登录子系统:OIDC 统一自签 token + 吊销即时生效 + 设备并入会话列表 + 应用内扫码 + 禁则修复

接续 90a3790(扫码 A0+A1+B + step-up 雏形)。蓝本见 AUTH.md。

OIDC 统一到 cdrop 自签 token
- /auth/exchange 先 JWKS 验 id_token 签名(自签 token 的唯一信任锚)再签 cdrop
  自签 HS256 access token(绑 sid),不再把 IdP RS256 下发浏览器;验签失败仅告警
  并回退 RS256(会话仍建、下次 refresh 自愈),登录不中断
- /auth/refresh oidc 路径仍打 IdP 轮换 refresh_token + 探测 IdP 侧吊销,但同样回
  自签 token;createWebSession 改返回行 id
- verify 链保留 RS256 分支仅供桌面端 loopback(其即时吊销留后续)

吊销即时生效 + 被吊销设备自知回退
- verifySelfToken 每请求按 sid 查 web_sessions 行,行删即拒 → 吊销在被吊销设备
  下一次请求即生效(不等 TTL),oidc / self / guest 一致
- 前端仅在「服务端以 401 确证会话失效」时 forceLogout 清登录态、回登录页;短期连接
  失败(5xx / 网络)一律保留登录态(refreshTokens 改三态 refreshed/invalid/transient,
  cookieRefresh 改 discriminated 结果)
- __root 反应式守卫:prod 下失登录态且非认证路由即跳登录页;新增 auth.sessionLost.* 三语

设备列表并入会话列表 + 孤儿自动清除
- GET /api/auth/sessions 统一 web_sessions 与原生客户端设备(桌面 / iOS,自 devices
  登记表呈现,native=true,离线也列);同名不重复列出,排除 shortcut 与无会话 browser
- 吊销网页会话连带删其设备登记(无同名在用会话时);原生「登出」走
  DELETE /api/devices/{name}(同要求 step-up)
- 新增 DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices(browser 型且无存活 web_session),接入设备清扫器(1h)

应用内扫码 + 聚珍崩溃 / CJK 禁则修复
- 登录页内置 getUserMedia + jsqr 扫码,不再外跳系统应用(避免开错浏览器)
- 修聚珍(cjk-autospace)MutationObserver 与 React 重渲染同子树冲突致的 insertBefore
  崩溃:扫码 / 显码 / 批准三状态机页整页跳过聚珍(data-jz-skip)
- 修流动正文未跑 CJK 禁则(jinze 为段落级、须 opt-in):设置 / 快捷指令 / 桌面页一批
  hint 补 data-jz-level="paragraph" + justify,短标签 / 状态仍留文本级

step-up 完善
- auth_time 改可选(Casdoor 不下发,原强制致死循环);stepped_up_at 按会话绑定、
  StepUpMaxAgeSeconds 窗口内不复要求;新增 POST /api/auth/stepup
- 批准页 persist 编进 step-up returnTo 防整页跳转丢失;scope 随档绑定(信任=full /
  仅此次=guest),默认偏安全的「仅此次」

文档与测试
- AUTH.md:折中架构、accounts 薄表、令牌架构、扫码流程、step-up、§4.4 统一会话列表
- 新增 Go 测试:OIDC 自签验证、verifySelfToken 吊销即拒、会话吊销连带删设备、
  统一会话列表(含原生 / 不含 shortcut / 不重复)、孤儿清扫、删设备需 step-up
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-22 11:55:02 +08:00
parent 90a3790a98
commit 018a77b13a
45 changed files with 2235 additions and 299 deletions
+14 -5
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@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
- **决策 B — `user_id` 继续 = OIDC `sub`,不引内部 id**。新增薄 `accounts` 表(键在 `sub`),其中存一个**稳定匹配键**(默认取 JWT 的 `email` claim)。日常切换 OAuth provider 即账号失效——**运维须知此前提**。仅当管理员显式启用“后端迁移标记”时,cdrop 才在新源登录时按该匹配键自动关联回同一账号(受控窗口,非日常自动 link,规避账号接管)。
- **决策 C — 2FA 委派给 provider**。cdrop 不自存任何第二因子密钥,仅保留敏感动作的 **step-up 钩子**(要求 provider 再认证),默认关闭。
- **决策 D — 扫码方向 = 陌生设备显码、已登录手机扫码批准**(微信 / WhatsApp 网页版模型)。陌生设备常无摄像头但有屏,最贴合“临时借设备传文件”。
- **决策 E — 扫码会话 = 受限访客会话,持久性可选**。批准时“信任此设备(7 天滑动)”或“仅此次(1 小时)”;访客会话能收发文件,但不能改账号、不能再批准别的设备、不能签发长效 token
- **决策 E — 扫码会话两档,scope 与持久性绑定**。批准时二选一:“信任此设备(完整会话,7 天滑动)”——授予 scope=full、kind=self,可完整使用本账号(自有设备用);“仅此次(受限访客,1 小时)”——授予 scope=guest、kind=guest能收发文件与消息,但不能改账号、不能再批准别的设备、不能签发长效 token(陌生/借用设备用)。默认偏向更安全的“仅此次”。(原设计两档皆 guest、仅持久性不同;2026-06-21 实测后改为 scope 随档绑定,消除“信任却受限”的语义矛盾。)
> 本文取代 `.scratch/auth-inversion-diff.html` 中按“全反转”写的 §四 大半——那五个“凭证保管者”决策(无邮件重置 / 开放注册 / argon2id 等)在折中下随委派 provider 而消散。
@@ -129,9 +129,10 @@ CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_login_requests_expires ON login_requests (expires
- **签名密钥**:从 `SESSION_SECRET` 派生独立 HMAC 密钥(`DeriveSessionTokenKey(SESSION_SECRET)`,与既有 `DeriveHS256Key(HS256Secret)` 区分密钥域)。`SESSION_SECRET` 在 prod 本就强制非空,无新增必填密钥。
- **载荷**`{ sub: user_id, sid: session_id, typ: "session", scope: "full"|"guest", iat, exp }`。短 TTL(默认 900s)。
- **校验**:中间件新增 `verifySelfToken` 分支(§9)。靠 `typ:"session"` + 独立签名密钥与 scoped shortcut token`typ` 缺省、`scope:"clipboard"`、走 `shortcut_tokens` 查吊销)区分,互不串验。
- **吊销 / 撤销**access token 无状态、短命;长效凭证是 `web_sessions``/auth/refresh` 每次(≤TTL 周期)查 session 行存活与未吊销,故吊销在一个 TTL 内生效`oidc` 会话 refresh 仍打 IdP,保留 IdP 侧登出 / 吊销传播。
- **吊销 / 撤销(即时)**:长效凭证是 `web_sessions`access token 短命且**绑定 `sid`**。`verifySelfToken` 每请求按 `sid` 查 session 行——行被删除(吊销)即当场拒绝,故吊销在被吊销设备的**下一次请求**即生效,而非等一个 TTL。`oidc` 会话 refresh 仍打 IdP,保留 IdP 侧登出 / 吊销传播。
- **被吊销设备的感知与回退**:服务端拒绝之外,前端把“访问被拒且续期也被拒”视作会话不可恢复 → 就地清空登录态并回到登录页(`net/api.ts``forceLogout` + `__root` 反应式守卫)。**离线设备**于下一次使用(请求 401 或开机 cookie 续期失败)得知;**在线设备**经 `Hub.Kick` 关流 → 约 1s 后重连撞 401 得知。两路殊途同归到 `verifySelfToken``sid` 查行。
> RS256IdP access token)退出每请求热路径,仅在 OIDC exchange 时验 `id_token` 签名一次(§5。中间件保留 RS256 分支作兼容(桌面端等仍直接带 IdP token 的客户端),待后续统一迁移到自签后再清理——避免 flag day
> RS256IdP access token退出浏览器每请求热路径:浏览器登录(含 OIDC)一律持自签 tokenOIDC exchange 时验 `id_token` 签名一次(§5作唯一信任锚,refresh 仍打 IdP 轮换 refresh_token 但同样回自签 token。中间件保留 RS256 分支仅供**桌面端**(自跑 loopback PKCE、直带 IdP token);桌面端即时吊销留后续
### 3.2 受限能力门(guest 会话)
@@ -179,6 +180,14 @@ CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_login_requests_expires ON login_requests (expires
前端:新设备“显码页”+ 手机“批准页”+ 设备 / 会话管理(列出 `granted_by` 借用设备、可吊销)。
### 4.4 登录会话列表 = 全部设备(统一视图 + 自动清除)
「登录会话」面板收敛到“一台设备 = 一条会话”:列表即当前登录此账号的全部设备。既往“手动清除设备”入口已撤,导致被吊销设备长期滞留——本节即为此消除。
- **统一列表**`GET /api/auth/sessions`):`web_sessions`(浏览器 oidc / self / guest、扫码)**并入**原生客户端设备(桌面 / iOS,`type ∈ {macos, windows, linux, ios}`)。原生客户端用 IdP 令牌、不入 `web_sessions`,故从设备登记表 `devices`(即决策里说的“等价表”)呈现:`id` 形如 `device:<设备名>``kind` 取设备类型、`native=true`。同名已有会话的设备不重复列出;无会话的 `browser` 型(孤儿)与 `shortcut` 型(自有面板)不在此列;过期会话已隐藏。这满足“原生设备也在会话列表登记”,且离线原生设备照常显示(`devices` 留有 `last_seen`)。
- **吊销即清设备**:吊销网页会话(`DELETE /api/auth/sessions/{id}`)在删会话行后**连带删除其设备登记**(除非另有同名在用会话),再 Kick + 广播 presence → 被吊销设备即时从所有列表消失。原生客户端的“登出”改走 `DELETE /api/devices/{name}`(同样要求 step-up),删设备 + Kick;该设备若仍在线,会在下次请求经中间件重新登记(原生**即时**吊销需客户端配合,留后续)。
- **孤儿自动清除**:设备清扫器(每 1h)除按 `last_seen` TTL 清陈旧设备外,新增清除“`browser` 型且无存活 `web_session`”的孤儿(会话已撤 / 过期但设备行滞留);`DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices` 一条 SQL 完成,原生 / shortcut 设备无 `web_session` 属正常、仅受 TTL 清扫。即时路径(吊销)+ 周期路径(清扫)合起来让设备列表与会话列表持续对齐。
---
## 5. 账号密码 / Passkey 登录(委派 provider
@@ -196,7 +205,7 @@ CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_login_requests_expires ON login_requests (expires
## 6. 2FA(委派 + step-up 钩子,已实装)
- **默认**2FA 在 provider 完成(Casdoor TOTP / passkey-as-2FA),cdrop 不感知、不存密钥。
- **step-up 钩子**(决策 C,默认关,`CDROP_STEP_UP_ENABLED`;新鲜度窗口 `CDROP_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS`,默认 300):开启后,批准扫码设备(`qr/approve`)这类敏感动作要求一次**现场再认证**。机制:前端先跑一次带 `prompt=login` / `max_age=0` 的新鲜 PKCE,把拿到的授权码 + verifier 交给 `qr/approve`;后端**就地**用它向 IdP 换 `id_token`JWKS 验签 + 校验 `sub` 等于调用者 + `auth_time` 在窗口内,方才放行(provider 若开了 2FA,即在这次 prompt=login 往返中强制)。失败返回 `403 step_up_required`。授权码一次性、不可重放;cdrop 不存任何第二因子,也不留 step-up 服务端状态——证明随这一次批准请求过期。
- **step-up 钩子**(决策 C,默认关,`CDROP_STEP_UP_ENABLED`;新鲜度窗口 `CDROP_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS`,默认 300):开启后,批准扫码设备(`qr/approve`)这类敏感动作要求一次**现场再认证**。机制:前端先跑一次带 `prompt=login` / `max_age=0` 的新鲜 PKCE,把拿到的授权码 + verifier 交给 `qr/approve`;后端**就地**用它向 IdP 换 `id_token`JWKS 验签 + 校验 `sub` 等于调用者,方才放行(provider 若开了 2FA,即在这次 prompt=login 往返中强制)。`auth_time` 为**可选**——OIDC 仅在 IdP 选择遵循 `max_age` 时才要求它,**Casdoor 不下发**;有则强制 `StepUpMaxAgeSeconds` 窗口,无则以「单次短寿授权码刚换出」作为新鲜度界(否则会因缺 `auth_time` 而恒拒、陷死循环,2026-06-21 实测修正)。失败返回 `403 step_up_required`。授权码一次性、不可重放;cdrop 不存任何第二因子,也不留 step-up 服务端状态——证明随这一次批准请求过期。
- `qr/request` 响应回带 `step_up` 标志,供批准页判断是否需先再认证。
- passkey 作为“快速登录”的补充:陌生设备场景下扫码优于 passkey(passkey 设备绑定,陌生设备上没有),故 passkey 由 provider 承担、不进 cdrop 自建范围。
@@ -268,7 +277,7 @@ verify(token):
## 11. 安全要点
- **`id_token` 必须 exchange 时验签**——自签 access token 后,原“每请求 JWKS 兜底”消失,OIDC 信任收敛到这唯一一刻。
- **自签 access token 短 TTL**(默认 900s,承载吊销时延上界;长效凭证只在 `web_sessions`,可吊销
- **吊销即时**`verifySelfToken` 每请求按 `sid``web_sessions` 行,删行即当场拒绝,被吊销设备下一次请求即失效(不依赖 TTL);前端据 401 + 续期失败回退登录页(§3.1)。自签 access token 短 TTL(默认 900s只是续期节律,长效凭证只在 `web_sessions` 行。
- **扫码三密钥分离**:QR 仅含批准信息,会话只投私有 `poll_secret` 持有者;偷拍 QR 双重失败。
- **访客会话能力门**`scope=guest` 服务端强制受限(§3.2),不依赖前端自律。
- **迁移标记受控**:跨源 `match_key` 关联仅在管理员显式开启时生效,非日常自动 link,规避 email 接管。
+4
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@@ -74,6 +74,10 @@ func Bootstrap(ctx context.Context, d *sql.DB) error {
"ALTER TABLE web_sessions ADD COLUMN granted_by TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''"); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("migrate web_sessions.granted_by: %w", err)
}
if err := ensureColumn(ctx, tx, "web_sessions", "stepped_up_at",
"ALTER TABLE web_sessions ADD COLUMN stepped_up_at INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0"); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("migrate web_sessions.stepped_up_at: %w", err)
}
if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("commit bootstrap: %w", err)
}
+23
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@@ -27,6 +27,29 @@ func (q *Queries) DeleteDevice(ctx context.Context, arg DeleteDeviceParams) (int
return result.RowsAffected()
}
const deleteOrphanBrowserDevices = `-- name: DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices :execrows
DELETE FROM devices
WHERE type = 'browser'
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM web_sessions ws
WHERE ws.user_id = devices.user_id
AND ws.device_name = devices.name
AND ws.expires_at > ?
)
`
// DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices removes browser device rows with no live web_session
// (the session was revoked or expired), keeping the device list aligned with the
// session list. The ? is the current epoch second. Native (macos/windows/linux/ios)
// and shortcut devices are left alone: they legitimately keep no web_session.
func (q *Queries) DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices(ctx context.Context, expiresAt int64) (int64, error) {
result, err := q.db.ExecContext(ctx, deleteOrphanBrowserDevices, expiresAt)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return result.RowsAffected()
}
const deleteStaleDevices = `-- name: DeleteStaleDevices :exec
DELETE FROM devices
WHERE last_seen < ?
+4 -1
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@@ -73,7 +73,10 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS web_sessions (
-- 但不能改账号、不能再批准别的设备、不能签发长效 token(路由层 requireFullSession 守门)。
scope TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'full',
-- granted_by=扫码批准者的 session id,供审计与「吊销我批准过的借用设备」连带吊销。
granted_by TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''
granted_by TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
-- stepped_up_at=本会话最近一次通过 step-up 再认证的 Unix 秒(AUTH.md §6)。在
-- StepUpMaxAgeSeconds 窗口内,敏感动作不再重复要求再认证(避免每次都弹再登录)。
stepped_up_at INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_web_sessions_expires ON web_sessions (expires_at);
+1
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@@ -101,4 +101,5 @@ type WebSession struct {
Kind string `json:"kind"`
Scope string `json:"scope"`
GrantedBy string `json:"granted_by"`
SteppedUpAt int64 `json:"stepped_up_at"`
}
+14
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@@ -15,6 +15,20 @@ ORDER BY name;
DELETE FROM devices
WHERE last_seen < ?;
-- DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices removes browser device rows with no live web_session
-- (the session was revoked or expired), keeping the device list aligned with the
-- session list. The ? is the current epoch second. Native (macos/windows/linux/ios)
-- and shortcut devices are left alone: they legitimately keep no web_session.
-- name: DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices :execrows
DELETE FROM devices
WHERE type = 'browser'
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM web_sessions ws
WHERE ws.user_id = devices.user_id
AND ws.device_name = devices.name
AND ws.expires_at > ?
);
-- name: DeleteDevice :execrows
DELETE FROM devices
WHERE user_id = ? AND name = ?;
+8 -1
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@@ -9,10 +9,17 @@ INSERT INTO web_sessions (id, user_id, refresh_token, device_name, user_agent, c
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);
-- name: GetWebSession :one
SELECT id, user_id, refresh_token, device_name, user_agent, created_at, last_used_at, expires_at, kind, scope, granted_by
SELECT id, user_id, refresh_token, device_name, user_agent, created_at, last_used_at, expires_at, kind, scope, granted_by, stepped_up_at
FROM web_sessions
WHERE id = ?;
-- SetSessionSteppedUp stamps the moment this session last passed step-up re-auth;
-- sensitive actions within the freshness window then skip re-auth (AUTH.md 6).
-- name: SetSessionSteppedUp :exec
UPDATE web_sessions
SET stepped_up_at = ?
WHERE id = ?;
-- name: RotateWebSession :exec
UPDATE web_sessions
SET refresh_token = ?, last_used_at = ?, expires_at = ?
