped_up_at 按会话绑定、
  StepUpMaxAgeSeconds 窗口内不复要求；新增 POST /api/auth/stepup
- 批准页 persist 编进 step-up returnTo 防整页跳转丢失；scope 随档绑定（信任=full /
  仅此次=guest），默认偏安全的「仅此次」

文档与测试
- AUTH.md：折中架构、accounts 薄表、令牌架构、扫码流程、step-up、§4.4 统一会话列表
- 新增 Go 测试：OIDC 自签验证、verifySelfToken 吊销即拒、会话吊销连带删设备、
  统一会话列表（含原生 / 不含 shortcut / 不重复）、孤儿清扫、删设备需 step-up

internal/httpapi/auth.go

@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ import (
 
 // PROJECT_BRIEF.md §2 keeps the browser path on standard OIDC PKCE. Backend
 // proxies the token endpoint so the browser doesn't need a CORS-friendly OIDC
-// provider; the access_token still flows back to the browser unchanged.
+// provider. The browser is then handed a cdrop self-signed access token (sid-bound
+// to its web_sessions row), not the IdP's RS256 token, so OIDC web sessions verify
+// statefully and revoke immediately — unified with scan-login (AUTH.md §5).
 
 type authConfigResp struct {
 	AuthMode     string `json:"auth_mode"`
@@ -120,33 +122,58 @@ func (s *Server) handleAuthExchange(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	// Refresh the thin accounts row (display name / avatar / roles / match_key).
 	s.upsertAccount(r.Context(), identity)
 
-	// Stash the refresh_token server-side and hand the browser an opaque,
-	// HttpOnly cookie instead. Guarded so a deploy without the encryption key (or
-	// an IdP that returned no refresh_token) still logs the user in — they just
-	// don't get passwordless re-login and re-auth on the next access-token expiry.
+	// By default the browser holds a cdrop self-signed access token (sid-bound),
+	// not the IdP's RS256 token — so the OIDC web session is verified statefully on
+	// every request (verifySelfToken → web_sessions lookup) and revoking the row
+	// logs this device out on its very next call, exactly like scan-login. We mint
+	// it only after stashing the refresh_token server-side (encrypted, behind an
+	// HttpOnly cookie) so the session is durable. The IdP RS256 token stays the
+	// fallback for degraded configs (no encryption key / no refresh_token / an
+	// id_token that fails verification) — it is still independently verified per
+	// request via JWKS (verifyRS256), and the next refresh upgrades the device to
+	// the unified self-token model. (AUTH.md §5; desktop keeps its RS256 token.)
+	accessToken, expiresIn := tr.AccessToken, tr.ExpiresIn
 	if len(s.sessionKey) > 0 && tr.RefreshToken != "" {
-		if err := s.createWebSession(r, w, user.ID, tr.RefreshToken); err != nil {
-			slog.Error("create web session failed", "err", err)
+		id, cerr := s.createWebSession(r, w, user.ID, tr.RefreshToken)
+		if cerr != nil {
+			slog.Error("create web session failed", "err", cerr)
+		} else {
+			// The id_token is the SOLE trust anchor for the minted self token (the
+			// IdP RS256 token no longer reaches the browser to be re-verified), so
+			// its signature MUST validate here and its subject must match. On
+			// failure we keep the durable session but hand back the per-request-
+			// verified RS256 token; the next refresh upgrades this device to the
+			// self-token model. (Should not happen with a healthy IdP — warn ops.)
+			sub, _, verr := s.auth.VerifyIDToken(r.Context(), tr.IDToken)
+			if verr != nil || sub != user.ID {
+				slog.Warn("oidc id_token verification failed; using RS256 fallback",
+					"err", verr, "sub_match", sub == user.ID)
+			} else if tok, ein, merr := s.mintSessionToken(user.ID, id, "full"); merr != nil {
+				slog.Error("mint session token failed", "err", merr)
+			} else {
+				accessToken, expiresIn = tok, ein
+			}
 		}
 	}
 
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, exchangeResp{
-		AccessToken: tr.AccessToken,
-		ExpiresIn:   tr.ExpiresIn,
+		AccessToken: accessToken,
+		ExpiresIn:   expiresIn,
 		User:        user,
 	})
 }
 