+20 -1
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@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ func (q *Queries) DeleteWebSessionForUser(ctx context.Context, arg DeleteWebSess
}
const getWebSession = `-- name: GetWebSession :one
SELECT id, user_id, refresh_token, device_name, user_agent, created_at, last_used_at, expires_at, kind, scope, granted_by
SELECT id, user_id, refresh_token, device_name, user_agent, created_at, last_used_at, expires_at, kind, scope, granted_by, stepped_up_at
FROM web_sessions
WHERE id = ?
`
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ func (q *Queries) GetWebSession(ctx context.Context, id string) (WebSession, err
&i.Kind,
&i.Scope,
&i.GrantedBy,
&i.SteppedUpAt,
)
return i, err
}
@@ -230,6 +231,24 @@ func (q *Queries) RotateWebSession(ctx context.Context, arg RotateWebSessionPara
return err
}
const setSessionSteppedUp = `-- name: SetSessionSteppedUp :exec
UPDATE web_sessions
SET stepped_up_at = ?
WHERE id = ?
`
type SetSessionSteppedUpParams struct {
SteppedUpAt int64 `json:"stepped_up_at"`
ID string `json:"id"`
}
// SetSessionSteppedUp stamps the moment this session last passed step-up re-auth;
// sensitive actions within the freshness window then skip re-auth (AUTH.md 6).
func (q *Queries) SetSessionSteppedUp(ctx context.Context, arg SetSessionSteppedUpParams) error {
_, err := q.db.ExecContext(ctx, setSessionSteppedUp, arg.SteppedUpAt, arg.ID)
return err
}
const setWebSessionDevice = `-- name: SetWebSessionDevice :exec
UPDATE web_sessions
SET device_name = ?
+63 -21
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@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ import (
// PROJECT_BRIEF.md §2 keeps the browser path on standard OIDC PKCE. Backend
// proxies the token endpoint so the browser doesn't need a CORS-friendly OIDC
// provider; the access_token still flows back to the browser unchanged.
// provider. The browser is then handed a cdrop self-signed access token (sid-bound
// to its web_sessions row), not the IdP's RS256 token, so OIDC web sessions verify
// statefully and revoke immediately — unified with scan-login (AUTH.md §5).
type authConfigResp struct {
AuthMode string `json:"auth_mode"`
@@ -120,33 +122,58 @@ func (s *Server) handleAuthExchange(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Refresh the thin accounts row (display name / avatar / roles / match_key).
s.upsertAccount(r.Context(), identity)
// Stash the refresh_token server-side and hand the browser an opaque,
// HttpOnly cookie instead. Guarded so a deploy without the encryption key (or
// an IdP that returned no refresh_token) still logs the user in — they just
// don't get passwordless re-login and re-auth on the next access-token expiry.
// By default the browser holds a cdrop self-signed access token (sid-bound),
// not the IdP's RS256 token — so the OIDC web session is verified statefully on
// every request (verifySelfToken → web_sessions lookup) and revoking the row
// logs this device out on its very next call, exactly like scan-login. We mint
// it only after stashing the refresh_token server-side (encrypted, behind an
// HttpOnly cookie) so the session is durable. The IdP RS256 token stays the
// fallback for degraded configs (no encryption key / no refresh_token / an
// id_token that fails verification) — it is still independently verified per
// request via JWKS (verifyRS256), and the next refresh upgrades the device to
// the unified self-token model. (AUTH.md §5; desktop keeps its RS256 token.)
accessToken, expiresIn := tr.AccessToken, tr.ExpiresIn
if len(s.sessionKey) > 0 && tr.RefreshToken != "" {
if err := s.createWebSession(r, w, user.ID, tr.RefreshToken); err != nil {
slog.Error("create web session failed", "err", err)
id, cerr := s.createWebSession(r, w, user.ID, tr.RefreshToken)
if cerr != nil {
slog.Error("create web session failed", "err", cerr)
} else {
// The id_token is the SOLE trust anchor for the minted self token (the
// IdP RS256 token no longer reaches the browser to be re-verified), so
// its signature MUST validate here and its subject must match. On
// failure we keep the durable session but hand back the per-request-
// verified RS256 token; the next refresh upgrades this device to the
// self-token model. (Should not happen with a healthy IdP — warn ops.)
sub, _, verr := s.auth.VerifyIDToken(r.Context(), tr.IDToken)
if verr != nil || sub != user.ID {
slog.Warn("oidc id_token verification failed; using RS256 fallback",
"err", verr, "sub_match", sub == user.ID)
} else if tok, ein, merr := s.mintSessionToken(user.ID, id, "full"); merr != nil {
slog.Error("mint session token failed", "err", merr)
} else {
accessToken, expiresIn = tok, ein
}
}
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, exchangeResp{
AccessToken: tr.AccessToken,
ExpiresIn: tr.ExpiresIn,
AccessToken: accessToken,
ExpiresIn: expiresIn,
User: user,
})
}
// createWebSession encrypts the refresh_token, persists a new session row, and
// sets the session cookie on the response.
func (s *Server) createWebSession(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter, userID, refreshToken string) error {
// sets the session cookie on the response. Returns the session row id so the
// caller can bind a cdrop self-signed access token to it (sid).
func (s *Server) createWebSession(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter, userID, refreshToken string) (string, error) {
raw, id, err := newSessionToken()
if err != nil {
return err
return "", err
}
enc, err := s.encryptRefresh(refreshToken)
if err != nil {
return err
return "", err
}
now := time.Now()
if err := s.queries.CreateWebSession(r.Context(), db.CreateWebSessionParams{
@@ -159,10 +186,10 @@ func (s *Server) createWebSession(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter, userID
LastUsedAt: now.Unix(),
ExpiresAt: now.Add(webSessionTTL).Unix(),
}); err != nil {
return err
return "", err
}
setSessionCookie(w, raw)
return nil
return id, nil
}
// refreshResp is what the browser sees: a fresh access_token plus the identity
@@ -282,9 +309,23 @@ func (s *Server) handleAuthRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
setSessionCookie(w, c.Value)
// Hand back a cdrop self-signed access token (sid-bound), not the IdP RS256
// token: the browser holds one uniform token type and revoking the session row
// logs this device out on its next request. The IdP round-trip above still ran
// — it rotated the refresh_token and surfaced IdP-side revocation (a rejected
// refresh deletes the session above) — its access_token simply no longer ships.
// Mint from the row's canonical user_id; degrade to the IdP token only if the
// HS256 key is unconfigured. (AUTH.md §5.)
accessToken, expiresIn := tr.AccessToken, tr.ExpiresIn
if tok, ein, mErr := s.mintSessionToken(sess.UserID, id, "full"); mErr != nil {
slog.Error("mint session token failed", "err", mErr)
} else {
accessToken, expiresIn = tok, ein
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, refreshResp{
AccessToken: tr.AccessToken,
ExpiresIn: tr.ExpiresIn,
AccessToken: accessToken,
ExpiresIn: expiresIn,
User: user,
DeviceName: sess.DeviceName,
})
@@ -369,10 +410,11 @@ type tokenIdentity struct {
// extractIdentity parses {sub, preferred_username | name | email, avatar | picture,
// matchClaim, groups} from the id_token if available, else the access_token. The
// signature is NOT verified here — for OIDC sessions the auth middleware verifies
// the access_token on every API call via JWKS, so any tamper surfaces there. (Once
// OIDC sessions migrate to cdrop self-signed access tokens, this becomes the only
// trust point and MUST then verify the id_token signature — AUTH.md §5.)
// signature is NOT verified here — callers verify separately around it: at login
// (handleAuthExchange) the id_token signature is checked via VerifyIDToken before
// the extracted subject is trusted to mint a self token; at refresh the IdP just
// authenticated the refresh_token over a TLS back-channel, so the token it returns
// is trusted by transport. Either way the extracted fields are sound. (AUTH.md §5.)
func extractIdentity(idToken, accessToken, matchClaim string) (tokenIdentity, error) {
pick := idToken
if pick == "" {
+8
View File
@@ -44,7 +44,15 @@ func (s *Server) handleDevices(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// handleDeleteDevice 注销设备:删除 (user, name) 行 + Kick 在线 SSE + 立刻广播
// 新的 presence。请求方若注销的是自己当前设备,前端需同步调用 logout,否则
// 任何后续带 X-Device-Name 的认证请求都会被中间件再次 UPSERT 回来。
//
// 这是登录会话列表里「原生客户端(桌面 / iOS)」一栏的登出路径——它们用 IdP 令牌、
// 不入 web_sessions,故按设备名吊销(AUTH.md §4)。注销设备属敏感动作,与吊销网页
// 会话同口径要求最近一次 step-up403 step_up_required,前端据此发起再认证)。
func (s *Server) handleDeleteDevice(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if s.cfg.StepUpEnabled && !s.sessionRecentlySteppedUp(r) {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{"error": "step_up_required"})
return
}
claims, _ := jwtauth.ClaimsFromContext(r.Context())
name := chi.URLParam(r, "name")
if name == "" {
+62 -4
View File
@@ -285,7 +285,9 @@ func (s *Server) handleQRRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
RequestIP: req.RequestIp,
ExpiresAt: req.ExpiresAt,
Status: req.Status,
StepUp: s.cfg.StepUpEnabled,
// Tell the approver UI to re-auth only if step-up is on AND this session
// hasn't recently stepped up (within the window) — no repeated prompts (#3).
StepUp: s.cfg.StepUpEnabled && !s.sessionRecentlySteppedUp(r),
})
}
@@ -309,11 +311,15 @@ func (s *Server) handleQRApprove(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Step-up: approving a new device into your account is sensitive. When enabled,
// require a fresh prompt=login re-auth (the provider's 2FA, if configured, is
// enforced during that exchange) within the freshness window (AUTH.md §6).
if s.cfg.StepUpEnabled && !s.verifyStepUp(r, claims.UserID, body.StepUpCode, body.StepUpVerifier) {
// enforced during that exchange) — UNLESS this session already stepped up within
// the freshness window, so the same session isn't re-prompted repeatedly (#3).
if s.cfg.StepUpEnabled && !s.sessionRecentlySteppedUp(r) {
if !s.verifyStepUp(r, claims.UserID, body.StepUpCode, body.StepUpVerifier) {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{"error": "step_up_required"})
return
}
s.recordStepUp(r)
}
scope := "guest" // this milestone grants restricted guest sessions only
if body.Scope == "full" {
@@ -367,6 +373,50 @@ func (s *Server) handleQRDeny(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// sessionFromCookie resolves the caller's web_session row from the cdrop_session
// cookie. The scan-approval endpoints live under /api/auth/*, which the cookie's
// Path covers, so both OIDC and self sessions can be located here.
func (s *Server) sessionFromCookie(r *http.Request) (db.WebSession, bool) {
c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName)
if err != nil || c.Value == "" {
return db.WebSession{}, false
}
sess, err := s.queries.GetWebSession(r.Context(), sessionID(c.Value))
if err != nil {
return db.WebSession{}, false
}
return sess, true
}
// sessionRecentlySteppedUp reports whether the caller's session passed step-up
// within StepUpMaxAgeSeconds — so a sensitive action skips re-auth and the same
// session isn't re-prompted repeatedly (#3, AUTH.md §6).
func (s *Server) sessionRecentlySteppedUp(r *http.Request) bool {
sess, ok := s.sessionFromCookie(r)
if !ok || sess.SteppedUpAt == 0 {
return false
}
window := int64(s.cfg.StepUpMaxAgeSeconds)
if window <= 0 {
window = 300
}
return time.Now().Unix()-sess.SteppedUpAt <= window
}
// recordStepUp stamps the caller's session as freshly stepped-up.
func (s *Server) recordStepUp(r *http.Request) {
sess, ok := s.sessionFromCookie(r)
if !ok {
return
}
if err := s.queries.SetSessionSteppedUp(r.Context(), db.SetSessionSteppedUpParams{
SteppedUpAt: time.Now().Unix(),
ID: sess.ID,
}); err != nil {
slog.Warn("record step-up failed", "err", err)
}
}
// verifyStepUp exchanges a fresh prompt=login authorization code and confirms it
// proves a recent interactive re-authentication by the same user: the id_token's
// signature validates (JWKS), its sub matches the caller, and its auth_time is
@@ -401,11 +451,19 @@ func (s *Server) verifyStepUp(r *http.Request, userID, code, verifier string) bo
if sub != userID {
return false
}
// Enforce the freshness window only when the IdP supplied auth_time (Casdoor
// omits it). When absent, the fresh single-use prompt=login code — exchanged
// once, just now — is itself the bound on how recent the re-auth was.
if authTime > 0 {
maxAge := int64(s.cfg.StepUpMaxAgeSeconds)
if maxAge <= 0 {
maxAge = 300
}
return time.Now().Unix()-authTime <= maxAge
if time.Now().Unix()-authTime > maxAge {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// lookupQRRequest fetches a request and verifies the approval_code in constant
+294 -1
View File
@@ -12,11 +12,13 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4/jwt"
"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/config"
"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/db"
"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/hub"
"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/jwtauth"
)
@@ -35,6 +37,7 @@ func newQRTestServer(t *testing.T) *Server {
if err := db.Bootstrap(context.Background(), conn); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("bootstrap: %v", err)
}
q := db.New(conn)
return &Server{
cfg: &config.Config{
AuthMode: "prod", SessionSecret: qrTestSecret,
@@ -42,7 +45,8 @@ func newQRTestServer(t *testing.T) *Server {
QRGuestTTLSeconds: 3600, QRPersistTTLHours: 168,
SessionTokenTTLSeconds: 900,
},
queries: db.New(conn),
queries: q,
hub: hub.New(q),
sessionKey: deriveSessionKey(qrTestSecret),
sessionTokenKey: jwtauth.DeriveSessionTokenKey(qrTestSecret),
siteOrigin: "https://drop.example.net",
@@ -222,6 +226,106 @@ func TestQRFlow_PendingLongPoll(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// noopAuthStore satisfies jwtauth.Store for middleware wiring in tests (no device
// upsert happens without an X-Device-Name header).
type noopAuthStore struct{}
func (noopAuthStore) UpsertDevice(context.Context, db.UpsertDeviceParams) error { return nil }
func (noopAuthStore) GetShortcutToken(context.Context, string) (db.ShortcutToken, error) {
return db.ShortcutToken{}, fmt.Errorf("none")
}
func (noopAuthStore) TouchShortcutTokenUsed(context.Context, db.TouchShortcutTokenUsedParams) error {
return nil
}
func (noopAuthStore) GetWebSession(_ context.Context, id string) (db.WebSession, error) {
return db.WebSession{ID: id}, nil // session always live in these tests
}
// End-to-end through the REAL chain (auth.Middleware → requireFullSession): a
// guest session token is rejected 403 on an account-management route, a full one
// passes. This is the backend enforcement behind AUTH.md §3.2 (guest can't approve
// devices / remove devices / mint tokens).
func TestRequireFullSession_GuestBlockedFullPasses(t *testing.T) {
secret := "test-session-secret-at-least-32-bytes-ok"
srv := &Server{
cfg: &config.Config{SessionTokenTTLSeconds: 900},
sessionTokenKey: jwtauth.DeriveSessionTokenKey(secret),
}
guest, _, err := srv.mintSessionToken("u", "sid", "guest")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mint guest: %v", err)
}
full, _, err := srv.mintSessionToken("u", "sid", "full")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mint full: %v", err)
}
a := jwtauth.New(&config.Config{AuthMode: "prod", SessionSecret: secret}, noopAuthStore{})
handler := a.Middleware(requireFullSession(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})))
probe := func(tok string) int {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/auth/qr/approve", nil)
r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return w.Code
}
if c := probe(guest); c != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("guest token on requireFullSession route: got %d, want 403", c)
}
if c := probe(full); c != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("full token on requireFullSession route: got %d, want 200", c)
}
}
// Revoking a session is sensitive: with step-up enabled it is refused (403
// step_up_required) until the caller's session has recently stepped up, then it
// proceeds (here to 400 missing-id, i.e. past the gate). Step-up state is keyed on
// the cookie session, so it is per-device (AUTH.md §1/§6).
func TestSessionRevoke_RequiresStepUp(t *testing.T) {
s := newQRTestServer(t)
s.cfg.StepUpEnabled = true
s.cfg.StepUpMaxAgeSeconds = 300
raw, id, err := newSessionToken()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("token: %v", err)
}
now := time.Now().Unix()
if err := s.queries.CreateSelfSession(context.Background(), db.CreateSelfSessionParams{
ID: id, UserID: "u", DeviceName: "", UserAgent: "", Kind: "oidc", Scope: "full",
GrantedBy: "", CreatedAt: now, LastUsedAt: now, ExpiresAt: now + 3600,
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create session: %v", err)
}
revoke := func() int {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/auth/sessions/x", nil)
r.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: sessionCookieName, Value: raw})
r = r.WithContext(jwtauth.ContextWithClaims(r.Context(),
&jwtauth.Claims{UserID: "u", SessionScope: "full"}))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.handleSessionRevoke(w, r)
return w.Code
}
// Not stepped up → blocked before any deletion.
if c := revoke(); c != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("revoke without step-up: got %d, want 403", c)
}
// Record step-up on this (cookie) session → gate now passes (400 = missing id,
// reached past the step-up check).
if err := s.queries.SetSessionSteppedUp(context.Background(), db.SetSessionSteppedUpParams{
SteppedUpAt: now, ID: id,
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set stepped up: %v", err)
}
if c := revoke(); c == http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("revoke after step-up still 403; gate did not honour stepped_up_at")
}
}
// selfTokenScope verifies a self-signed session token under the test's session
// key (proving the signature) and returns its scope claim.
func selfTokenScope(t *testing.T, token string) string {
@@ -241,3 +345,192 @@ func selfTokenScope(t *testing.T, token string) string {
scope, _ := custom["scope"].(string)
return scope
}
// revokeByID drives handleSessionRevoke with the chi {id} param and full claims,
// step-up off (the gate is exercised separately).
func revokeByID(s *Server, id, userID string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/auth/sessions/"+id, nil)
rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
rctx.URLParams.Add("id", id)
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx)
ctx = jwtauth.ContextWithClaims(ctx, &jwtauth.Claims{UserID: userID, SessionScope: "full"})
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.handleSessionRevoke(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
return w
}
// Revoking a web session removes its device registration too, so a revoked device
// disappears from the device list at once (the user can no longer remove devices
// by hand). AUTH.md §4.