 // createWebSession encrypts the refresh_token, persists a new session row, and
-// sets the session cookie on the response.
-func (s *Server) createWebSession(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter, userID, refreshToken string) error {
+// sets the session cookie on the response. Returns the session row id so the
+// caller can bind a cdrop self-signed access token to it (sid).
+func (s *Server) createWebSession(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter, userID, refreshToken string) (string, error) {
 	raw, id, err := newSessionToken()
 	if err != nil {
-		return err
+		return "", err
 	}
 	enc, err := s.encryptRefresh(refreshToken)
 	if err != nil {
-		return err
+		return "", err
 	}
 	now := time.Now()
 	if err := s.queries.CreateWebSession(r.Context(), db.CreateWebSessionParams{
@@ -159,10 +186,10 @@ func (s *Server) createWebSession(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter, userID
 		LastUsedAt:   now.Unix(),
 		ExpiresAt:    now.Add(webSessionTTL).Unix(),
 	}); err != nil {
-		return err
+		return "", err
 	}
 	setSessionCookie(w, raw)
-	return nil
+	return id, nil
 }
 
 // refreshResp is what the browser sees: a fresh access_token plus the identity
@@ -282,9 +309,23 @@ func (s *Server) handleAuthRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 	setSessionCookie(w, c.Value)
 
+	// Hand back a cdrop self-signed access token (sid-bound), not the IdP RS256
+	// token: the browser holds one uniform token type and revoking the session row
+	// logs this device out on its next request. The IdP round-trip above still ran
+	// — it rotated the refresh_token and surfaced IdP-side revocation (a rejected
+	// refresh deletes the session above) — its access_token simply no longer ships.
+	// Mint from the row's canonical user_id; degrade to the IdP token only if the
+	// HS256 key is unconfigured. (AUTH.md §5.)
+	accessToken, expiresIn := tr.AccessToken, tr.ExpiresIn
+	if tok, ein, mErr := s.mintSessionToken(sess.UserID, id, "full"); mErr != nil {
+		slog.Error("mint session token failed", "err", mErr)
+	} else {
+		accessToken, expiresIn = tok, ein
+	}
+
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, refreshResp{
-		AccessToken: tr.AccessToken,
-		ExpiresIn:   tr.ExpiresIn,
+		AccessToken: accessToken,
+		ExpiresIn:   expiresIn,
 		User:        user,
 		DeviceName:  sess.DeviceName,
 	})
@@ -369,10 +410,11 @@ type tokenIdentity struct {
 
 // extractIdentity parses {sub, preferred_username | name | email, avatar | picture,
 // matchClaim, groups} from the id_token if available, else the access_token. The
-// signature is NOT verified here — for OIDC sessions the auth middleware verifies
-// the access_token on every API call via JWKS, so any tamper surfaces there. (Once
-// OIDC sessions migrate to cdrop self-signed access tokens, this becomes the only
-// trust point and MUST then verify the id_token signature — AUTH.md §5.)
+// signature is NOT verified here — callers verify separately around it: at login
+// (handleAuthExchange) the id_token signature is checked via VerifyIDToken before
+// the extracted subject is trusted to mint a self token; at refresh the IdP just
+// authenticated the refresh_token over a TLS back-channel, so the token it returns
+// is trusted by transport. Either way the extracted fields are sound. (AUTH.md §5.)
 func extractIdentity(idToken, accessToken, matchClaim string) (tokenIdentity, error) {
 	pick := idToken
 	if pick == "" {

internal/httpapi/devices.go

@@ -44,7 +44,15 @@ func (s *Server) handleDevices(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 // handleDeleteDevice 注销设备：删除 (user, name) 行 + Kick 在线 SSE + 立刻广播
 // 新的 presence。请求方若注销的是自己当前设备，前端需同步调用 logout，否则
 // 任何后续带 X-Device-Name 的认证请求都会被中间件再次 UPSERT 回来。
+//
+// 这是登录会话列表里「原生客户端（桌面 / iOS）」一栏的登出路径——它们用 IdP 令牌、
+// 不入 web_sessions，故按设备名吊销（AUTH.md §4）。注销设备属敏感动作，与吊销网页
+// 会话同口径要求最近一次 step-up（403 step_up_required，前端据此发起再认证）。
 func (s *Server) handleDeleteDevice(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if s.cfg.StepUpEnabled && !s.sessionRecentlySteppedUp(r) {
+		writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{"error": "step_up_required"})
+		return
+	}
 	claims, _ := jwtauth.ClaimsFromContext(r.Context())
 	name := chi.URLParam(r, "name")
 	if name == "" {

internal/httpapi/qr.go

@@ -285,7 +285,9 @@ func (s *Server) handleQRRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		RequestIP:  req.RequestIp,
 		ExpiresAt:  req.ExpiresAt,
 		Status:     req.Status,
-		StepUp:     s.cfg.StepUpEnabled,
+		// Tell the approver UI to re-auth only if step-up is on AND this session
+		// hasn't recently stepped up (within the window) — no repeated prompts (#3).
+		StepUp: s.cfg.StepUpEnabled && !s.sessionRecentlySteppedUp(r),
 	})
 }
 