func TestSessionRevoke_DeletesDevice(t *testing.T) {
s := newQRTestServer(t) // step-up off by default
ctx := context.Background()
now := time.Now().Unix()
_, id, err := newSessionToken()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("token: %v", err)
}
if err := s.queries.CreateSelfSession(ctx, db.CreateSelfSessionParams{
ID: id, UserID: "u", DeviceName: "Laptop", UserAgent: "", Kind: "oidc", Scope: "full",
GrantedBy: "", CreatedAt: now, LastUsedAt: now, ExpiresAt: now + 3600,
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create session: %v", err)
}
if err := s.queries.UpsertDevice(ctx, db.UpsertDeviceParams{
UserID: "u", Name: "Laptop", Type: "browser", LastSeen: now,
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("upsert device: %v", err)
}
if w := revokeByID(s, id, "u"); w.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
t.Fatalf("revoke: got %d %s, want 204", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if _, err := s.queries.GetWebSession(ctx, id); err == nil {
t.Errorf("session still present after revoke")
}
devs, _ := s.queries.ListDevicesByUser(ctx, "u")
for _, d := range devs {
if d.Name == "Laptop" {
t.Errorf("device 'Laptop' not deleted on session revoke")
}
}
}
// The session list unifies web_sessions with native client devices (desktop / iOS)
// that have no web_session, while never double-listing a device that already has a
// session and excluding shortcut-token devices. AUTH.md §4.
func TestSessionsList_IncludesNativeDevices(t *testing.T) {
s := newQRTestServer(t)
ctx := context.Background()
now := time.Now().Unix()
_, id, err := newSessionToken()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("token: %v", err)
}
if err := s.queries.CreateSelfSession(ctx, db.CreateSelfSessionParams{
ID: id, UserID: "u", DeviceName: "Web", UserAgent: "", Kind: "oidc", Scope: "full",
GrantedBy: "", CreatedAt: now, LastUsedAt: now, ExpiresAt: now + 3600,
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create session: %v", err)
}
for _, d := range []struct{ name, typ string }{
{"Web", "browser"}, // has a web_session — must not be double-listed
{"Desk", "macos"}, // native, no session — must appear as native
{"iShortcut", "shortcut"}, // scoped token — excluded from session list
} {
if err := s.queries.UpsertDevice(ctx, db.UpsertDeviceParams{
UserID: "u", Name: d.name, Type: d.typ, LastSeen: now,
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("upsert device %s: %v", d.name, err)
}
}
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/auth/sessions", nil)
r = r.WithContext(jwtauth.ContextWithClaims(r.Context(),
&jwtauth.Claims{UserID: "u", SessionScope: "full"}))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.handleSessionsList(w, r)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("sessions list: got %d %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp struct {
Sessions []sessionView `json:"sessions"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
}
var web, webNativeDup, desk, shortcut bool
for _, v := range resp.Sessions {
switch {
case v.DeviceName == "Web" && !v.Native && v.Kind == "oidc":
web = true
case v.DeviceName == "Web" && v.Native:
webNativeDup = true
case v.DeviceName == "Desk" && v.Native && v.Kind == "macos":
desk = true
case v.DeviceName == "iShortcut":
shortcut = true
}
}
if !web {
t.Errorf("web session for 'Web' missing")
}
if webNativeDup {
t.Errorf("'Web' double-listed as a native device")
}
if !desk {
t.Errorf("native device 'Desk' missing from session list")
}
if shortcut {
t.Errorf("shortcut device leaked into session list")
}
}
// The sweeper drops browser devices whose web_session is gone (orphans) while
// keeping browser devices that still have a live session and all native devices.
func TestDeleteOrphanBrowserDevices(t *testing.T) {
s := newQRTestServer(t)
ctx := context.Background()
now := time.Now().Unix()
// Browser "Kept" has a live session; browser "Orphan" has none; native "Desk"
// (macos) legitimately has no session and must survive.
_, id, err := newSessionToken()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("token: %v", err)
}
if err := s.queries.CreateSelfSession(ctx, db.CreateSelfSessionParams{
ID: id, UserID: "u", DeviceName: "Kept", Kind: "oidc", Scope: "full",
CreatedAt: now, LastUsedAt: now, ExpiresAt: now + 3600,
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create session: %v", err)
}
for _, d := range []struct{ name, typ string }{
{"Kept", "browser"}, {"Orphan", "browser"}, {"Desk", "macos"},
} {
if err := s.queries.UpsertDevice(ctx, db.UpsertDeviceParams{
UserID: "u", Name: d.name, Type: d.typ, LastSeen: now,
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("upsert %s: %v", d.name, err)
}
}
if _, err := s.queries.DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices(ctx, now); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sweep: %v", err)
}
devs, _ := s.queries.ListDevicesByUser(ctx, "u")
got := map[string]bool{}
for _, d := range devs {
got[d.Name] = true
}
if !got["Kept"] {
t.Errorf("browser 'Kept' with a live session was wrongly swept")
}
if got["Orphan"] {
t.Errorf("orphan browser 'Orphan' was not swept")
}
if !got["Desk"] {
t.Errorf("native 'Desk' was wrongly swept (it keeps no web_session)")
}
}
// Removing a native device (the session list's logout path for desktop / iOS) is
// sensitive and requires a recent step-up, mirroring web-session revocation.
func TestDeleteDevice_RequiresStepUp(t *testing.T) {
s := newQRTestServer(t)
s.cfg.StepUpEnabled = true
s.cfg.StepUpMaxAgeSeconds = 300
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/devices/Desk", nil)
rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
rctx.URLParams.Add("name", "Desk")
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx)
ctx = jwtauth.ContextWithClaims(ctx, &jwtauth.Claims{UserID: "u", SessionScope: "full"})
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.handleDeleteDevice(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("delete device without step-up: got %d, want 403", w.Code)
}
}
+16
View File
@@ -176,6 +176,13 @@ func (s *Server) routes() {
r.Get("/auth/qr/request", s.handleQRRequest)
r.Post("/auth/qr/approve", s.handleQRApprove)
r.Post("/auth/qr/deny", s.handleQRDeny)
// Session management: list logins with their permission level,
// really revoke one (logout), and the standalone step-up the
// revoke flow re-uses. All under /api/auth so the session cookie
// (Path=/api/auth) is available for step-up state.
r.Post("/auth/stepup", s.handleStepUp)
r.Get("/auth/sessions", s.handleSessionsList)
r.Delete("/auth/sessions/{id}", s.handleSessionRevoke)
})
r.Route("/transfer", func(r chi.Router) {
@@ -219,6 +226,10 @@ type meResp struct {
UserID string `json:"user_id"`
Groups []string `json:"groups"`
DeviceName string `json:"device_name"`
// Scope is the session's capability level: "guest" (scan-login borrow,
// capability-limited) or "full" (normal login). The UI hides account-management
// affordances on guest sessions (AUTH.md §3.2).
Scope string `json:"scope"`
}
func (s *Server) handleMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -228,10 +239,15 @@ func (s *Server) handleMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
device, _ := jwtauth.DeviceNameFromContext(r.Context())
scope := "full"
if claims.Guest() {
scope = "guest"
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, meResp{
UserID: claims.UserID,
Groups: claims.Groups,
DeviceName: device,
Scope: scope,
})
}
+218
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
package httpapi
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/db"
"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/jwtauth"
)
// Session management (AUTH.md §1, §6): list the caller's logins with their
// capability level, and really revoke one (delete the row → its access token can
// no longer refresh and dies within its short TTL). Revocation is a sensitive
// action, so it requires a recent step-up. A standalone step-up endpoint lets the
// UI establish that re-auth once (per session/device) and reuse it across actions
// within the window — the same session isn't re-prompted repeatedly (#3).
type stepUpReq struct {
Code string `json:"code"`
Verifier string `json:"verifier"`
}
// handleStepUp exchanges a fresh prompt=login code and, on success, stamps the
// caller's session as stepped-up (per-session, cookie-keyed). Sensitive actions
// within StepUpMaxAgeSeconds then skip re-auth. 403 on failure; 204 when step-up
// is disabled (nothing to establish).
func (s *Server) handleStepUp(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !s.cfg.StepUpEnabled {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
return
}
claims, _ := jwtauth.ClaimsFromContext(r.Context())
var body stepUpReq
if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 8192)).Decode(&body); err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "invalid json"})
return
}
if !s.verifyStepUp(r, claims.UserID, body.Code, body.Verifier) {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{"error": "step_up_required"})
return
}
s.recordStepUp(r)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
type sessionView struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
DeviceName string `json:"device_name"`
Kind string `json:"kind"` // oidc | self | guest | macos | windows | linux | ios
Scope string `json:"scope"` // full | guest
Current bool `json:"current"`
Online bool `json:"online"` // device currently connected (SSE) — UI sorts online first
// Native marks a device that authenticates with an IdP token and keeps no
// web_session row (desktop / iOS). It is surfaced from the devices registry so
// the session list covers every device; its "logout" routes to the device
// endpoint rather than the web-session one.
Native bool `json:"native"`
CreatedAt int64 `json:"created_at"`
LastUsedAt int64 `json:"last_used_at"`
ExpiresAt int64 `json:"expires_at"`
}
// isNativeDeviceType reports whether a device type is a real native client (one
// that authenticates via the IdP and keeps no web_session). browser devices are
// expected to carry a web_session; "shortcut" tokens have their own panel.
func isNativeDeviceType(t string) bool {
switch t {
case "macos", "windows", "linux", "ios":
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// handleSessionsList returns the caller's login sessions with their scope, so the
// UI can show the permission level (完整 / 受限访客) and offer real logout. The list
// is unified: web_sessions (browser / scan-login) PLUS native client devices
// (desktop / iOS) that have no web_session of their own — so every logged-in
// device appears in one place and orphaned device rows fall away (AUTH.md §4).
func (s *Server) handleSessionsList(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
claims, _ := jwtauth.ClaimsFromContext(r.Context())
now := time.Now().Unix()
rows, err := s.queries.ListWebSessionsByUser(r.Context(), claims.UserID)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("list sessions failed", "err", err, "user", claims.UserID)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{"error": "db"})
return
}
current := ""
if c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName); err == nil && c.Value != "" {
current = sessionID(c.Value)
}
// Cookieless callers (native apps) can't match by cookie; fall back to their
// own device name to mark the "current" row.
callerDevice, _ := jwtauth.DeviceNameFromContext(r.Context())
out := make([]sessionView, 0, len(rows))
named := make(map[string]struct{}, len(rows))
for _, row := range rows {
if row.ExpiresAt < now {
continue // hide expired sessions (reaped separately)
}
if row.DeviceName != "" {
named[row.DeviceName] = struct{}{}
}
out = append(out, sessionView{
ID: row.ID,
DeviceName: row.DeviceName,
Kind: row.Kind,
Scope: row.Scope,
Current: row.ID == current || (current == "" && row.DeviceName != "" && row.DeviceName == callerDevice),
Online: row.DeviceName != "" && s.hub.Online(claims.UserID, row.DeviceName),
CreatedAt: row.CreatedAt,
LastUsedAt: row.LastUsedAt,
ExpiresAt: row.ExpiresAt,
})
}
// Native clients keep no web_session — surface them from the devices registry,
// skipping any whose name already has a web_session (no double-listing).
if devs, derr := s.queries.ListDevicesByUser(r.Context(), claims.UserID); derr == nil {
for _, d := range devs {
if !isNativeDeviceType(d.Type) {
continue
}
if _, ok := named[d.Name]; ok {
continue
}
out = append(out, sessionView{
ID: "device:" + d.Name,
DeviceName: d.Name,
Kind: d.Type,
Scope: "full",
Native: true,
Current: current == "" && d.Name != "" && d.Name == callerDevice,
Online: s.hub.Online(claims.UserID, d.Name),
CreatedAt: d.LastSeen,
LastUsedAt: d.LastSeen,
ExpiresAt: 0,
})
}
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"sessions": out})
}
// deviceNameHasLiveSession reports whether the user still has a non-expired
// web_session bound to deviceName — used to avoid deleting a device that another
// live session (e.g. a re-login that left the old row) still depends on.
func (s *Server) deviceNameHasLiveSession(ctx context.Context, userID, deviceName string) bool {
rows, err := s.queries.ListWebSessionsByUser(ctx, userID)
if err != nil {
return false
}
now := time.Now().Unix()
for _, ws := range rows {
if ws.DeviceName == deviceName && ws.ExpiresAt >= now {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// handleSessionRevoke deletes a session row (scoped to its owner), really
// invalidating that login. Requires a recent step-up (403 step_up_required
// otherwise). Kicks the device's live SSE so it drops immediately.
func (s *Server) handleSessionRevoke(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if s.cfg.StepUpEnabled && !s.sessionRecentlySteppedUp(r) {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{"error": "step_up_required"})
return
}
claims, _ := jwtauth.ClaimsFromContext(r.Context())
id := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
if id == "" {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "missing id"})
return
}
// Read the device name before deletion so we can kick its SSE.
deviceName := ""
if sess, err := s.queries.GetWebSession(r.Context(), id); err == nil && sess.UserID == claims.UserID {
deviceName = sess.DeviceName
}
n, err := s.queries.DeleteWebSessionForUser(r.Context(), db.DeleteWebSessionForUserParams{
ID: id,
UserID: claims.UserID,
})
if err != nil {
slog.Error("revoke session failed", "err", err)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{"error": "db"})
return
}
if n == 0 {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusNotFound, map[string]string{"error": "not found"})
return
}
if deviceName != "" {
// Drop the device registration too, so a revoked device disappears from the
// device list at once (we no longer remove devices by hand) — unless another
// live session still uses this name.
if !s.deviceNameHasLiveSession(r.Context(), claims.UserID, deviceName) {
if _, derr := s.queries.DeleteDevice(r.Context(), db.DeleteDeviceParams{
UserID: claims.UserID,
Name: deviceName,
}); derr != nil {
slog.Warn("delete device on session revoke failed", "err", derr)
}
}
s.hub.Kick(claims.UserID, deviceName)
s.hub.PublishPresence(r.Context(), claims.UserID)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
+13 -5
View File
@@ -11,10 +11,14 @@ import (
// DeviceSweepInterval is how often the device sweeper wakes up.
const DeviceSweepInterval = 1 * time.Hour
// RunDeviceSweeper deletes devices whose last_seen is older than ttl.
// Per user requirement: device registration must not outlive the longest
// valid refresh_token (brief §2: 196h sliding window). Anything ≤ TTL is fine;
// 0 disables the sweeper.
// RunDeviceSweeper prunes the devices table on a timer so it stays aligned with
// the session list (AUTH.md §4): it drops (1) devices whose last_seen is older
// than ttl — registration must not outlive the longest valid refresh_token
// (brief §2: 196h sliding window) — and (2) browser devices whose web_session is
// gone (revoked or expired), which would otherwise linger until the stale cutoff
// now that users can no longer remove devices by hand. Native and shortcut
// devices keep no web_session and are pruned by the stale cutoff only. ttl ≤ 0
// disables the sweeper.
func RunDeviceSweeper(ctx context.Context, queries *db.Queries, ttl time.Duration) {
if ttl <= 0 {
slog.Info("device sweeper disabled (ttl <= 0)")
@@ -29,10 +33,14 @@ func RunDeviceSweeper(ctx context.Context, queries *db.Queries, ttl time.Duratio
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-t.C:
cutoff := time.Now().Add(-ttl).Unix()
now := time.Now()
cutoff := now.Add(-ttl).Unix()
if err := queries.DeleteStaleDevices(ctx, cutoff); err != nil {
slog.Error("device sweeper failed", "err", err)
}
if _, err := queries.DeleteOrphanBrowserDevices(ctx, now.Unix()); err != nil {
slog.Error("device sweeper: orphan browser cleanup failed", "err", err)
}
}
}
}
+31 -13
View File
@@ -19,13 +19,16 @@ import (
"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/db"
)
// Store is the subset of *db.Queries the auth middleware uses: device upserts
// plus the shortcut-token lookups needed to honour revocation. Declared as an
// interface so tests can swap in a fake.
// Store is the subset of *db.Queries the auth middleware uses: device upserts,
// the shortcut-token lookups needed to honour revocation, and the web_session
// lookup that makes a self-signed session token's revocation take effect at once
// (a deleted row → the token is rejected on its next request, not after TTL).
// Declared as an interface so tests can swap in a fake.
type Store interface {
UpsertDevice(ctx context.Context, arg db.UpsertDeviceParams) error
GetShortcutToken(ctx context.Context, jti string) (db.ShortcutToken, error)
TouchShortcutTokenUsed(ctx context.Context, arg db.TouchShortcutTokenUsedParams) error
GetWebSession(ctx context.Context, id string) (db.WebSession, error)
}
type Authenticator struct {
@@ -108,7 +111,7 @@ func (a *Authenticator) verify(ctx context.Context, token string, r *http.Reques
// cdrop self-signed session tokens first: distinct key + typ=session, so a
// shortcut token (different key, requires jti) never validates here and a
// session token never falls through to the shortcut path's DB lookup.
if c, err := a.verifySelfToken(token); err == nil {
if c, err := a.verifySelfToken(ctx, token); err == nil {
return c, nil
}
if c, err := a.verifyHS256(ctx, token); err == nil {
@@ -119,9 +122,13 @@ func (a *Authenticator) verify(ctx context.Context, token string, r *http.Reques
// verifySelfToken validates a cdrop self-signed session access token (AUTH.md
// §3.1): HS256 over DeriveSessionTokenKey, carrying typ=session and a full/guest
// scope. Stateless by design — no DB lookup, so it stays cheap on every request;
// revocation rides the short TTL (the session row is re-checked at /auth/refresh).
func (a *Authenticator) verifySelfToken(token string) (*Claims, error) {
// scope. This is the unified browser token — scan-login (self/guest) AND OIDC web
// logins both ride it now, so the browser holds one token type. After the cheap
// signature/exp/scope checks it does ONE indexed lookup of the token's sid against
// web_sessions: a deleted row means the session was revoked, and the token is
// rejected on its very next request (immediate "log out this device"). The IdP
// RS256 path (verifyRS256) remains only for the desktop client's loopback tokens.
func (a *Authenticator) verifySelfToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (*Claims, error) {
if len(a.sessionTokenKey) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("session token key not configured")
}
@@ -147,6 +154,16 @@ func (a *Authenticator) verifySelfToken(token string) (*Claims, error) {
if scope != "full" && scope != "guest" {
return nil, errors.New("session token invalid scope")
}
// Bind the token to its live web_session row (sid): once that row is revoked
// (deleted), the token is rejected on its very next request — "log out this
// device" takes effect immediately rather than after the access token's TTL.
sid, _ := custom["sid"].(string)
if sid == "" {
return nil, errors.New("session token missing sid")
}
if _, err := a.store.GetWebSession(ctx, sid); err != nil {
return nil, errors.New("session revoked")
}
return &Claims{UserID: std.Subject, SessionScope: scope}, nil
}
@@ -265,8 +282,9 @@ func (a *Authenticator) verifyRS256(ctx context.Context, token string) (*Claims,
// VerifyIDToken validates an OIDC id_token (RS256 via JWKS, issuer + audience)
// from a fresh prompt=login exchange and returns its subject and auth_time (the
// epoch second of the actual end-user authentication). Used for step-up re-auth
// (AUTH.md §6): the caller checks sub matches and auth_time is recent enough.