@@ -309,10 +311,14 @@ func (s *Server) handleQRApprove(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	// Step-up: approving a new device into your account is sensitive. When enabled,
 	// require a fresh prompt=login re-auth (the provider's 2FA, if configured, is
-	// enforced during that exchange) within the freshness window (AUTH.md §6).
-	if s.cfg.StepUpEnabled && !s.verifyStepUp(r, claims.UserID, body.StepUpCode, body.StepUpVerifier) {
-		writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{"error": "step_up_required"})
-		return
+	// enforced during that exchange) — UNLESS this session already stepped up within
+	// the freshness window, so the same session isn't re-prompted repeatedly (#3).
+	if s.cfg.StepUpEnabled && !s.sessionRecentlySteppedUp(r) {
+		if !s.verifyStepUp(r, claims.UserID, body.StepUpCode, body.StepUpVerifier) {
+			writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{"error": "step_up_required"})
+			return
+		}
+		s.recordStepUp(r)
 	}
 
 	scope := "guest" // this milestone grants restricted guest sessions only
@@ -367,6 +373,50 @@ func (s *Server) handleQRDeny(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
 }
 
+// sessionFromCookie resolves the caller's web_session row from the cdrop_session
+// cookie. The scan-approval endpoints live under /api/auth/*, which the cookie's
+// Path covers, so both OIDC and self sessions can be located here.
+func (s *Server) sessionFromCookie(r *http.Request) (db.WebSession, bool) {
+	c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName)
+	if err != nil || c.Value == "" {
+		return db.WebSession{}, false
+	}
+	sess, err := s.queries.GetWebSession(r.Context(), sessionID(c.Value))
+	if err != nil {
+		return db.WebSession{}, false
+	}
+	return sess, true
+}
+
+// sessionRecentlySteppedUp reports whether the caller's session passed step-up
+// within StepUpMaxAgeSeconds — so a sensitive action skips re-auth and the same
+// session isn't re-prompted repeatedly (#3, AUTH.md §6).
+func (s *Server) sessionRecentlySteppedUp(r *http.Request) bool {
+	sess, ok := s.sessionFromCookie(r)
+	if !ok || sess.SteppedUpAt == 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	window := int64(s.cfg.StepUpMaxAgeSeconds)
+	if window <= 0 {
+		window = 300
+	}
+	return time.Now().Unix()-sess.SteppedUpAt <= window
+}
+
+// recordStepUp stamps the caller's session as freshly stepped-up.
+func (s *Server) recordStepUp(r *http.Request) {
+	sess, ok := s.sessionFromCookie(r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	if err := s.queries.SetSessionSteppedUp(r.Context(), db.SetSessionSteppedUpParams{
+		SteppedUpAt: time.Now().Unix(),
+		ID:          sess.ID,
+	}); err != nil {
+		slog.Warn("record step-up failed", "err", err)
+	}
+}
+
 // verifyStepUp exchanges a fresh prompt=login authorization code and confirms it
 // proves a recent interactive re-authentication by the same user: the id_token's
 // signature validates (JWKS), its sub matches the caller, and its auth_time is
@@ -401,11 +451,19 @@ func (s *Server) verifyStepUp(r *http.Request, userID, code, verifier string) bo
 	if sub != userID {
 		return false
 	}
-	maxAge := int64(s.cfg.StepUpMaxAgeSeconds)
-	if maxAge <= 0 {
-		maxAge = 300
+	// Enforce the freshness window only when the IdP supplied auth_time (Casdoor
+	// omits it). When absent, the fresh single-use prompt=login code — exchanged
+	// once, just now — is itself the bound on how recent the re-auth was.
+	if authTime > 0 {
+		maxAge := int64(s.cfg.StepUpMaxAgeSeconds)
+		if maxAge <= 0 {
+			maxAge = 300
+		}
+		if time.Now().Unix()-authTime > maxAge {
+			return false
+		}
 	}
-	return time.Now().Unix()-authTime <= maxAge
+	return true
 }
 