// epoch second of the actual end-user authentication, or 0 when the IdP omits the
// claim — Casdoor does). Used for step-up re-auth (AUTH.md §6): the caller checks
// sub matches and, only when auth_time is present, that it is recent enough.
func (a *Authenticator) VerifyIDToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (subject string, authTime int64, err error) {
if a.jwks == nil {
return "", 0, errors.New("JWKS not configured")
@@ -300,10 +318,10 @@ func (a *Authenticator) VerifyIDToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (subjec
if std.Subject == "" {
return "", 0, errors.New("missing subject claim")
}
at, ok := numericClaim(custom["auth_time"])
if !ok {
return "", 0, errors.New("missing auth_time claim")
}
// auth_time is OPTIONAL: required by OIDC only when the IdP chooses to honour
// max_age, and Casdoor omits it entirely. Absent → 0; the caller treats the
// fresh single-use prompt=login code as the freshness bound instead.
at, _ := numericClaim(custom["auth_time"])
return std.Subject, at, nil
}
+31 -1
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ type fakeDeviceUpserter struct {
calls []db.UpsertDeviceParams
err error
tokens map[string]db.ShortcutToken
revokedSIDs map[string]bool
}
func (f *fakeDeviceUpserter) UpsertDevice(_ context.Context, arg db.UpsertDeviceParams) error {
@@ -45,6 +46,15 @@ func (f *fakeDeviceUpserter) TouchShortcutTokenUsed(_ context.Context, _ db.Touc
return nil
}
// GetWebSession backs the self-token revocation check. revokedSIDs lets a test
// simulate a revoked session (deleted row); any other sid resolves to a live row.
func (f *fakeDeviceUpserter) GetWebSession(_ context.Context, id string) (db.WebSession, error) {
if f.revokedSIDs[id] {
return db.WebSession{}, sql.ErrNoRows
}
return db.WebSession{ID: id, UserID: "user-x"}, nil
}
// echo handler that responds with the claims+device discovered in context.
func echoMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
claims, _ := ClaimsFromContext(r.Context())
@@ -489,6 +499,26 @@ func TestSanitizeDeviceName(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// A self-signed session token is bound to its web_session row: once the row is
// revoked (deleted), the token is rejected on its next request even though it is
// still cryptographically valid and unexpired — "log out this device" is immediate
// (AUTH.md §1/§3.1).
func TestSelfToken_RejectedAfterSessionRevoked(t *testing.T) {
secret := "test-session-secret-at-least-32-bytes-long"
exp := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
live := New(&config.Config{AuthMode: "prod", SessionSecret: secret}, &fakeDeviceUpserter{})
if c, _ := serveBearer(live, signSelfToken(t, secret, "user-x", "session", "full", exp)); c != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("token with a live session: got %d, want 200", c)
}
revoked := New(&config.Config{AuthMode: "prod", SessionSecret: secret},
&fakeDeviceUpserter{revokedSIDs: map[string]bool{"test-sid": true}})
if c, _ := serveBearer(revoked, signSelfToken(t, secret, "user-x", "session", "full", exp)); c != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("token whose session was revoked must be rejected, got %d", c)
}
}
// signSelfToken mints a cdrop self-signed session token the way httpapi.mintSessionToken
// does: HS256 over DeriveSessionTokenKey, with typ + scope custom claims and no jti.
func signSelfToken(t *testing.T, secret, sub, typ, scope string, exp time.Time) string {
@@ -505,7 +535,7 @@ func signSelfToken(t *testing.T, secret, sub, typ, scope string, exp time.Time)
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
Expiry: jwt.NewNumericDate(exp),
}
tok, err := jwt.Signed(sig).Claims(std).Claims(map[string]any{"typ": typ, "scope": scope}).Serialize()
tok, err := jwt.Signed(sig).Claims(std).Claims(map[string]any{"typ": typ, "scope": scope, "sid": "test-sid"}).Serialize()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("serialize: %v", err)
}
+7
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
"@mantine/notifications": "^7.13.5",
"@tanstack/react-router": "^1.82.0",
"@types/qrcode": "^1.5.6",
"jsqr": "^1.4.0",
"lucide-react": "^0.460.0",
"qrcode": "^1.5.4",
"react": "^18.3.1",
@@ -2433,6 +2434,12 @@
"node": ">=6"
}
},
"node_modules/jsqr": {
"version": "1.4.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/jsqr/-/jsqr-1.4.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-dxLob7q65Xg2DvstYkRpkYtmKm2sPJ9oFhrhmudT1dZvNFFTlroai3AWSpLey/w5vMcLBXRgOJsbXpdN9HzU/A==",
"license": "Apache-2.0"
},
"node_modules/lilconfig": {
"version": "3.1.3",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/lilconfig/-/lilconfig-3.1.3.tgz",
+1
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
"@mantine/notifications": "^7.13.5",
"@tanstack/react-router": "^1.82.0",
"@types/qrcode": "^1.5.6",
"jsqr": "^1.4.0",
"lucide-react": "^0.460.0",
"qrcode": "^1.5.4",
"react": "^18.3.1",
+8 -2
View File
@@ -20,13 +20,19 @@ export interface AuthShellProps
* 跳转到主界面,跳转帧里顶栏 logo 会与主界面 header 的 logo 重叠成“两个
* logo”,隐藏即可消除。登录页是整页跳 IdP、无此重叠,保留 logo。 */
hideBrand?: boolean;
/** 整页跳过聚珍 CJK 处理(在 shell 根加 data-jz-skip)。状态机页面(扫码 /
* 批准 / 显码:mount 后即 getUserMedia/fetch → setState 频繁重渲染)必须用:
* 聚珍是渲染后 MutationObserver 改 DOM 的库,与 React 重渲染同一子树本质冲突,
* 会触发 insertBefore 崩溃。这些页以短 chrome 文本为主,跳过聚珍仅损失些微
* 中西间距,远胜崩溃。 */
skipAutospace?: boolean;
}
// 全屏外壳:登录、首次设置、OAuth 回调共用。带轻量品牌 + 主题切换,
// 让用户在登录前也能调主题。
export function AuthShell(props: AuthShellProps)
{
const { title, subtitle, children, footer, cardBrand, hideBrand } = props;
const { title, subtitle, children, footer, cardBrand, hideBrand, skipAutospace } = props;
const theme = useAppStore((s) => s.theme);
const setTheme = useAppStore((s) => s.setTheme);
const next: ThemeMode = theme === "system" ? "light" : theme === "light" ? "dark" : "system";
@@ -38,7 +44,7 @@ export function AuthShell(props: AuthShellProps)
const brandNode = cardBrand === undefined ? null : cardBrand;
return (
<div className={s.shell}>
<div className={s.shell} data-jz-skip={skipAutospace ? "" : undefined}>
<div className={s.topbar}>
{/* 空 span 占位保持 space-between,主题切换仍靠右。 */}
{hideBrand ? <span /> : <span className={s.brand}><Wordmark /></span>}
+73 -15
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@ import { useAppStore, type User } from "../../store";
import { t } from "../../i18n";
import { apiFetch } from "../../net/api";
import { isDesktop, desktopRefresh, clearDesktopSession } from "../../net/desktop";
import { fetchMeScope } from "../../net/sessions";
import { stashStepUpPending } from "../qr/stepUp";
import { toast } from "../../ui/feedback";
// ---- dev mode -------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -46,6 +48,29 @@ export function logout()
if (isDesktop()) { clearDesktopSession(); }
}
// forceLogout 在「服务端确证会话已失效」时清掉本地登录态——触发点仅一处:
// access token 401 后续期也被服务端以 401 拒绝(refreshTokens 返回 "invalid"
// 即被远程吊销或已过期)。短期连接失败(网络抖动 / 5xx)绝不走到这里(见
// net/api.ts)。与 logout() 不同,它不发任何服务端请求(会话已死,调用只会再次
// 401),只就地清空 + 提示,让 __root 的反应式守卫把界面送回登录页
// (离线设备「下一次使用即得知」)。
//
// 幂等:靠「已登出即跳过」实现——首个 401 同步清空 user/accessToken 后,并发涌入
// 的其余 401 看到已为空便直接返回,不会重复弹 toast、不重复清桌面 session。
export function forceLogout(): void
{
const st = useAppStore.getState();
if (!st.user && !st.accessToken)
{
// 已被并发的某个 401 清空,或本就处于登出态:不重复处理(避免 toast 刷屏)。
return;
}
st.clearAuth();
// 桌面端:删除 Go 侧持久化 session,否则下次启动仍注入这枚已失效的登录态。
if (isDesktop()) { clearDesktopSession(); }
toast.error(t("auth.sessionLost.title"), t("auth.sessionLost.body"));
}
// ---- prod (OIDC PKCE) -----------------------------------------------------
interface AuthConfig
@@ -242,48 +267,69 @@ interface CookieRefreshResp
device_name?: string;
}
// CookieRefreshResult 区分「服务端确证会话失效」与「短期失败」,使上层只在前者
// 清空登录态:
// ok —— 换到新 access token
// invalid —— /api/auth/refresh 返回 401:服务端查证会话已失效 / 被吊销 / 过期
// (其处理器同时清掉 cookie),凭据确凿不可恢复
// transient —— 5xx / 同源校验 403 / 响应残缺等非确证失败(网络层抛错则根本不进此
// 函数、照常向上抛)——一律保留登录态,按短期错误处理
type CookieRefreshResult =
| { kind: "ok"; accessToken: string; user: User; deviceName: string }
| { kind: "invalid" }
| { kind: "transient" };
// cookieRefresh 用 HttpOnly session cookie 静默换一枚新 access_token。无 body——
// cookie 自动随同源请求发出(Path=/api/auth)。成功返回 {accessToken, user,
// deviceName}cookie 缺失 / 过期 / 被 IdP 拒绝 → null(调用方据此落到登录页)
async function cookieRefresh(): Promise<{ accessToken: string; user: User; deviceName: string } | null>
// cookie 自动随同源请求发出(Path=/api/auth)。返回见 CookieRefreshResult:只有
// 服务端明确以 401 拒绝才算 invalid,短期失败一律 transient,不误伤登录态
async function cookieRefresh(): Promise<CookieRefreshResult>
{
const r = await fetch("/api/auth/refresh", { method: "POST" });
if (!r.ok) { return null; }
if (!r.ok)
{
return { kind: r.status === 401 ? "invalid" : "transient" };
}
const data = await r.json().catch(() => null) as CookieRefreshResp | null;
if (!data?.access_token || !data.user?.id) { return null; }
if (!data?.access_token || !data.user?.id) { return { kind: "transient" }; }
return {
kind: "ok",
accessToken: data.access_token,
user: { id: data.user.id, name: data.user.name, avatar: data.user.avatar },
deviceName: data.device_name ?? "",
};
}
// refreshTokens 换新 access_tokenapi.ts 在请求拿到 401 时惰性调用。返回是否成功。
export async function refreshTokens(): Promise<boolean>
// RefreshOutcome 是续期对上层的三态结论;只有 "invalid"(服务端确证失效)才允许
// 上层 forceLogout"transient" 必须保留登录态(短期连接失败不清状态)。
export type RefreshOutcome = "refreshed" | "invalid" | "transient";
// refreshTokens 换新 access_tokenapi.ts 在请求拿到 401 时惰性调用。
export async function refreshTokens(): Promise<RefreshOutcome>
{
const store = useAppStore.getState();
if (store.authMode !== "prod") { return false; }
if (store.authMode !== "prod") { return "transient"; }
// 桌面端:refresh 完全在 Go 内部完成(refresh_token 只在 GoJS 不持有),
// 直接无参调用。
// 直接无参调用。Go 侧暂不区分「被吊销」与「短期失败」,故失败一律按 transient
// 处理(不清空登录态)——桌面端即时吊销留后续(AUTH.md §3.1)。
if (isDesktop())
{
const res = await desktopRefresh();
if (!res?.access_token) { return false; }
if (!res?.access_token) { return "transient"; }
const cur = useAppStore.getState();
if (!cur.user) { return false; }
if (!cur.user) { return "transient"; }
cur.setAuth({ accessToken: res.access_token, user: cur.user });
return true;
return "refreshed";
}
// 浏览器端:走 HttpOnly cookie sessionrefresh_token 在服务端,JS 不持有)。
const res = await cookieRefresh();
if (!res) { return false; }
if (res.kind !== "ok") { return res.kind; } // "invalid" | "transient",透传给上层
const cur = useAppStore.getState();
cur.setAuth({ accessToken: res.accessToken, user: res.user });
// 设备名以服务端为权威;本地缺失(PWA 存储被清)时回填。
if (res.deviceName && !cur.selfDeviceName) { cur.setSelfDeviceName(res.deviceName); }
return true;
return "refreshed";
}
// bootstrapAuth 在 App 挂载前尝试「免重登」:浏览器端若本会话尚无 access_token
@@ -297,12 +343,24 @@ export async function bootstrapAuth(): Promise<void>
if (store.accessToken && store.user) { return; } // 同会话已登录(sessionStorage 命中)
const res = await cookieRefresh();
if (!res) { return; }
if (res.kind !== "ok") { return; } // 开机水合失败(含 invalid / transient)→ 照常落登录页
const cur = useAppStore.getState();
cur.setAuth({ accessToken: res.accessToken, user: res.user });
if (res.deviceName && !cur.selfDeviceName) { cur.setSelfDeviceName(res.deviceName); }
}
// refreshSessionScope 拉一次 /api/me 校正本会话权限级别(full / guest)并写进
// store。在登录成功 / 开机水合后调用一次,使受限访客的账号管理入口被隐藏。失败
// 静默回退 "full"——只多展示入口,后端仍 403 兜底。dev 模式无 guest 概念,跳过。
export async function refreshSessionScope(): Promise<void>
{
const store = useAppStore.getState();
if (store.authMode !== "prod") { return; }
if (!store.user || !store.accessToken) { return; }
const scope = await fetchMeScope();
useAppStore.getState().setSessionScope(scope);
}
// syncWebDeviceName 把本机设备名推到服务端 session(cookie 鉴权),让 PWA 存储被清
// 后开机仍能从 cookie session 恢复设备名、不再误跳 /setup。仅浏览器 prod;桌面端走
// persistDesktopDeviceNameGo 持久化),dev 无 session。失败静默——只是体验降级。
+3 -3
View File
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ export function DesktopSettings()
<Group justify="space-between" wrap="nowrap" align="flex-start">
<Stack gap={2} style={{ minWidth: 0 }}>
<Text size="sm" fw={500}>{t("settings.desktop.downloadDir")}</Text>
<Text size="xs" c="dimmed">{t("settings.desktop.downloadDirHint")}</Text>
<Text size="xs" c="dimmed" className="justify" data-jz-level="paragraph">{t("settings.desktop.downloadDirHint")}</Text>
<Text
size="xs"
style={{ fontFamily: "var(--font-mono, ui-monospace, monospace)", wordBreak: "break-all" }}
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ export function DesktopSettings()
</Stack>
</Group>
<div style={{ height: 1, background: "var(--divider)" }} />
<Text size="xs" c="dimmed">
<Text size="xs" c="dimmed" className="justify" data-jz-level="paragraph">
{t("settings.desktop.ttlNote")}
</Text>
</Stack>
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ function ToggleRow(props: {
<Group justify="space-between" wrap="nowrap" align="flex-start">
<Stack gap={2} style={{ minWidth: 0 }}>
<Text size="sm" fw={500}>{title}</Text>
<Text size="xs" c="dimmed">{hint}</Text>
<Text size="xs" c="dimmed" className="justify" data-jz-level="paragraph">{hint}</Text>