 // lookupQRRequest fetches a request and verifies the approval_code in constant

internal/httpapi/qr_test.go

@@ -12,11 +12,13 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
+	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
 	"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
 	"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4/jwt"
 
 	"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/config"
 	"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/db"
+	"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/hub"
 	"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/jwtauth"
 )
 
@@ -35,6 +37,7 @@ func newQRTestServer(t *testing.T) *Server {
 	if err := db.Bootstrap(context.Background(), conn); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("bootstrap: %v", err)
 	}
+	q := db.New(conn)
 	return &Server{
 		cfg: &config.Config{
 			AuthMode: "prod", SessionSecret: qrTestSecret,
@@ -42,7 +45,8 @@ func newQRTestServer(t *testing.T) *Server {
 			QRGuestTTLSeconds: 3600, QRPersistTTLHours: 168,
 			SessionTokenTTLSeconds: 900,
 		},
-		queries:         db.New(conn),
+		queries:         q,
+		hub:             hub.New(q),
 		sessionKey:      deriveSessionKey(qrTestSecret),
 		sessionTokenKey: jwtauth.DeriveSessionTokenKey(qrTestSecret),
 		siteOrigin:      "https://drop.example.net",
@@ -222,6 +226,106 @@ func TestQRFlow_PendingLongPoll(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// noopAuthStore satisfies jwtauth.Store for middleware wiring in tests (no device
+// upsert happens without an X-Device-Name header).
+type noopAuthStore struct{}
+
+func (noopAuthStore) UpsertDevice(context.Context, db.UpsertDeviceParams) error { return nil }
+func (noopAuthStore) GetShortcutToken(context.Context, string) (db.ShortcutToken, error) {
+	return db.ShortcutToken{}, fmt.Errorf("none")
+}
+func (noopAuthStore) TouchShortcutTokenUsed(context.Context, db.TouchShortcutTokenUsedParams) error {
+	return nil
+}
+func (noopAuthStore) GetWebSession(_ context.Context, id string) (db.WebSession, error) {
+	return db.WebSession{ID: id}, nil // session always live in these tests
+}
+
+// End-to-end through the REAL chain (auth.Middleware → requireFullSession): a
+// guest session token is rejected 403 on an account-management route, a full one
+// passes. This is the backend enforcement behind AUTH.md §3.2 (guest can't approve
+// devices / remove devices / mint tokens).
+func TestRequireFullSession_GuestBlockedFullPasses(t *testing.T) {
+	secret := "test-session-secret-at-least-32-bytes-ok"
+	srv := &Server{
+		cfg:             &config.Config{SessionTokenTTLSeconds: 900},
+		sessionTokenKey: jwtauth.DeriveSessionTokenKey(secret),
+	}
+	guest, _, err := srv.mintSessionToken("u", "sid", "guest")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("mint guest: %v", err)
+	}
+	full, _, err := srv.mintSessionToken("u", "sid", "full")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("mint full: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	a := jwtauth.New(&config.Config{AuthMode: "prod", SessionSecret: secret}, noopAuthStore{})
+	handler := a.Middleware(requireFullSession(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	})))
+	probe := func(tok string) int {
+		r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/auth/qr/approve", nil)
+		r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		handler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+		return w.Code
+	}
+	if c := probe(guest); c != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Errorf("guest token on requireFullSession route: got %d, want 403", c)
+	}
+	if c := probe(full); c != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Errorf("full token on requireFullSession route: got %d, want 200", c)
+	}
+}
+
+// Revoking a session is sensitive: with step-up enabled it is refused (403
+// step_up_required) until the caller's session has recently stepped up, then it
+// proceeds (here to 400 missing-id, i.e. past the gate). Step-up state is keyed on
+// the cookie session, so it is per-device (AUTH.md §1/§6).
+func TestSessionRevoke_RequiresStepUp(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newQRTestServer(t)
+	s.cfg.StepUpEnabled = true
+	s.cfg.StepUpMaxAgeSeconds = 300
+
+	raw, id, err := newSessionToken()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("token: %v", err)
+	}
+	now := time.Now().Unix()
+	if err := s.queries.CreateSelfSession(context.Background(), db.CreateSelfSessionParams{
+		ID: id, UserID: "u", DeviceName: "", UserAgent: "", Kind: "oidc", Scope: "full",
+		GrantedBy: "", CreatedAt: now, LastUsedAt: now, ExpiresAt: now + 3600,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create session: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	revoke := func() int {
+		r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/auth/sessions/x", nil)
+		r.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: sessionCookieName, Value: raw})
+		r = r.WithContext(jwtauth.ContextWithClaims(r.Context(),
+			&jwtauth.Claims{UserID: "u", SessionScope: "full"}))
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		s.handleSessionRevoke(w, r)
+		return w.Code
+	}
+
+	// Not stepped up → blocked before any deletion.
+	if c := revoke(); c != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("revoke without step-up: got %d, want 403", c)
+	}
+	// Record step-up on this (cookie) session → gate now passes (400 = missing id,
+	// reached past the step-up check).
+	if err := s.queries.SetSessionSteppedUp(context.Background(), db.SetSessionSteppedUpParams{
+		SteppedUpAt: now, ID: id,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("set stepped up: %v", err)
+	}
+	if c := revoke(); c == http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Errorf("revoke after step-up still 403; gate did not honour stepped_up_at")
+	}
+}
+
 // selfTokenScope verifies a self-signed session token under the test's session
 // key (proving the signature) and returns its scope claim.
 func selfTokenScope(t *testing.T, token string) string {
@@ -241,3 +345,192 @@ func selfTokenScope(t *testing.T, token string) string {
 	scope, _ := custom["scope"].(string)
 	return scope
 }
+
+// revokeByID drives handleSessionRevoke with the chi {id} param and full claims,
+// step-up off (the gate is exercised separately).
+func revokeByID(s *Server, id, userID string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/auth/sessions/"+id, nil)
+	rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
+	rctx.URLParams.Add("id", id)
+	ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx)
+	ctx = jwtauth.ContextWithClaims(ctx, &jwtauth.Claims{UserID: userID, SessionScope: "full"})
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.handleSessionRevoke(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
+	return w
+}
+
+// Revoking a web session removes its device registration too, so a revoked device