</Stack>
<Switch
checked={checked}
@@ -160,8 +160,20 @@
.headerCount { color: var(--text-muted); font-size: var(--fs-12); margin-left: 4px; }
/* header 右侧动作组:「显示/隐藏离线」与「扫码登录新设备」并排,同款文本按钮语汇。 */
.headerActions
{
display: inline-flex;
align-items: center;
gap: var(--space-1);
flex-shrink: 0;
}
.headerSwitch
{
display: inline-flex;
align-items: center;
gap: 5px;
background: transparent;
border: 0;
color: var(--text-muted);
@@ -173,3 +185,4 @@
transition: background-color var(--dur-fast) var(--ease-out);
}
.headerSwitch:hover { background: var(--accent-soft); color: var(--accent); }
.headerSwitch:focus-visible { outline: 2px solid var(--accent); outline-offset: 2px; }
+17 -3
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
import { useMemo, useState, type DragEvent } from "react";
import { Check } from "lucide-react";
import { Check, ScanLine } from "lucide-react";
import { DeviceTypeIcon, StateDot } from "../../ui/glyphs";
import type { DeviceKind } from "../../ui/glyphs";
import type { DeviceInfo } from "../../store";
@@ -15,11 +15,13 @@ export interface DeviceStripProps
onSelect: (name: string | null) => void;
/** 拖拽文件落到设备卡上,跳过 composer 直接发送。 */
onDropFile?: (deviceName: string, file: File) => void;
/** 「扫码登录新设备」入口:应用内相机扫码把另一台设备接入账号。 */
onLinkDevice?: () => void;
}
export function DeviceStrip(props: DeviceStripProps)
{
const { devices, selfDeviceName, selectedDevice, onSelect, onDropFile } = props;
const { devices, selfDeviceName, selectedDevice, onSelect, onDropFile, onLinkDevice } = props;
const [ showOffline, setShowOffline ] = useState(false);
const peers = useMemo(
@@ -42,6 +44,7 @@ export function DeviceStrip(props: DeviceStripProps)
{t("home.deviceList.onlineSuffix", { count: onlineCount })}
</span>
</div>
<div className={s.headerActions}>
{offlineCount > 0 && (
<button
type="button"
@@ -49,10 +52,21 @@ export function DeviceStrip(props: DeviceStripProps)
onClick={() => setShowOffline((v) => !v)}
>
{showOffline
? "隐藏离线"
? t("home.deviceList.hideOffline")
: t("home.deviceList.showOffline", { count: offlineCount })}
</button>
)}
{onLinkDevice && (
<button
type="button"
className={s.headerSwitch}
onClick={onLinkDevice}
>
<ScanLine size={13} aria-hidden />
{t("qr.entry.scanNewDevice")}
</button>
)}
</div>
</div>
{visible.length === 0 ? (
+36 -6
View File
@@ -15,12 +15,24 @@
const PENDING_KEY = "cdrop.qr.stepup_pending"; // { verifier, returnTo }
const STASH_KEY = "cdrop.qr.stepup_stash"; // { code, verifier }
// 登录会话登出的 step-up:跨整页跳转记住「要登出的是哪条会话」。回到设置页后取出,
// 重试那条 DELETE。批准页的 step-up 不用它(要批准的 request 已编在 returnTo 里)。
const REVOKE_KEY = "cdrop.qr.stepup_revoke"; // sessionIdstring
// 仅允许站内 /link 路径回流,杜绝 open-redirect(外部 URL / 协议相对地址)。
// 与 returnTo.ts 同口径——step-up 往返回来后的整页跳转目标只能是批准页。
function isSafeLinkPath(path: string): boolean
// 仅允许两个站内回流目标,杜绝 open-redirect(外部 URL / 协议相对地址 / 任意路径):
// - /link[?…] ——批准页(扫码登录的 step-up);
// - /settings ——设置页(登录会话登出的 step-up)。
// step-up 往返回来后的整页跳转目标只能是这两处之一;其余一律拒。校验 path 必须以
// "/link" 或 "/settings" 起头且后随串只能是空或 "?…",挡住 "/linkmalicious" /
// "//evil.com"(协议相对)/ "/settings/../x" 之类绕过。
function isSafeReturnPath(path: string): boolean
{
return path.startsWith("/link?") || path === "/link";
for (const base of [ "/link", "/settings" ])
{
if (path === base) { return true; }
if (path.startsWith(base + "?")) { return true; }
}
return false;
}
export interface StepUpPending
@@ -40,7 +52,7 @@ export interface StepUpStash
export function stashStepUpPending(pending: StepUpPending): boolean
{
if (typeof window === "undefined") { return false; }
if (!pending.verifier || !isSafeLinkPath(pending.returnTo)) { return false; }
if (!pending.verifier || !isSafeReturnPath(pending.returnTo)) { return false; }
window.sessionStorage.setItem(PENDING_KEY, JSON.stringify(pending));
return true;
}
@@ -53,7 +65,7 @@ export function peekStepUpPending(): StepUpPending | null
const raw = window.sessionStorage.getItem(PENDING_KEY);
if (!raw) { return null; }
const p = safeParse<StepUpPending>(raw);
if (!p?.verifier || !isSafeLinkPath(p.returnTo)) { return null; }
if (!p?.verifier || !isSafeReturnPath(p.returnTo)) { return null; }
return p;
}
@@ -91,6 +103,24 @@ export function clearStepUpStash(): void
window.sessionStorage.removeItem(STASH_KEY);
}
// stashPendingRevoke 在发起会话登出的 step-up 再认证前记下待登出的 sessionId,
// 跨整页跳转留到回到设置页后取出重试。
export function stashPendingRevoke(sessionId: string): void
{
if (typeof window === "undefined") { return; }
if (!sessionId) { return; }
window.sessionStorage.setItem(REVOKE_KEY, sessionId);
}
// consumePendingRevoke 取出并清除待登出的 sessionId(一次性,用完即清)。
export function consumePendingRevoke(): string | null
{
if (typeof window === "undefined") { return null; }
const id = window.sessionStorage.getItem(REVOKE_KEY);
window.sessionStorage.removeItem(REVOKE_KEY);
return id || null;
}
function safeParse<T>(raw: string): T | null
{
try { return JSON.parse(raw) as T; }
+10 -10
View File
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ export function ShortcutTokens()
return (
<Panel title={t("settings.shortcut.title")}>
<Stack gap="sm">
<Text size="sm" c="dimmed">{t("settings.shortcut.intro")}</Text>
<Text size="sm" c="dimmed" className="justify" data-jz-level="paragraph">{t("settings.shortcut.intro")}</Text>
<Group align="flex-end" gap="sm" wrap="nowrap">
<div style={{ flex: 1, minWidth: 0 }}>
@@ -273,24 +273,24 @@ function IssuedReveal(props: { issued: IssueResp; base: string; onDismiss: () =>
<Stack gap={6}>
<Text size="sm" fw={600}>{t("settings.shortcut.guideTitle")}</Text>
<Text size="sm" c="dimmed">{t("settings.shortcut.guideIntro")}</Text>
<Text size="sm" c="dimmed">{t("settings.shortcut.guideDeviceName")}</Text>
<Text size="sm" c="dimmed" className="justify" data-jz-level="paragraph">{t("settings.shortcut.guideIntro")}</Text>
<Text size="sm" c="dimmed" className="justify" data-jz-level="paragraph">{t("settings.shortcut.guideDeviceName")}</Text>
<Text size="sm" fw={500}>{t("settings.shortcut.guidePullTitle")}</Text>
<Stack gap={2}>
<Text size="sm">1. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePull1")}</Text>
<Text size="sm">2. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePull2")}</Text>
<Text size="sm">3. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePull3")}</Text>
<Text size="sm" className="justify" data-jz-level="paragraph">1. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePull1")}</Text>
<Text size="sm" className="justify" data-jz-level="paragraph">2. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePull2")}</Text>
<Text size="sm" className="justify" data-jz-level="paragraph">3. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePull3")}</Text>
</Stack>
<Text size="sm" fw={500}>{t("settings.shortcut.guidePushTitle")}</Text>
<Stack gap={2}>
<Text size="sm">1. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePush1")}</Text>
<Text size="sm">2. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePush2")}</Text>
<Text size="sm">3. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePush3")}</Text>
<Text size="sm" className="justify" data-jz-level="paragraph">1. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePush1")}</Text>
<Text size="sm" className="justify" data-jz-level="paragraph">2. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePush2")}</Text>
<Text size="sm" className="justify" data-jz-level="paragraph">3. {t("settings.shortcut.guidePush3")}</Text>
</Stack>
<Text size="xs" c="dimmed">{t("settings.shortcut.guideToleranceNote")}</Text>
<Text size="xs" c="dimmed" className="justify" data-jz-level="paragraph">{t("settings.shortcut.guideToleranceNote")}</Text>
</Stack>
<Group justify="flex-end">
+54 -9
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ export const enUS: Partial<TranslationDict> = {
"app.disconnectedHint":
"Lost connection to the server — retrying automatically. No need to refresh.",
// ---- session lost (revoked remotely / expired) ----------------------
"auth.sessionLost.title": "Signed out",
"auth.sessionLost.body":
"This device's login was revoked or expired. Please sign in again.",
// ---- header / user menu ---------------------------------------------
"nav.accountMenu": "Account menu",
"nav.thisDeviceLabel": "This device: ",
@@ -34,6 +39,7 @@ export const enUS: Partial<TranslationDict> = {
"home.deviceList.title": "Devices",
"home.deviceList.onlineSuffix": "({{count}} online)",
"home.deviceList.showOffline": "Show offline ({{count}})",
"home.deviceList.hideOffline": "Hide offline",
"home.deviceList.empty":
"No peer devices yet. Open the app in another tab with a different device name (Settings → Device name) to see it here.",
"home.tabs.file": "File",
@@ -95,6 +101,20 @@ export const enUS: Partial<TranslationDict> = {
// ---- QR sign-in · entry --------------------------------------------
"qr.entry.fromLogin": "Sign in with a QR code",
"qr.entry.scanNewDevice": "Scan to link a device",
// In-app scanner: scan a new device's QR code from this signed-in device to link it.
"qr.scan.title": "Scan to link a device",
"qr.scan.subtitle": "Point the code shown on the other device at the frame. Approval stays on this signed-in device.",
"qr.scan.starting": "Starting the camera…",
"qr.scan.aiming": "Line the code up inside the frame",
"qr.scan.foreign": "That isn't a sign-in code for this site. Aim at the code from “Sign in with a QR code” on the new device.",
"qr.scan.noCamera": "This device has no camera available. Use a phone or tablet with a camera to scan instead.",
"qr.scan.denied": "Camera access was blocked. Allow the camera in your browser's site settings, then reopen this page.",
"qr.scan.error": "Couldn't open the camera. Try again, or scan from a device with a camera.",
"qr.scan.howto1": "On the new device, open “Sign in with a QR code” to show a code.",
"qr.scan.howto2": "Line that code up in the frame above — approval starts automatically.",
"qr.scan.back": "Back",
// ---- QR sign-in · show page (new device) ---------------------------
"qr.show.title": "Sign in with a QR code",
@@ -109,6 +129,8 @@ export const enUS: Partial<TranslationDict> = {
"qr.show.expired": "This code has expired. Generate a new one and scan again.",
"qr.show.denied": "This request was declined. If that was you, generate a new code and try again.",
"qr.show.regenerate": "Generate a new code",
"qr.show.back": "Back to home",
"qr.show.backToName": "Back",
// ---- QR sign-in · approve page (phone) -----------------------------
"qr.approve.title": "Approve a new device",
@@ -117,11 +139,12 @@ export const enUS: Partial<TranslationDict> = {
"qr.approve.badLink": "This approval link is incomplete. Generate a new code on the device and scan it again.",
"qr.approve.signInFirst": "Sign in to your account first, then approve this device.",
"qr.approve.trustLabel": "Trust duration",
"qr.approve.trust.title": "Trust this device",
"qr.approve.trust.title": "Trust this device (7 days)",
"qr.approve.trust.hint": "Skip approval for 7 days, renewed on each use.",
"qr.approve.once.title": "Just this once",
"qr.approve.once.title": "Just this once (1 hour)",
"qr.approve.once.hint": "Signed in for 1 hour, then scan again.",
"qr.approve.scopeGuest": "This device signs in as a limited guest: it can send and receive files and messages, but can't change your account or approve other devices.",
"qr.approve.scopeFull": "This device signs fully into your account for 7 days: it can send and receive files and messages, and manage your account and devices.",
"qr.approve.scopeGuest": "Signs in as a limited guest — it can send and receive files and messages, but can't change your account or approve other devices; expires after 1 hour.",
"qr.approve.approve": "Approve sign-in",
"qr.approve.stepUp.notice": "For security, verify your identity before approving — the button below takes you through a fresh sign-in.",
"qr.approve.stepUp.button": "Verify and approve",
@@ -151,16 +174,38 @@ export const enUS: Partial<TranslationDict> = {
"Removes this device's registration and signs you out.",
"settings.unregister.currentConfirm":
"Unregistering this device will remove its registration and sign you out. Continue?",
"settings.unregister.peerConfirm": "Remove device \"{{name}}\"?",
"settings.peers.title": "Other devices",
"settings.peers.empty": "No other devices.",
"settings.peers.remove": "Remove",
"settings.peers.removing": "Removing…",
"settings.error.delete": "Action failed: {{message}}",
// ---- Limited-guest badge --------------------------------------------
"settings.guest.badge": "Limited guest",
"settings.guest.title": "This device is a limited guest",
"settings.guest.body": "This device is signed in as a limited guest: it can send and receive files, messages, and clipboard, but cannot manage the account, remove devices, or authorize new ones. To get full access, sign in again on your main device.",
// ---- Login sessions / device management -----------------------------
"settings.sessions.title": "Login sessions",
"settings.sessions.hint": "Every device currently signed in to this account — browser, desktop, and mobile clients; online ones are listed first. Signing a device out ends its session immediately; it must sign in again on that device to continue.",
"settings.sessions.guestNote": "Limited guests can't manage login sessions. To manage them, sign in fully on your main device.",
"settings.sessions.empty": "No other login sessions.",
"settings.sessions.loadError": "Failed to load login sessions.",
"settings.sessions.retry": "Retry",
"settings.sessions.current": "This device",
"settings.sessions.scopeFull": "Full",
"settings.sessions.scopeGuest": "Limited guest",
"settings.sessions.kind.oidc": "Account login",
"settings.sessions.kind.self": "Local account",
"settings.sessions.kind.guest": "Scanned guest",
"settings.sessions.lastUsed": "Last active {{time}}",
"settings.sessions.neverUsed": "Not active yet",
"settings.sessions.signOut": "Sign out",
"settings.sessions.signingOut": "Signing out…",
"settings.sessions.signOutCurrent": "Sign out this device",
"settings.sessions.confirmOther": "Sign out device \"{{name}}\"? Its session will be invalidated immediately and it must sign in again.",
"settings.sessions.confirmCurrent": "Signing out this device is the same as logging out. Continue?",
"settings.sessions.revoked": "Signed that device out",
"settings.sessions.stepUpRejected": "Identity verification failed or expired. Please try again.",
"settings.online": "Online",
"settings.offline": "Offline",
"settings.lastSeen": "Last seen {{time}}",
"settings.lastSeenNever": "Never connected",
"settings.push.title": "Push notifications",
"settings.push.hint": "When this page is closed, new files, messages, and transfer results arrive as system notifications; while it's open, you'll see in-app alerts instead.",
"settings.push.enable": "Enable push",
+56 -12
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ export const zhCN = {
"app.disconnectedTitle": "正在重连",
"app.disconnectedHint": "与服务器的连接已断开,正在自动重连,无需刷新页面。",
// ---- 会话失效(被远程吊销 / 过期)------------------------------------
"auth.sessionLost.title": "登录已失效",
"auth.sessionLost.body": "此设备的登录凭据已被注销或过期,请重新登录。",
// ---- 顶部栏 / 用户菜单 ------------------------------------------------
"nav.accountMenu": "账号菜单",
"nav.thisDeviceLabel": "本机:",
@@ -32,6 +36,7 @@ export const zhCN = {
"home.deviceList.title": "设备",
"home.deviceList.onlineSuffix": "{{count}} 台在线)",
"home.deviceList.showOffline": "显示离线设备({{count}}",
"home.deviceList.hideOffline": "隐藏离线设备",
"home.deviceList.empty":
"暂无其他设备。在另一标签页或设备上以相同账户登录,并设置一个不同的设备名(设置 → 设备名称),即可在此处看到它。",
"home.tabs.file": "文件",
@@ -93,6 +98,20 @@ export const zhCN = {
// ---- 扫码登录 · 入口 -------------------------------------------------
"qr.entry.fromLogin": "扫码登录此设备",
"qr.entry.scanNewDevice": "扫码登录新设备",
// 应用内扫码器:在已登录设备上扫新设备的二维码,把它接入账号。
"qr.scan.title": "扫码登录新设备",
"qr.scan.subtitle": "把另一台设备显示的二维码对准取景框。批准全程留在这台已登录设备上。",
"qr.scan.starting": "正在启动相机…",
"qr.scan.aiming": "把二维码对准取景框",
"qr.scan.foreign": "这不是本站的登录二维码。请对准新设备上“扫码登录此设备”生成的码。",
"qr.scan.noCamera": "这台设备没有可用的摄像头。请改用带相机的手机或平板扫码。",
"qr.scan.denied": "相机权限被拒绝。请在浏览器站点设置里允许使用相机,再重新打开此页。",
"qr.scan.error": "无法打开相机。请重试,或改用带相机的设备扫码。",
"qr.scan.howto1": "在新设备上打开“扫码登录此设备”,生成一张二维码。",
"qr.scan.howto2": "把那张二维码对准上方取景框,识别后会自动进入批准。",
"qr.scan.back": "返回",
// ---- 扫码登录 · 显码页(新设备)-------------------------------------
"qr.show.title": "扫码登录此设备",
@@ -107,20 +126,23 @@ export const zhCN = {
"qr.show.expired": "二维码已过期。重新生成一张再扫。",
"qr.show.denied": "这次接入被拒绝。如确为你本人操作,重新生成二维码再试。",
"qr.show.regenerate": "重新生成二维码",
"qr.show.back": "返回主页",
"qr.show.backToName": "返回上一步",
// ---- 扫码登录 · 批准页(手机)-------------------------------------
"qr.approve.title": "批准新设备",
"qr.approve.subtitle": "确认让这台设备登你的账号。请核对设备与来源无误。",
"qr.approve.subtitle": "确认让这台设备登你的账号。请核对设备与来源无误。",
"qr.approve.loading": "正在读取设备信息…",
"qr.approve.badLink": "这个批准链接不完整。请在新设备上重新生成二维码再扫。",
"qr.approve.signInFirst": "先登录你的账号,再批准这台设备接入。",
"qr.approve.trustLabel": "信任时长",
"qr.approve.trust.title": "信任此设备",
"qr.approve.trust.title": "信任此设备7 天)",
"qr.approve.trust.hint": "7 天内免再次批准,每次使用自动续期。",
"qr.approve.once.title": "仅此一次",
"qr.approve.once.title": "仅此一次1 小时)",
"qr.approve.once.hint": "登录有效 1 小时,到期需重新扫码。",
"qr.approve.scopeGuest": "这台设备将以受限访客身份登入:可收发文件与消息,但不能更改账号、不能批准其他设备。",
"qr.approve.approve": "批准登入",
"qr.approve.scopeFull": "这台设备将完整登录你的账号、7 天内有效:可正常收发文件与消息,并能管理账号与设备。",
"qr.approve.scopeGuest": "以受限访客身份登录——可收发文件与消息,但不能更改账号、不能批准其他设备;1 小时后失效。",
"qr.approve.approve": "批准登录",
"qr.approve.stepUp.notice": "为安全起见,批准前需先验证你的身份——点下方按钮会引导你重新登录一次。",
"qr.approve.stepUp.button": "验证并批准",
"qr.approve.stepUp.rejected": "身份验证未通过或已过期。请再验证一次,确认是你本人后即可批准。",
@@ -128,7 +150,7 @@ export const zhCN = {
"qr.approve.doneApprovedTitle": "已批准",
"qr.approve.doneApproved": "这台设备已接入你的账号,现在即可在它上面收发文件。",
"qr.approve.doneDeniedTitle": "已拒绝",
"qr.approve.doneDenied": "这次接入已被拒绝,那台设备不会登你的账号。",
"qr.approve.doneDenied": "这次接入已被拒绝,那台设备不会登你的账号。",
"qr.approve.expiredTitle": "二维码已过期",
"qr.approve.expired": "这张二维码已失效。请在新设备上重新生成再扫。",
"qr.approve.errorTitle": "出错了",
@@ -148,16 +170,38 @@ export const zhCN = {
"settings.unregister.currentHint": "将退出登录并移除此设备的注册。",
"settings.unregister.currentConfirm":
"注销当前设备会移除此设备的注册并退出登录,确认继续?",
"settings.unregister.peerConfirm": "确认要移除设备“{{name}}”?",
"settings.peers.title": "其他设备",
"settings.peers.empty": "暂无其他设备。",
"settings.peers.remove": "移除",
"settings.peers.removing": "正在移除…",
"settings.error.delete": "操作失败:{{message}}",
// ---- 受限访客标识 ----------------------------------------------------
"settings.guest.badge": "受限访客",
"settings.guest.title": "这台设备是受限访客",
"settings.guest.body": "本设备以受限访客身份登录:可正常收发文件、消息与剪贴板,但不能管理账号、移除设备或授权新设备。需要完整权限,请在你的主设备上重新登录。",
// ---- 登录会话 / 设备管理 ---------------------------------------------
"settings.sessions.title": "登录会话",
"settings.sessions.hint": "这里列出当前登录此账号的所有设备,含浏览器、桌面与移动客户端;在线的排在上方。登出某台设备会立即结束它的登录,需在该设备上重新登录才能继续使用。",
"settings.sessions.guestNote": "受限访客无法管理登录会话;如需管理,请在你的主设备上完整登录。",
"settings.sessions.empty": "暂无其他登录会话。",
"settings.sessions.loadError": "登录会话加载失败。",
"settings.sessions.retry": "重试",
"settings.sessions.current": "本机",
"settings.sessions.scopeFull": "完整",
"settings.sessions.scopeGuest": "受限访客",
"settings.sessions.kind.oidc": "账号登录",
"settings.sessions.kind.self": "本地账号",
"settings.sessions.kind.guest": "扫码访客",
"settings.sessions.lastUsed": "最近活跃 {{time}}",
"settings.sessions.neverUsed": "尚未活跃",
"settings.sessions.signOut": "登出",
"settings.sessions.signingOut": "正在登出…",
"settings.sessions.signOutCurrent": "登出本机",
"settings.sessions.confirmOther": "确认登出设备“{{name}}”?该会话将立即失效,需重新登录。",
"settings.sessions.confirmCurrent": "登出本机会等同于退出登录,确认继续?",
"settings.sessions.revoked": "已登出该设备",
"settings.sessions.stepUpRejected": "身份验证未通过或已过期,请再试一次。",
"settings.online": "在线",
"settings.offline": "离线",
"settings.lastSeen": "上次活跃 {{time}}",
"settings.lastSeenNever": "尚未上线",
"settings.push.title": "推送通知",
"settings.push.hint": "页面关闭时,新文件、消息和传输结果会以系统通知提醒;页面打开时仍走应用内提示。",
"settings.push.enable": "启用推送",
+53 -9
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@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ export const zhTW: Partial<TranslationDict> = {
"app.disconnectedTitle": "正在重新連線",
"app.disconnectedHint": "與伺服器的連線已中斷,正在自動重新連線,無需重新整理頁面。",
// ---- 工作階段失效(被遠端撤銷 / 逾期)-------------------------------
"auth.sessionLost.title": "登入已失效",
"auth.sessionLost.body": "此裝置的登入憑證已被撤銷或逾期,請重新登入。",
// ---- 頂部列 / 使用者選單 ---------------------------------------------
"nav.accountMenu": "帳號選單",
"nav.thisDeviceLabel": "本機:",
@@ -36,6 +40,7 @@ export const zhTW: Partial<TranslationDict> = {
"home.deviceList.title": "裝置",
"home.deviceList.onlineSuffix": "{{count}} 部線上)",
"home.deviceList.showOffline": "顯示離線裝置({{count}}",
"home.deviceList.hideOffline": "隱藏離線裝置",
"home.deviceList.empty":
"尚無其他裝置。在另一個分頁或裝置上以同一帳號登入,並設定一個不同的裝置名稱(設定 → 裝置名稱),即可在此處看到它。",
"home.tabs.file": "檔案",
@@ -97,6 +102,20 @@ export const zhTW: Partial<TranslationDict> = {
// ---- 掃碼登入 · 入口 -------------------------------------------------
"qr.entry.fromLogin": "掃碼登入此裝置",
"qr.entry.scanNewDevice": "掃碼登入新裝置",
// 應用內掃碼器:在已登入裝置上掃新裝置的 QR 碼,把它接入帳號。
"qr.scan.title": "掃碼登入新裝置",
"qr.scan.subtitle": "把另一部裝置顯示的 QR 碼對準取景框。批准全程留在這部已登入裝置上。",
"qr.scan.starting": "正在啟動相機…",
"qr.scan.aiming": "把 QR 碼對準取景框",
"qr.scan.foreign": "這不是本站的登入 QR 碼。請對準新裝置上「掃碼登入此裝置」產生的碼。",
"qr.scan.noCamera": "這部裝置沒有可用的相機。請改用有相機的手機或平板掃碼。",
"qr.scan.denied": "相機權限被拒絕。請在瀏覽器網站設定裡允許使用相機,再重新開啟此頁。",
"qr.scan.error": "無法開啟相機。請重試,或改用有相機的裝置掃碼。",
"qr.scan.howto1": "在新裝置上開啟「掃碼登入此裝置」,產生一張 QR 碼。",
"qr.scan.howto2": "把那張 QR 碼對準上方取景框,辨識後會自動進入批准。",
"qr.scan.back": "返回",
// ---- 掃碼登入 · 顯碼頁(新裝置)-------------------------------------
"qr.show.title": "掃碼登入此裝置",
@@ -111,6 +130,8 @@ export const zhTW: Partial<TranslationDict> = {
"qr.show.expired": "QR 碼已逾時。重新產生一張再掃。",
"qr.show.denied": "這次接入被拒絕。如確為你本人操作,重新產生 QR 碼再試。",
"qr.show.regenerate": "重新產生 QR 碼",
"qr.show.back": "返回首頁",
"qr.show.backToName": "返回上一步",
// ---- 掃碼登入 · 批准頁(手機)-------------------------------------
"qr.approve.title": "批准新裝置",
@@ -119,11 +140,12 @@ export const zhTW: Partial<TranslationDict> = {
"qr.approve.badLink": "這個批准連結不完整。請在新裝置上重新產生 QR 碼再掃。",
"qr.approve.signInFirst": "先登入你的帳號,再批准這部裝置接入。",
"qr.approve.trustLabel": "信任時長",
"qr.approve.trust.title": "信任此裝置",
"qr.approve.trust.title": "信任此裝置7 天)",
"qr.approve.trust.hint": "7 天內免再次批准,每次使用自動續期。",
"qr.approve.once.title": "僅此一次",
"qr.approve.once.title": "僅此一次1 小時)",
"qr.approve.once.hint": "登入有效 1 小時,逾時需重新掃碼。",
"qr.approve.scopeGuest": "這部裝置將以受限訪客身分登入:可收發檔案與訊息,但不能變更帳號、不能批准其他裝置。",
"qr.approve.scopeFull": "這部裝置將完整登入你的帳號、7 天內有效:可正常收發檔案與訊息,並能管理帳號與裝置。",
"qr.approve.scopeGuest": "以受限訪客身分登入——可收發檔案與訊息,但不能變更帳號、不能批准其他裝置;1 小時後失效。",
"qr.approve.approve": "批准登入",
"qr.approve.stepUp.notice": "為安全起見,批准前需先驗證你的身分——點下方按鈕會引導你重新登入一次。",
"qr.approve.stepUp.button": "驗證並批准",
@@ -152,16 +174,38 @@ export const zhTW: Partial<TranslationDict> = {
"settings.unregister.currentHint": "將登出並移除本裝置的註冊。",
"settings.unregister.currentConfirm":
"解除註冊本裝置會移除其註冊並登出,確認繼續?",
"settings.unregister.peerConfirm": "確認要移除裝置「{{name}}」?",
"settings.peers.title": "其他裝置",
"settings.peers.empty": "尚無其他裝置。",
"settings.peers.remove": "移除",
"settings.peers.removing": "正在移除…",
"settings.error.delete": "操作失敗:{{message}}",
// ---- 受限訪客標識 ----------------------------------------------------
"settings.guest.badge": "受限訪客",
"settings.guest.title": "這部裝置是受限訪客",
"settings.guest.body": "本裝置以受限訪客身分登入:可正常收發檔案、訊息與剪貼簿,但不能管理帳號、移除裝置或授權新裝置。需要完整權限,請在你的主裝置上重新登入。",
// ---- 登入工作階段 / 裝置管理 ------------------------------------------
"settings.sessions.title": "登入工作階段",
"settings.sessions.hint": "這裡列出目前登入此帳號的所有裝置,含瀏覽器、桌面與行動用戶端;線上的排在上方。登出某台裝置會立即結束它的登入,需在該裝置上重新登入才能繼續使用。",
"settings.sessions.guestNote": "受限訪客無法管理登入工作階段;如需管理,請在你的主裝置上完整登入。",
"settings.sessions.empty": "尚無其他登入工作階段。",
"settings.sessions.loadError": "登入工作階段載入失敗。",
"settings.sessions.retry": "重試",
"settings.sessions.current": "本機",
"settings.sessions.scopeFull": "完整",
"settings.sessions.scopeGuest": "受限訪客",
"settings.sessions.kind.oidc": "帳號登入",
"settings.sessions.kind.self": "本機帳號",
"settings.sessions.kind.guest": "掃碼訪客",
"settings.sessions.lastUsed": "最近活躍 {{time}}",
"settings.sessions.neverUsed": "尚未活躍",
"settings.sessions.signOut": "登出",
"settings.sessions.signingOut": "正在登出…",
"settings.sessions.signOutCurrent": "登出本機",
"settings.sessions.confirmOther": "確認登出裝置「{{name}}」?該工作階段將立即失效,需重新登入。",
"settings.sessions.confirmCurrent": "登出本機等同於登出帳號,確認繼續?",
"settings.sessions.revoked": "已登出該裝置",
"settings.sessions.stepUpRejected": "身分驗證未通過或已過期,請再試一次。",
"settings.online": "線上",
"settings.offline": "離線",
"settings.lastSeen": "上次活躍 {{time}}",
"settings.lastSeenNever": "尚未上線",
"settings.push.title": "推播通知",
"settings.push.hint": "頁面關閉時,新檔案、訊息與傳輸結果會以系統通知提醒;頁面開啟時仍走應用內提示。",
"settings.push.enable": "啟用推播",
+19 -3
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
import { useAppStore } from "../store";
import { refreshTokens } from "../features/auth/auth";
import { refreshTokens, forceLogout } from "../features/auth/auth";
import { readInjectedApiBase, readInjectedDeviceType } from "../store/helpers";
import { toAsciiDeviceName } from "../utils/format";
import { t } from "../i18n";
@@ -26,19 +26,35 @@ function withBase(input: RequestInfo): RequestInfo
// - always sets X-Device-Name from the store
// - in prod, on a 401 response transparently refreshes the access token via
// /api/auth/refresh and retries once
// - in prod, ONLY if the server authoritatively confirms the session is gone
// (refresh → HTTP 401), forces a local logout so the app returns to login
//
// Returns the fetch Response untouched so callers can drive streaming bodies
// (SSE, relay GET stream) themselves.
//
// State is cleared ONLY on server-confirmed credential invalidation. Short-term
// failures never clear it: a transient refresh response (5xx / same-origin 403)
// yields "transient", and a network error during refresh THROWS out of here —
// both keep the session, leaving the original 401 for the caller as a retryable
// error. So a flaky network or a server blip can't log the user out; only a
// genuine revoke/expire (refresh → 401) does.