+// disappears from the device list at once (the user can no longer remove devices
+// by hand). AUTH.md §4.
+func TestSessionRevoke_DeletesDevice(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newQRTestServer(t) // step-up off by default
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	now := time.Now().Unix()
+
+	_, id, err := newSessionToken()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("token: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := s.queries.CreateSelfSession(ctx, db.CreateSelfSessionParams{
+		ID: id, UserID: "u", DeviceName: "Laptop", UserAgent: "", Kind: "oidc", Scope: "full",
+		GrantedBy: "", CreatedAt: now, LastUsedAt: now, ExpiresAt: now + 3600,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create session: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := s.queries.UpsertDevice(ctx, db.UpsertDeviceParams{
+		UserID: "u", Name: "Laptop", Type: "browser", LastSeen: now,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("upsert device: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if w := revokeByID(s, id, "u"); w.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
+		t.Fatalf("revoke: got %d %s, want 204", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if _, err := s.queries.GetWebSession(ctx, id); err == nil {
+		t.Errorf("session still present after revoke")
+	}
+	devs, _ := s.queries.ListDevicesByUser(ctx, "u")
+	for _, d := range devs {
+		if d.Name == "Laptop" {
+			t.Errorf("device 'Laptop' not deleted on session revoke")
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// The session list unifies web_sessions with native client devices (desktop / iOS)
+// that have no web_session, while never double-listing a device that already has a
+// session and excluding shortcut-token devices. AUTH.md §4.
+func TestSessionsList_IncludesNativeDevices(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newQRTestServer(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	now := time.Now().Unix()
+
+	_, id, err := newSessionToken()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("token: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := s.queries.CreateSelfSession(ctx, db.CreateSelfSessionParams{
+		ID: id, UserID: "u", DeviceName: "Web", UserAgent: "", Kind: "oidc", Scope: "full",
+		GrantedBy: "", CreatedAt: now, LastUsedAt: now, ExpiresAt: now + 3600,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create session: %v", err)
+	}
+	for _, d := range []struct{ name, typ string }{
+		{"Web", "browser"},        // has a web_session — must not be double-listed
+		{"Desk", "macos"},         // native, no session — must appear as native
+		{"iShortcut", "shortcut"}, // scoped token — excluded from session list
+	} {
+		if err := s.queries.UpsertDevice(ctx, db.UpsertDeviceParams{
+			UserID: "u", Name: d.name, Type: d.typ, LastSeen: now,
+		}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("upsert device %s: %v", d.name, err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/auth/sessions", nil)
+	r = r.WithContext(jwtauth.ContextWithClaims(r.Context(),
+		&jwtauth.Claims{UserID: "u", SessionScope: "full"}))
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.handleSessionsList(w, r)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("sessions list: got %d %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	var resp struct {
+		Sessions []sessionView `json:"sessions"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
+	}
+	var web, webNativeDup, desk, shortcut bool
+	for _, v := range resp.Sessions {
+		switch {
+		case v.DeviceName == "Web" && !v.Native && v.Kind == "oidc":
+			web = true
+		case v.DeviceName == "Web" && v.Native:
+			webNativeDup = true
+		case v.DeviceName == "Desk" && v.Native && v.Kind == "macos":
+			desk = true
+		case v.DeviceName == "iShortcut":
+			shortcut = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !web {
+		t.Errorf("web session for 'Web' missing")
+	}
+	if webNativeDup {
+		t.Errorf("'Web' double-listed as a native device")
+	}
+	if !desk {
+		t.Errorf("native device 'Desk' missing from session list")
+	}
+	if shortcut {
+		t.Errorf("shortcut device leaked into session list")
+	}
+}
+
+// The sweeper drops browser devices whose web_session is gone (orphans) while
+// keeping browser devices that still have a live session and all native devices.
+func TestDeleteOrphanBrowserDevices(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newQRTestServer(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	now := time.Now().Unix()
+
+	// Browser "Kept" has a live session; browser "Orphan" has none; native "Desk"
+	// (macos) legitimately has no session and must survive.
+	_, id, err := newSessionToken()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("token: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := s.queries.CreateSelfSession(ctx, db.CreateSelfSessionParams{
+		ID: id, UserID: "u", DeviceName: "Kept", Kind: "oidc", Scope: "full",
+		CreatedAt: now, LastUsedAt: now, ExpiresAt: now + 3600,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create session: %v", err)
+	}
+	for _, d := range []struct{ name, typ string }{
+		{"Kept", "browser"}, {"Orphan", "browser"}, {"Desk", "macos"},
+	} {
+		if err := s.queries.UpsertDevice(ctx, db.UpsertDeviceParams{
+			UserID: "u", Name: d.name, Type: d.typ, LastSeen: now,
+		}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("upsert %s: %v", d.name, err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if _, err := s.queries.DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices(ctx, now); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("sweep: %v", err)
+	}
+	devs, _ := s.queries.ListDevicesByUser(ctx, "u")
+	got := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, d := range devs {
+		got[d.Name] = true
+	}
+	if !got["Kept"] {
+		t.Errorf("browser 'Kept' with a live session was wrongly swept")
+	}
+	if got["Orphan"] {
+		t.Errorf("orphan browser 'Orphan' was not swept")
+	}
+	if !got["Desk"] {
+		t.Errorf("native 'Desk' was wrongly swept (it keeps no web_session)")
+	}
+}
+
+// Removing a native device (the session list's logout path for desktop / iOS) is
+// sensitive and requires a recent step-up, mirroring web-session revocation.
+func TestDeleteDevice_RequiresStepUp(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newQRTestServer(t)
+	s.cfg.StepUpEnabled = true
+	s.cfg.StepUpMaxAgeSeconds = 300
+
+	r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/devices/Desk", nil)
+	rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
+	rctx.URLParams.Add("name", "Desk")
+	ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx)
+	ctx = jwtauth.ContextWithClaims(ctx, &jwtauth.Claims{UserID: "u", SessionScope: "full"})
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.handleDeleteDevice(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
+	if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("delete device without step-up: got %d, want 403", w.Code)
+	}
+}

internal/httpapi/server.go

@@ -176,6 +176,13 @@ func (s *Server) routes() {
 					r.Get("/auth/qr/request", s.handleQRRequest)
 					r.Post("/auth/qr/approve", s.handleQRApprove)
 					r.Post("/auth/qr/deny", s.handleQRDeny)
+					// Session management: list logins with their permission level,
+					// really revoke one (logout), and the standalone step-up the
+					// revoke flow re-uses. All under /api/auth so the session cookie
+					// (Path=/api/auth) is available for step-up state.
+					r.Post("/auth/stepup", s.handleStepUp)
+					r.Get("/auth/sessions", s.handleSessionsList)
+					r.Delete("/auth/sessions/{id}", s.handleSessionRevoke)
 				})
 
 				r.Route("/transfer", func(r chi.Router) {
@@ -219,6 +226,10 @@ type meResp struct {
 	UserID     string   `json:"user_id"`
 	Groups     []string `json:"groups"`
 	DeviceName string   `json:"device_name"`
+	// Scope is the session's capability level: "guest" (scan-login borrow,
+	// capability-limited) or "full" (normal login). The UI hides account-management
+	// affordances on guest sessions (AUTH.md §3.2).
+	Scope string `json:"scope"`
 }
 
 func (s *Server) handleMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -228,10 +239,15 @@ func (s *Server) handleMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 	device, _ := jwtauth.DeviceNameFromContext(r.Context())
+	scope := "full"
+	if claims.Guest() {
+		scope = "guest"
+	}
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, meResp{
 		UserID:     claims.UserID,
 		Groups:     claims.Groups,
 		DeviceName: device,
+		Scope:      scope,
 	})
 }
 