export async function apiFetch(input: RequestInfo, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response>
{
let r = await doFetch(input, init);
if (r.status === 401 && useAppStore.getState().authMode === "prod")
{
const ok = await refreshTokens();
if (ok)
const outcome = await refreshTokens();
if (outcome === "refreshed")
{
r = await doFetch(input, init);
}
else if (outcome === "invalid")
{
// 服务端确证会话已失效(/auth/refresh 返回 401,已被吊销 / 过期)→
// 清空本地登录态,由 __root 守卫把界面送回登录页。返回这次 401 让调用
// 方照常收尾。"transient"5xx / 网络抖动)不进此分支:保留登录态。
forceLogout();
}
}
return r;
}
+34 -2
View File
@@ -217,8 +217,9 @@ export class StepUpRequiredError extends Error
}
}
// qrApprove 批准该设备登入本账号。scope 本期固定 guest(受限访客);persist 决定
// 信任时长(persist=7 天滑动 / once=1 小时)。成功 204。
// qrApprove 批准该设备登入本账号。scope 决定授予的会话级别:full=完整登录、
// guest=受限访客;与 persist 时长一一对应(full+persist=7 天滑动、guest+once=1 小时)。
// 成功 204。
//
// step_up 开启时须带上一次新鲜 prompt=login 再认证拿到的 stepUpCode + stepUpVerifier
// 后端就地向 IdP 换 id_token、验签 + 校 auth_time 新鲜 + sub 匹配;缺失 / 过期 →
@@ -278,3 +279,34 @@ function sleep(ms: number): Promise<void>
{
return new Promise((resolve) => { window.setTimeout(resolve, ms); });
}
// ---- 应用内扫码:批准链接解析 --------------------------------------------------
export interface LinkParams
{
requestId: string;
code: string;
}
// parseLinkApprovalUrl 把扫到的二维码内容解析成批准页参数,严格校验后才放行——
// 这是应用内扫码器的安全闸门,决定扫到的码能否在已登录会话内被导航。
// 只接受「本站 origin + /link 路径 + 同时带 r 与 c」的 URL:
// - 同源(origin 严格等于当前页 origin)——挡开放重定向 / 钓鱼站二维码;
// - 路径恰为 /link——挡指向本站其他页的码;
// - r/c 皆非空——挡残缺码。
// 任一不满足返回 null(调用方据此提示「继续对准」,不导航)。
export function parseLinkApprovalUrl(raw: string): LinkParams | null
{
let url: URL;
try { url = new URL(raw); }
catch { return null; }
if (url.origin !== window.location.origin) { return null; }
if (url.pathname !== "/link") { return null; }
const requestId = url.searchParams.get("r");
const code = url.searchParams.get("c");
if (!requestId || !code) { return null; }
return { requestId, code };
}
+156
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@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
import { apiFetch, apiJSON } from "./api";
// 登录会话 / 设备的网络封装。全部走 apiFetch(带 Bearer + 401 自动续期);
// refresh_token 永不进 JS——吊销由后端令短 TTL 的 access_token 随之失效完成。
// ---- /api/me:本会话权限级别 ------------------------------------------------
export type SessionScopeValue = "full" | "guest";
interface MeRaw
{
// /api/me 现回传本会话的 scopefull=完整登录、guest=受限访客)。旧后端 / 异常
// 缺字段时按 "full" 解析(只多展示入口,后端仍 403 兜底)。
scope?: string;
}
// fetchMeScope 拉取 /api/me 并解析本会话权限级别。失败 / 缺字段回退 "full"。
export async function fetchMeScope(): Promise<SessionScopeValue>
{
try
{
const data = await apiJSON<MeRaw>("/api/me");
return data.scope === "guest" ? "guest" : "full";
}
catch
{
return "full";
}
}
// ---- 登录会话列表 / 吊销 / step-up ------------------------------------------
// 会话「种类」:oidc / self / guest 为网页 / 扫码会话;macos / windows / linux / ios
// 为原生客户端(桌面 / 移动)——它们用 IdP 令牌、不入 web_sessions,由设备登记表呈现。
export type SessionKind =
| "oidc" | "self" | "guest"
| "macos" | "windows" | "linux" | "ios";
const KNOWN_KINDS: readonly SessionKind[] = [
"oidc", "self", "guest", "macos", "windows", "linux", "ios",
];
export interface AuthSession
{
id: string;
deviceName: string;
kind: SessionKind;
scope: SessionScopeValue;
// current=true:这条就是本机当前会话(登出它等价于退出登录)。
current: boolean;
// online=true:该设备当前在线(有活跃 SSE 连接)。用于列表排序与在线指示。
online: boolean;
// native=true:原生客户端(无 web_session),登出走设备登记端点而非会话端点。
native: boolean;
createdAt: number;
lastUsedAt: number;
expiresAt: number;
}
interface AuthSessionRaw
{
id: string;
device_name?: string;
kind?: string;
scope?: string;
current?: boolean;
online?: boolean;
native?: boolean;
created_at?: number;
last_used_at?: number;
expires_at?: number;
}
interface SessionsResp
{
sessions: AuthSessionRaw[];
}
function normalizeKind(kind: string | undefined): SessionKind
{
return KNOWN_KINDS.includes(kind as SessionKind) ? (kind as SessionKind) : "oidc";
}
// listSessions 拉取当前账号下的全部登录会话(含本机),每条带 online(当前是否在线)。
// 受限访客无权管理登录会话、后端会 403,故调用方(SessionsPanel)在 guest 时根本不发
// 此请求、直接展示克制说明,不会走到这里。
export async function listSessions(): Promise<AuthSession[]>
{
const data = await apiJSON<SessionsResp>("/api/auth/sessions");
const rows = Array.isArray(data.sessions) ? data.sessions : [];
return rows.map((r) => (
{
id: r.id,
deviceName: r.device_name ?? "",
kind: normalizeKind(r.kind),
scope: r.scope === "guest" ? "guest" : "full",
current: r.current === true,
online: r.online === true,
native: r.native === true,
createdAt: r.created_at ?? 0,
lastUsedAt: r.last_used_at ?? 0,
expiresAt: r.expires_at ?? 0,
}));
}
// StepUpRequiredErrorDELETE /api/auth/sessions/{id} 因再认证缺失 / 过期被后端拒
// 403 {error:"step_up_required"})。调用方据此发起一次 step-up 再认证而非当成
// 普通错误。
export class StepUpRequiredError extends Error
{
constructor()
{
super("step_up_required");
this.name = "StepUpRequiredError";
}
}
// revokeSession 真正吊销一条登录会话。网页 / 扫码会话走 /auth/sessions/{id}(删会话
// 行 + 连带删设备);原生客户端(id 形如 "device:设备名")无 web_session,改走
// /devices/{name} 按设备名注销。两者均:成功 204;后端要求再认证时抛
// StepUpRequiredError403 step_up_required),其余非 2xx 抛普通错误。
const NATIVE_ID_PREFIX = "device:";
export async function revokeSession(id: string): Promise<void>
{
const path = id.startsWith(NATIVE_ID_PREFIX)
? `/api/devices/${encodeURIComponent(id.slice(NATIVE_ID_PREFIX.length))}`
: `/api/auth/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`;
const r = await apiFetch(path, { method: "DELETE" });
if (!r.ok)
{
const text = await r.text().catch(() => r.statusText);
if (r.status === 403 && /step_up_required/.test(text))
{
throw new StepUpRequiredError();
}
throw new Error(`revoke session ${r.status}: ${text}`);
}
}
// postStepUp 把一次新鲜 prompt=login 再认证拿到的 {code, verifier} 交给后端就地
// 核验,成功后服务端在本会话记下 stepped_up_at(5 分钟窗口内复用,不再反复要求)。
// 成功 204step-up 未开后端亦 204(视作通过);失败 403。
export async function postStepUp(code: string, verifier: string): Promise<void>
{
const r = await apiFetch("/api/auth/stepup", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ code, verifier }),
});
if (!r.ok)
{
const text = await r.text().catch(() => r.statusText);
throw new Error(`step-up ${r.status}: ${text}`);
}
}
+26 -2
View File
@@ -11,14 +11,14 @@ import { Outlet, Link, createRootRoute, useLocation, useNavigate } from "@tansta
import { Check, ChevronDown, LogOut, Monitor, Moon, Settings, Sun, Wifi, WifiOff } from "lucide-react";
import { useEffect, useState, type ReactNode } from "react";
import { useAppStore, type ThemeMode } from "../store";
import { logout } from "../features/auth/auth";
import { logout, refreshSessionScope } from "../features/auth/auth";
import { uploadClipboard } from "../features/clipboard/clipboard";
import { onNativeClipboard } from "../net/desktop";
import { startHub } from "../features/transfer/hub";
import { resyncPush } from "../net/push";
import { refreshICEServers, stopICEServerRefresh } from "../features/transfer/iceServers";
import { t, type Locale } from "../i18n";
import { Callout, IconButton, Tooltip } from "../ui/primitives";
import { Badge, Callout, IconButton, Tooltip } from "../ui/primitives";
import { Wordmark } from "../ui/brand";
export const Route = createRootRoute({ component: RootLayout });
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ export const Route = createRootRoute({ component: RootLayout });
function RootLayout()
{
const user = useAppStore((s) => s.user);
const authMode = useAppStore((s) => s.authMode);
const sessionScope = useAppStore((s) => s.sessionScope);
const selfDeviceName = useAppStore((s) => s.selfDeviceName);
const sseConnected = useAppStore((s) => s.sseConnected);
const sseReconnecting = useAppStore((s) => s.sseReconnecting);
@@ -39,6 +41,19 @@ function RootLayout()
// 这里只渲染 <Outlet/>,不包 AppShell,从而隐去顶栏。
const fullscreen = isAuthRoute(location.pathname);
// 反应式登出守卫:当登录态在运行中被清空(access token 被远程吊销 / 过期 →
// apiFetch 触发 forceLogout,见 net/api.ts),把界面送回登录页。路由的
// beforeLoad 只在导航时跑,停在当前页时不会自动重定向,故这里补一道反应式跳转。
// 仅 prod:dev 无远程吊销概念,登录态由 loginDev 同步建立。已在认证类路由上则
// 不跳(避免与 /login 自身、扫码显码 / 批准页打架)。
useEffect(() =>
{
if (authMode !== "prod") { return; }
if (user) { return; }
if (isAuthRoute(location.pathname)) { return; }
navigate({ to: "/login", search: { dev_user: undefined } });
}, [ authMode, user, location.pathname, navigate ]);
// SSE 在登录后立即开启;user.id 或 selfDeviceName 任一变化即重连
// (改名后会自动以新设备名重新注册)。
useEffect(() =>
@@ -46,6 +61,9 @@ function RootLayout()
if (!user || !selfDeviceName) { return; }
const ctrl = new AbortController();
startHub(ctrl.signal);
// 校正本会话权限级别(/api/me 的 scope):受限访客据此隐藏账号管理入口。
// 覆盖所有登录路径(OAuth / 扫码新设备 / 开机水合 / dev),一处搞定。
void refreshSessionScope();
// 预取 Cloudflare TURN 凭据(或 STUN 回退),首次 WebRTC 同步可用。
void refreshICEServers();
// 已开启推送的浏览器:登录后把订阅重新登记到当前用户名下(自愈换用户 /
@@ -125,7 +143,12 @@ function RootLayout()
</Menu.Target>
<Menu.Dropdown>
<Stack gap={2} px="sm" pt="xs" pb={6}>
<Group gap={6} wrap="nowrap" align="center">
<Text size="sm" fw={500} truncate>{user.name}</Text>
{sessionScope === "guest" && (
<Badge tone="warn">{t("settings.guest.badge")}</Badge>
)}
</Group>
<Text size="xs" c="dimmed">
{t("nav.thisDeviceLabel")}
<Text span fw={500}>{selfDeviceName}</Text>
@@ -316,6 +339,7 @@ function isAuthRoute(pathname: string): boolean
|| pathname === "/setup"
|| pathname === "/link"
|| pathname === "/link/new"
|| pathname === "/link/scan"
|| pathname.startsWith("/oauth/");
}
+10 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { useEffect, useMemo } from "react";
import { Container } from "@mantine/core";
import { createFileRoute, redirect } from "@tanstack/react-router";
import { createFileRoute, redirect, useNavigate } from "@tanstack/react-router";
import { useAppStore } from "../store";
import { consumeLinkReturn } from "../features/qr/returnTo";
import { DeviceStrip } from "../features/devices/DeviceStrip";
@@ -33,7 +33,9 @@ void CLIPBOARD_MAX_BYTES;
function HomePage()
{
const navigate = useNavigate();
const user = useAppStore((s) => s.user);
const sessionScope = useAppStore((s) => s.sessionScope);
const devices = useAppStore((s) => s.devices);
const selfDeviceName = useAppStore((s) => s.selfDeviceName);
const activeTransfers = useAppStore((s) => s.activeTransfers);
@@ -96,6 +98,13 @@ function HomePage()
selectedDevice={selectedDevice}
onSelect={setSelectedDevice}
onDropFile={handleDropFile}
// 受限访客不能授权新设备:不传 onLinkDeviceDeviceStrip 据此
// 隐藏「扫码登录新设备」入口(条件渲染已在组件内)。
onLinkDevice={
sessionScope === "guest"
? undefined
: () => navigate({ to: "/link/scan" })
}
/>
<div className={s.dualColumn}>
+20 -7
View File
@@ -77,27 +77,34 @@
width: 100%;
text-align: left;
padding: var(--space-3) var(--space-4);
background: var(--surface);
/* 未选中态明显更轻:sunken 底 + 细分隔线左条,与选中态拉开对比。 */
background: var(--surface-sunken);
border: 1px solid var(--divider);
border-left: 3px solid var(--divider);
border-radius: var(--radius-control);
cursor: pointer;
color: var(--text);
color: var(--text-muted);
transition:
border-color var(--dur-fast) var(--ease-out),
background-color var(--dur-fast) var(--ease-out);
background-color var(--dur-fast) var(--ease-out),
box-shadow var(--dur-fast) var(--ease-out);
}
.choice:hover { border-color: var(--divider-strong); }
/* 选中态:accent 左色条 + soft 底(同 Callout / Activity 的状态编码语汇)。 */
/* 选中态:实心 accent 边框 + 加粗左色条 + accent 描边环 + soft 底(同
DeviceStrip.portSelected 的强选中语汇),与未选中态形成明显对比。 */
.choiceOn
{
background: var(--accent-softer);
border-color: var(--accent-ring);
border-left-color: var(--accent);
background: var(--accent-soft);
border-color: var(--accent);
border-left: 4px solid var(--accent);
color: var(--text);
box-shadow: 0 0 0 1px var(--accent);
}
.choiceOn:hover { border-color: var(--accent); }
.choice:focus-visible
{
outline: 2px solid var(--accent-ring);
@@ -130,6 +137,9 @@
font-weight: 600;
}
/* 选中项标题着 accent 色,进一步强化「当前选的是这个」。 */
.choiceOn .choiceTitle { color: var(--accent); }
.choiceHint
{
font-size: var(--fs-12);
@@ -137,6 +147,9 @@
color: var(--text-muted);
}
/* 选中项说明文字恢复常规对比(未选中时整块被压暗)。 */
.choiceOn .choiceHint { color: var(--text-muted); }
/* 批准 / 拒绝:批准是主色行动,拒绝是安静的 ghost。 */
.actions
{
+36 -11
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ export const Route = createFileRoute("/link")({
({
r: typeof search.r === "string" ? search.r : undefined,
c: typeof search.c === "string" ? search.c : undefined,
// p:信任时长选择(persist/once)。step-up 整页跳转回来后据此恢复,避免选择丢失。
p: typeof search.p === "string" ? search.p : undefined,
}),
});
@@ -31,12 +33,14 @@ type Outcome = "approved" | "denied" | "expired" | "error" | null;
function LinkApprovePage()
{
const navigate = useNavigate();
const { r: requestId, c: code } = Route.useSearch();
const { r: requestId, c: code, p: persistParam } = Route.useSearch();
const user = useAppStore((s) => s.user);
const [ info, setInfo ] = useState<QrRequestInfo | null>(null);
const [ loadError, setLoadError ] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [ persist, setPersist ] = useState<QrPersist>("persist");
// 初值优先取 URL 的 p(step-up 跳转回来后恢复选择),否则默认更安全的「仅此次」
// (受限访客)——避免一路默认到完整会话(full)。
const [ persist, setPersist ] = useState<QrPersist>(persistParam === "persist" ? "persist" : "once");
const [ submitting, setSubmitting ] = useState(false);
const [ outcome, setOutcome ] = useState<Outcome>(null);
const [ actionError, setActionError ] = useState<string | null>(null);
@@ -92,7 +96,10 @@ function LinkApprovePage()
setStepUpRejected(false);
try
{
await qrApprove(requestId, code, "guest", persist, stash?.code, stash?.verifier);
// persist=「信任此设备」→ 完整会话(scope=full);once=「仅此次」→ 受限访客
// scope=guest)。后端按 scope 决定授予的会话级别,二者与 persist 时长一一对应。
const scope = persist === "persist" ? "full" : "guest";
await qrApprove(requestId, code, scope, persist, stash?.code, stash?.verifier);
setOutcome("approved");
}
catch (e)
@@ -124,7 +131,15 @@ function LinkApprovePage()
setSubmitting(true);
setActionError(null);
setStepUpRejected(false);
try { await startStepUpReauth(window.location.pathname + window.location.search); }
try
{
// 把当前「信任时长」选择编进 returnTo:step-up 整页跳转回来后页面重载、
// React state 复位,必须从 URL 恢复 persist,否则会回落默认、令本应受限
// 的设备被建成完整会话(#2 根因)。
const back = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
back.set("p", persist);
await startStepUpReauth(window.location.pathname + "?" + back.toString());
}
catch (e)
{
setActionError(e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e));
@@ -155,10 +170,13 @@ function LinkApprovePage()
if (!requestId || !code)
{
return (
<AuthShell title={t("qr.approve.title")} hideBrand>
<AuthShell title={t("qr.approve.title")} hideBrand skipAutospace>
<Callout tone="error" icon={<AlertTriangle size={16} />}>
{t("qr.approve.badLink")}
</Callout>
<Button variant="secondary" size="lg" block onClick={() => navigate({ to: "/" })}>
{t("qr.approve.backHome")}
</Button>
</AuthShell>
);
}
@@ -170,6 +188,7 @@ function LinkApprovePage()
title={t("qr.approve.title")}
subtitle={t("qr.approve.signInFirst")}
hideBrand
skipAutospace
>
<Button
variant="primary"
@@ -189,8 +208,11 @@ function LinkApprovePage()
if (loadError)
{
return (
<AuthShell title={t("qr.approve.title")} hideBrand>
<AuthShell title={t("qr.approve.title")} hideBrand skipAutospace>
<Callout tone="error" icon={<AlertTriangle size={16} />}>{loadError}</Callout>
<Button variant="secondary" size="lg" block onClick={() => navigate({ to: "/" })}>
{t("qr.approve.backHome")}
</Button>
</AuthShell>
);
}
@@ -198,12 +220,12 @@ function LinkApprovePage()
if (!info)
{
return (
<AuthShell title={t("qr.approve.title")} subtitle={t("qr.approve.loading")} hideBrand />
<AuthShell title={t("qr.approve.title")} subtitle={t("qr.approve.loading")} hideBrand skipAutospace />
);
}
return (
<AuthShell title={t("qr.approve.title")} subtitle={t("qr.approve.subtitle")} hideBrand>
<AuthShell title={t("qr.approve.title")} subtitle={t("qr.approve.subtitle")} hideBrand skipAutospace>
{/* 待批准设备:单行身份块——图标 + 名字 + 来源 IP(monospace 元数据)。 */}
<div className={s.device}>
<span className={s.deviceIcon}>
@@ -237,9 +259,12 @@ function LinkApprovePage()
/>
</div>
{/* 权限范围说明:本期固定受限访客,明确告知边界(非装饰)。 */}
{/* 权限范围说明:随选中项切换——信任=完整登录、仅此次=受限访客,明确告知
这台设备将以什么身份登录(非装饰)。 */}
<Callout tone="info" icon={<ShieldCheck size={16} />}>
{t("qr.approve.scopeGuest")}
{persist === "persist"
? t("qr.approve.scopeFull")
: t("qr.approve.scopeGuest")}
</Callout>
{/* step-up:批准前的明确安全步骤——需先验证身份(provider 2FA 即此处过)。 */}
@@ -332,7 +357,7 @@ function OutcomeView(props: { outcome: Exclude<Outcome, null>; onHome: () => voi
title: t("qr.approve.errorTitle"), body: t("qr.approve.error") },
}[outcome];
return (
<AuthShell title={map.title} hideBrand>
<AuthShell title={map.title} hideBrand skipAutospace>
<Callout tone={map.tone} icon={map.icon}>{map.body}</Callout>
<Button variant="secondary" size="lg" block onClick={onHome}>
{t("qr.approve.backHome")}
+35 -2
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