internal/httpapi/sessions.go

@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+package httpapi
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
+
+	"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/db"
+	"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/jwtauth"
+)
+
+// Session management (AUTH.md §1, §6): list the caller's logins with their
+// capability level, and really revoke one (delete the row → its access token can
+// no longer refresh and dies within its short TTL). Revocation is a sensitive
+// action, so it requires a recent step-up. A standalone step-up endpoint lets the
+// UI establish that re-auth once (per session/device) and reuse it across actions
+// within the window — the same session isn't re-prompted repeatedly (#3).
+
+type stepUpReq struct {
+	Code     string `json:"code"`
+	Verifier string `json:"verifier"`
+}
+
+// handleStepUp exchanges a fresh prompt=login code and, on success, stamps the
+// caller's session as stepped-up (per-session, cookie-keyed). Sensitive actions
+// within StepUpMaxAgeSeconds then skip re-auth. 403 on failure; 204 when step-up
+// is disabled (nothing to establish).
+func (s *Server) handleStepUp(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if !s.cfg.StepUpEnabled {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+		return
+	}
+	claims, _ := jwtauth.ClaimsFromContext(r.Context())
+	var body stepUpReq
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 8192)).Decode(&body); err != nil {
+		writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "invalid json"})
+		return
+	}
+	if !s.verifyStepUp(r, claims.UserID, body.Code, body.Verifier) {
+		writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{"error": "step_up_required"})
+		return
+	}
+	s.recordStepUp(r)
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+}
+
+type sessionView struct {
+	ID         string `json:"id"`
+	DeviceName string `json:"device_name"`
+	Kind       string `json:"kind"`  // oidc | self | guest | macos | windows | linux | ios
+	Scope      string `json:"scope"` // full | guest
+	Current    bool   `json:"current"`
+	Online     bool   `json:"online"` // device currently connected (SSE) — UI sorts online first
+	// Native marks a device that authenticates with an IdP token and keeps no
+	// web_session row (desktop / iOS). It is surfaced from the devices registry so
+	// the session list covers every device; its "logout" routes to the device
+	// endpoint rather than the web-session one.
+	Native     bool  `json:"native"`
+	CreatedAt  int64 `json:"created_at"`
+	LastUsedAt int64 `json:"last_used_at"`
+	ExpiresAt  int64 `json:"expires_at"`
+}
+
+// isNativeDeviceType reports whether a device type is a real native client (one
+// that authenticates via the IdP and keeps no web_session). browser devices are
+// expected to carry a web_session; "shortcut" tokens have their own panel.
+func isNativeDeviceType(t string) bool {
+	switch t {
+	case "macos", "windows", "linux", "ios":
+		return true
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
+// handleSessionsList returns the caller's login sessions with their scope, so the
+// UI can show the permission level (完整 / 受限访客) and offer real logout. The list
+// is unified: web_sessions (browser / scan-login) PLUS native client devices
+// (desktop / iOS) that have no web_session of their own — so every logged-in
+// device appears in one place and orphaned device rows fall away (AUTH.md §4).
+func (s *Server) handleSessionsList(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	claims, _ := jwtauth.ClaimsFromContext(r.Context())
+	now := time.Now().Unix()
+
+	rows, err := s.queries.ListWebSessionsByUser(r.Context(), claims.UserID)
+	if err != nil {
+		slog.Error("list sessions failed", "err", err, "user", claims.UserID)
+		writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{"error": "db"})
+		return
+	}
+	current := ""
+	if c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName); err == nil && c.Value != "" {
+		current = sessionID(c.Value)
+	}
+	// Cookieless callers (native apps) can't match by cookie; fall back to their
+	// own device name to mark the "current" row.
+	callerDevice, _ := jwtauth.DeviceNameFromContext(r.Context())
+
+	out := make([]sessionView, 0, len(rows))
+	named := make(map[string]struct{}, len(rows))
+	for _, row := range rows {
+		if row.ExpiresAt < now {
+			continue // hide expired sessions (reaped separately)
+		}
+		if row.DeviceName != "" {
+			named[row.DeviceName] = struct{}{}
+		}
+		out = append(out, sessionView{
+			ID:         row.ID,
+			DeviceName: row.DeviceName,
+			Kind:       row.Kind,
+			Scope:      row.Scope,
+			Current:    row.ID == current || (current == "" && row.DeviceName != "" && row.DeviceName == callerDevice),
+			Online:     row.DeviceName != "" && s.hub.Online(claims.UserID, row.DeviceName),
+			CreatedAt:  row.CreatedAt,
+			LastUsedAt: row.LastUsedAt,
+			ExpiresAt:  row.ExpiresAt,
+		})
+	}
+
+	// Native clients keep no web_session — surface them from the devices registry,
+	// skipping any whose name already has a web_session (no double-listing).
+	if devs, derr := s.queries.ListDevicesByUser(r.Context(), claims.UserID); derr == nil {
+		for _, d := range devs {
+			if !isNativeDeviceType(d.Type) {
+				continue
+			}
+			if _, ok := named[d.Name]; ok {
+				continue
+			}
+			out = append(out, sessionView{
+				ID:         "device:" + d.Name,
+				DeviceName: d.Name,
+				Kind:       d.Type,
+				Scope:      "full",
+				Native:     true,
+				Current:    current == "" && d.Name != "" && d.Name == callerDevice,
+				Online:     s.hub.Online(claims.UserID, d.Name),
+				CreatedAt:  d.LastSeen,
+				LastUsedAt: d.LastSeen,
+				ExpiresAt:  0,
+			})
+		}
+	}
+
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"sessions": out})
+}
+
+// deviceNameHasLiveSession reports whether the user still has a non-expired
+// web_session bound to deviceName — used to avoid deleting a device that another
+// live session (e.g. a re-login that left the old row) still depends on.
+func (s *Server) deviceNameHasLiveSession(ctx context.Context, userID, deviceName string) bool {
+	rows, err := s.queries.ListWebSessionsByUser(ctx, userID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	now := time.Now().Unix()
+	for _, ws := range rows {
+		if ws.DeviceName == deviceName && ws.ExpiresAt >= now {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// handleSessionRevoke deletes a session row (scoped to its owner), really
+// invalidating that login. Requires a recent step-up (403 step_up_required
+// otherwise). Kicks the device's live SSE so it drops immediately.
+func (s *Server) handleSessionRevoke(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if s.cfg.StepUpEnabled && !s.sessionRecentlySteppedUp(r) {
+		writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{"error": "step_up_required"})
+		return
+	}
+	claims, _ := jwtauth.ClaimsFromContext(r.Context())
+	id := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
+	if id == "" {
+		writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "missing id"})
+		return
+	}
+	// Read the device name before deletion so we can kick its SSE.
+	deviceName := ""
+	if sess, err := s.queries.GetWebSession(r.Context(), id); err == nil && sess.UserID == claims.UserID {
+		deviceName = sess.DeviceName
+	}
+	n, err := s.queries.DeleteWebSessionForUser(r.Context(), db.DeleteWebSessionForUserParams{
+		ID:     id,
+		UserID: claims.UserID,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		slog.Error("revoke session failed", "err", err)
+		writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{"error": "db"})
+		return
+	}
+	if n == 0 {
+		writeJSON(w, http.StatusNotFound, map[string]string{"error": "not found"})
+		return
+	}
+	if deviceName != "" {
+		// Drop the device registration too, so a revoked device disappears from the
+		// device list at once (we no longer remove devices by hand) — unless another
+		// live session still uses this name.
+		if !s.deviceNameHasLiveSession(r.Context(), claims.UserID, deviceName) {
+			if _, derr := s.queries.DeleteDevice(r.Context(), db.DeleteDeviceParams{
+				UserID: claims.UserID,
+				Name:   deviceName,
+			}); derr != nil {
+				slog.Warn("delete device on session revoke failed", "err", derr)
+			}
+		}
+		s.hub.Kick(claims.UserID, deviceName)
+		s.hub.PublishPresence(r.Context(), claims.UserID)
+	}
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+}