import { createFileRoute, useNavigate } from "@tanstack/react-router";
import { AlertTriangle, ArrowRight, RefreshCw, ScanLine } from "lucide-react";
import { AlertTriangle, ArrowLeft, ArrowRight, RefreshCw, ScanLine } from "lucide-react";
import { useCallback, useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react";
import { AuthShell } from "../features/auth/AuthShell";
import { syncWebDeviceName } from "../features/auth/auth";
@@ -109,6 +109,16 @@ function LinkNewPage()
void begin(name.trim());
};
// 回上一步:弃掉当前二维码会话,退回命名步骤(轮询随 session 清空由 effect 清理)。
const handleBackToName = () =>
{
cancelPollRef.current?.();
cancelPollRef.current = null;
setSession(null);
setError(null);
setStep("name");
};
if (step === "name")
{
return (
@@ -116,6 +126,7 @@ function LinkNewPage()
title={t("qr.show.title")}
subtitle={t("qr.show.subtitle")}
hideBrand
skipAutospace
>
{error && (
<Callout tone="error" icon={<AlertTriangle size={16} />}>{error}</Callout>
@@ -146,12 +157,21 @@ function LinkNewPage()
>
{t("qr.show.generate")}
</Button>
<Button
variant="ghost"
size="lg"
block
leftIcon={<ArrowLeft size={16} />}
onClick={() => navigate({ to: "/" })}
>
{t("qr.show.back")}
</Button>
</AuthShell>
);
}
return (
<AuthShell title={t("qr.show.scanTitle")} hideBrand>
<AuthShell title={t("qr.show.scanTitle")} hideBrand skipAutospace>
{error && (
<Callout tone="error" icon={<AlertTriangle size={16} />}>{error}</Callout>
)}
@@ -189,6 +209,19 @@ function LinkNewPage()
{t("qr.show.regenerate")}
</Button>
)}
{/* 始终给一个明确退出口:回到命名步骤,避免卡在显码 / 终态页。 */}
{phase !== "approved" && (
<Button
variant="ghost"
size="lg"
block
leftIcon={<ArrowLeft size={16} />}
onClick={handleBackToName}
>
{t("qr.show.backToName")}
</Button>
)}
</AuthShell>
);
}
+122
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
/* 应用内扫码器:取景框是这一屏的签名时刻——与显码页的 QrCanvas 互为镜像。
显码页把一枚码托在四角定位记号里给人看,扫码页则在同一组记号里「找」一枚码。
同一套 accent L 形角标,同一套 recessed plate 语汇,零新全局样式。 */
.stage
{
display: flex;
flex-direction: column;
align-items: center;
gap: var(--space-4);
padding: var(--space-2) 0 var(--space-1);
}
/* 取景框:方形 viewport,下沉 plate 把相机画面托成「一个对准的对象」。 */
.viewport
{
position: relative;
width: 248px;
height: 248px;
max-width: 100%;
overflow: hidden;
background: var(--surface-sunken);
border: 1px solid var(--divider);
border-radius: var(--radius-card);
}
/* 视频铺满取景框,居中裁切。镜像关闭——后置 / 外接相机扫码不应翻转。 */
.video
{
display: block;
width: 100%;
height: 100%;
object-fit: cover;
}
/* 四角定位记号:与 QrCanvas 同款 accent L 形角标,内缩到取景框内沿。 */
.tick
{
position: absolute;
width: 22px;
height: 22px;
border: 2px solid var(--accent);
pointer-events: none;
}
.tl { top: var(--space-3); left: var(--space-3);
border-right: none; border-bottom: none; border-top-left-radius: 4px; }
.tr { top: var(--space-3); right: var(--space-3);
border-left: none; border-bottom: none; border-top-right-radius: 4px; }
.bl { bottom: var(--space-3); left: var(--space-3);
border-right: none; border-top: none; border-bottom-left-radius: 4px; }
.br { bottom: var(--space-3); right: var(--space-3);
border-left: none; border-top: none; border-bottom-right-radius: 4px; }
/* 扫描线:唯一的动效「时刻」,accent 横线在取景框内上下扫动,传达「正在找」。
reduced-motion 下归零(见底部 media query)。 */
.beam
{
position: absolute;
left: var(--space-3);
right: var(--space-3);
top: var(--space-3);
height: 2px;
background: var(--accent);
box-shadow: 0 0 8px 0 var(--accent-ring);
opacity: 0.85;
animation: scan-beam 2.4s var(--ease-in-out) infinite;
pointer-events: none;
}
@keyframes scan-beam
{
0% { transform: translateY(0); }
50% { transform: translateY(202px); }
100% { transform: translateY(0); }
}
/* 命中过渡:解出有效码后取景框整体淡出,承接导航到批准页。 */
.viewportHit
{
border-color: var(--accent-ring);
}
.statusLine
{
display: inline-flex;
align-items: center;
gap: var(--space-2);
font-size: var(--fs-13);
color: var(--text-muted);
}
/* 两步指引:与显码页同款语义序号列表。 */
.steps
{
margin: 0;
padding-left: var(--space-5);
display: flex;
flex-direction: column;
gap: var(--space-2);
font-size: var(--fs-13);
line-height: var(--lh-body);
color: var(--text-muted);
}
.steps li::marker
{
color: var(--accent);
font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums;
}
.actions
{
display: flex;
flex-direction: column;
gap: var(--space-2);
}
@media (prefers-reduced-motion: reduce)
{
.beam { animation: none; opacity: 0; }
}
+259
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
import { createFileRoute, redirect, useNavigate } from "@tanstack/react-router";
import { AlertTriangle, ArrowLeft, Camera, CameraOff, ScanLine } from "lucide-react";
import jsQR from "jsqr";
import { useCallback, useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react";
import { AuthShell } from "../features/auth/AuthShell";
import { parseLinkApprovalUrl } from "../net/qr";
import { useAppStore } from "../store";
import { t } from "../i18n";
import { Button, Callout } from "../ui/primitives";
import s from "./link_.scan.module.css";
// 应用内扫码器:在已登录的 cdrop 里直接调相机扫码,解出 /link?r=&c= 后在同一已鉴权
// 会话内导航到批准页——绕开「系统相机打开链接落到未登录浏览器」的断流。批准走既有
// /link 页(step-up 开启时该页会自动要求再认证),本组件只负责「扫到合法码 → 导航」。
export const Route = createFileRoute("/link_/scan")({
component: LinkScanPage,
// 守卫:受限访客(scope=guest)不能授权新设备(后端 approve 亦 403),故连扫码
// 授权页都不让进——直接弹回首页,避免误触。未登录交由批准页处理,这里只挡访客。
beforeLoad: () =>
{
if (useAppStore.getState().sessionScope === "guest")
{
throw redirect({ to: "/" });
}
},
});
// 扫码器的几种态:请求相机中 / 正在扫 / 命中(淡出过渡)/ 无摄像头 / 权限被拒 / 其他错误。
type ScanState = "starting" | "scanning" | "hit" | "noCamera" | "denied" | "error";
function LinkScanPage()
{
const navigate = useNavigate();
const videoRef = useRef<HTMLVideoElement | null>(null);
// 解码用的离屏 canvas,逐帧把视频画上去再喂给 jsQR。
const canvasRef = useRef<HTMLCanvasElement | null>(null);
const streamRef = useRef<MediaStream | null>(null);
const rafRef = useRef<number | null>(null);
// 命中后置位:阻止 rAF 循环继续解码 / 重复导航。
const doneRef = useRef(false);
const [ state, setState ] = useState<ScanState>("starting");
const [ errorMsg, setErrorMsg ] = useState<string | null>(null);
// 扫到无关 / 非本站二维码:提示「继续对准」,但相机继续扫,不打断。
const [ sawForeignCode, setSawForeignCode ] = useState(false);
// stop 释放相机:停轨道 + 取消 rAF。卸载、命中、出错时都调用,确保相机指示灯熄灭。
const stop = useCallback(() =>
{
if (rafRef.current !== null) { cancelAnimationFrame(rafRef.current); rafRef.current = null; }
const stream = streamRef.current;
if (stream) { stream.getTracks().forEach((tr) => tr.stop()); streamRef.current = null; }
}, []);
// tick:单帧解码循环。把当前视频帧画到离屏 canvas,jsQR 解一次;解出有效本站
// /link 码即停机 + 应用内导航,否则下一帧继续。
const tick = useCallback(() =>
{
if (doneRef.current) { return; }
const video = videoRef.current;
const canvas = canvasRef.current;
if (!video || !canvas || video.readyState < video.HAVE_ENOUGH_DATA)
{
rafRef.current = requestAnimationFrame(tick);
return;
}
const w = video.videoWidth;
const h = video.videoHeight;
if (!w || !h)
{
rafRef.current = requestAnimationFrame(tick);
return;
}
canvas.width = w;
canvas.height = h;
const ctx = canvas.getContext("2d", { willReadFrequently: true });
if (!ctx)
{
rafRef.current = requestAnimationFrame(tick);
return;
}
ctx.drawImage(video, 0, 0, w, h);
const image = ctx.getImageData(0, 0, w, h);
const result = jsQR(image.data, w, h, { inversionAttempts: "dontInvert" });
if (result && result.data)
{
const link = parseLinkApprovalUrl(result.data);
if (link)
{
// 命中合法本站码:停机、淡出,应用内导航到批准页(留在已登录 SPA 会话)。
doneRef.current = true;
stop();
setState("hit");
// p 不带:批准页会回落到更安全的默认「仅此次」(受限访客)。
navigate({ to: "/link", search: { r: link.requestId, c: link.code, p: undefined } });
return;
}
// 扫到了码,但不是本站 /link 码(别的二维码 / 钓鱼链接):提示继续对准。
setSawForeignCode(true);
}
rafRef.current = requestAnimationFrame(tick);
}, [ navigate, stop ]);
// 进页面即请求相机并起解码循环。无摄像头 / 权限被拒分别落到清晰的引导态。
useEffect(() =>
{
doneRef.current = false;
let cancelled = false;
const start = async () =>
{
if (!navigator.mediaDevices?.getUserMedia)
{
setState("noCamera");
return;
}
try
{
const stream = await navigator.mediaDevices.getUserMedia({
// 优先后置相机(手机扫码自然朝外);桌面无后置则退到任意可用相机。
video: { facingMode: { ideal: "environment" } },
audio: false,
});
if (cancelled) { stream.getTracks().forEach((tr) => tr.stop()); return; }
streamRef.current = stream;
const video = videoRef.current;
if (video)
{
video.srcObject = stream;
// iOS Safari 要求 playsInline + 显式 play(),否则不出画面。
await video.play().catch(() => { /* 自动播放被拦:画面仍随轨道更新 */ });
}
setState("scanning");
rafRef.current = requestAnimationFrame(tick);
}
catch (e)
{
if (cancelled) { return; }
const name = e instanceof DOMException ? e.name : "";
if (name === "NotAllowedError" || name === "SecurityError")
{
setState("denied");
}
else if (name === "NotFoundError" || name === "OverconstrainedError")
{
setState("noCamera");
}
else
{
setErrorMsg(e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e));
setState("error");
}
}
};
void start();
return () => { cancelled = true; stop(); };
}, [ tick, stop ]);
const goBack = () => navigate({ to: "/" });
// ---- 渲染分支 --------------------------------------------------------
// 无摄像头(桌面常见):优雅降级,引导改用手机扫,不报错。
if (state === "noCamera")
{
return (
<AuthShell title={t("qr.scan.title")} hideBrand skipAutospace>
<Callout tone="info" icon={<CameraOff size={16} />}>
{t("qr.scan.noCamera")}
</Callout>
<Button variant="secondary" size="lg" block leftIcon={<ArrowLeft size={16} />} onClick={goBack}>
{t("qr.scan.back")}
</Button>
</AuthShell>
);
}
// 权限被拒:明确告诉用户去哪儿改回来。
if (state === "denied")
{
return (
<AuthShell title={t("qr.scan.title")} hideBrand skipAutospace>
<Callout tone="warn" icon={<CameraOff size={16} />}>
{t("qr.scan.denied")}
</Callout>
<Button variant="secondary" size="lg" block leftIcon={<ArrowLeft size={16} />} onClick={goBack}>
{t("qr.scan.back")}
</Button>
</AuthShell>
);
}
if (state === "error")
{
return (
<AuthShell title={t("qr.scan.title")} hideBrand skipAutospace>
<Callout tone="error" icon={<AlertTriangle size={16} />}>
{errorMsg ?? t("qr.scan.error")}
</Callout>
<Button variant="secondary" size="lg" block leftIcon={<ArrowLeft size={16} />} onClick={goBack}>
{t("qr.scan.back")}
</Button>
</AuthShell>
);
}
return (
<AuthShell title={t("qr.scan.title")} subtitle={t("qr.scan.subtitle")} hideBrand skipAutospace>
<div className={s.stage}>
<div className={`${s.viewport} ${state === "hit" ? s.viewportHit : ""}`}>
<video
ref={videoRef}
className={s.video}
muted
playsInline
// 仅装饰性预览,扫码内容不读屏;语义流程在批准页。
aria-hidden="true"
/>
{state === "scanning" && <span className={s.beam} aria-hidden="true" />}
<span className={`${s.tick} ${s.tl}`} aria-hidden="true" />
<span className={`${s.tick} ${s.tr}`} aria-hidden="true" />
<span className={`${s.tick} ${s.bl}`} aria-hidden="true" />
<span className={`${s.tick} ${s.br}`} aria-hidden="true" />
</div>
<canvas ref={canvasRef} style={{ display: "none" }} />
<div className={s.statusLine}>
{state === "starting"
? <><Camera size={14} />{t("qr.scan.starting")}</>
: <><ScanLine size={14} />{t("qr.scan.aiming")}</>}
</div>
</div>
{/* 扫到非本站码:安静提示继续对准,相机不中断。 */}
{sawForeignCode && state === "scanning" && (
<Callout tone="info" icon={<ScanLine size={16} />}>
{t("qr.scan.foreign")}
</Callout>
)}
<ol className={s.steps} data-jz-level="paragraph">
<li>{t("qr.scan.howto1")}</li>
<li>{t("qr.scan.howto2")}</li>
</ol>
<div className={s.actions}>
<Button variant="ghost" size="lg" block leftIcon={<ArrowLeft size={16} />} onClick={goBack}>
{t("qr.scan.back")}
</Button>
</div>
</AuthShell>
);
}
+12 -19
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import { createFileRoute, Link, useNavigate } from "@tanstack/react-router";
import { createFileRoute, useNavigate } from "@tanstack/react-router";
import { AlertTriangle, LogIn, QrCode } from "lucide-react";
import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
import { fetchAuthConfig, loginDev, loginProd } from "../features/auth/auth";
@@ -131,25 +131,18 @@ function LoginPage()
>
{t("login.prod.button")}
</Button>
{/* 扫码登录入口:从已登录的另一台设备批准本机接入,无需在此重登。
克制——一行带图标的次级链接,不与主 CTA 争重。 */}
<Link
to="/link/new"
search={{}}
style={{
display: "inline-flex",
alignItems: "center",
justifyContent: "center",
gap: "var(--space-2)",
marginTop: "calc(var(--space-1) * -1)",
color: "var(--text-muted)",
fontSize: "var(--fs-13)",
textDecoration: "none",
}}
{/* 扫码登录入口:与 OAuth 登录平级的另一种登录方式——从已登录的
另一台设备批准本机接入,无需在此重登。secondary 变体、等宽、
同 size,与主登录按钮同级视觉重量。 */}
<Button
variant="secondary"
size="lg"
block
leftIcon={<QrCode size={16} />}
onClick={() => navigate({ to: "/link/new" })}
>
<QrCode size={15} />
<span>{t("qr.entry.fromLogin")}</span>
</Link>
{t("qr.entry.fromLogin")}
</Button>
</>
)}
</AuthShell>
+281 -99
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import { useEffect, useMemo, useState } from "react";
import { useCallback, useEffect, useState } from "react";
import {
Anchor,
Container,
@@ -8,9 +8,12 @@ import {
Title,
} from "@mantine/core";
import { createFileRoute, Link, redirect, useNavigate } from "@tanstack/react-router";
import { Bell, LogOut, Trash2 } from "lucide-react";
import { logout, syncWebDeviceName } from "../features/auth/auth";
import { AlertTriangle, Bell, LogOut, ShieldAlert, Trash2 } from "lucide-react";
import { logout, startStepUpReauth, syncWebDeviceName } from "../features/auth/auth";
import { DesktopSettings } from "../features/desktop/DesktopSettings";
import {
consumePendingRevoke, consumeStepUpCode, stashPendingRevoke,
} from "../features/qr/stepUp";
import { isDesktop, persistDesktopDeviceName } from "../net/desktop";
import { apiFetch } from "../net/api";
import {
@@ -20,25 +23,15 @@ import {
pushSupported,
type PushState,
} from "../net/push";
import { useAppStore, type DeviceInfo } from "../store";
import {
listSessions, postStepUp, revokeSession, StepUpRequiredError,
type AuthSession,
} from "../net/sessions";
import { useAppStore } from "../store";
import { t } from "../i18n";
import { formatRelative, isAsciiDeviceName } from "../utils/format";
import { Badge, Button, Panel, TextField } from "../ui/primitives";
import { Badge, Button, Callout, Panel, TextField } from "../ui/primitives";
import { StateDot } from "../ui/glyphs";
// deviceTypeLabel 把后端存的设备类型本地化展示(浏览器 / macOS 客户端 / …)。
// 容错匹配(与 DeviceStrip 的 mapKind 一致),未知类型回退原值。
function deviceTypeLabel(type: string): string
{
const k = type.toLowerCase();
if (k.includes("mac") || k === "darwin") { return t("deviceType.macos"); }
if (k.includes("win")) { return t("deviceType.windows"); }
if (k.includes("linux")) { return t("deviceType.linux"); }
if (k === "shortcut") { return t("deviceType.shortcut"); }
if (k.includes("ios") || k === "iphone" || k === "ipad") { return t("deviceType.ios"); }
if (k === "browser") { return t("deviceType.browser"); }
return type;
}
import { toast } from "../ui/feedback";
export const Route = createFileRoute("/settings")({
@@ -55,19 +48,14 @@ function SettingsPage()
{
const navigate = useNavigate();
const user = useAppStore((s) => s.user);
const sessionScope = useAppStore((s) => s.sessionScope);
const isGuest = sessionScope === "guest";
const selfDeviceName = useAppStore((s) => s.selfDeviceName);
const setSelfDeviceName = useAppStore((s) => s.setSelfDeviceName);
const storeDevices = useAppStore((s) => s.devices);
const [ pendingName, setPendingName ] = useState(selfDeviceName ?? "");
const [ removing, setRemoving ] = useState<Set<string>>(new Set());
const [ renaming, setRenaming ] = useState(false);
const peerDevices = useMemo(
() => storeDevices.filter((d) => d.name !== selfDeviceName),
[ storeDevices, selfDeviceName ],
);
const trimmedName = pendingName.trim();
const canSaveName = !!trimmedName && trimmedName !== selfDeviceName;
@@ -118,48 +106,6 @@ function SettingsPage()
}
};
const handleRemovePeer = async (name: string) =>
{
if (!window.confirm(t("settings.unregister.peerConfirm", { name }))) { return; }
setRemoving((prev) =>
{
const next = new Set(prev);
next.add(name);
return next;
});
try
{
const r = await apiFetch(
`/api/devices/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`,
{ method: "DELETE" },
);
if (!r.ok)
{
const text = await r.text().catch(() => r.statusText);
throw new Error(`${r.status}: ${text}`);
}
// 服务端的 publishPresence 会通过 SSE 推送新的设备列表,store
// 会随之更新,这里不需要手动 setDevices。
toast.ok("设备已移除", name);
}
catch (e)
{
toast.error(t("settings.error.delete", {
message: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e),
}));
}
finally
{
setRemoving((prev) =>
{
const next = new Set(prev);
next.delete(name);
return next;
});
}
};
const handleUnregisterSelf = async () =>
{
if (!selfDeviceName) { return; }
@@ -194,12 +140,27 @@ function SettingsPage()
<Container size="sm" py="lg">
<Stack gap="lg">
<Group justify="space-between" align="center" wrap="nowrap">
<Group gap="xs" align="center" wrap="nowrap">
<Title order={2}>{t("settings.title")}</Title>
{isGuest && <Badge tone="warn">{t("settings.guest.badge")}</Badge>}
</Group>
<Anchor component={Link} to="/" size="sm">
{t("nav.backToHome")}
</Anchor>
</Group>
{/* 受限访客标识:说明这台设备不能管理账号 / 授权设备,要完整权限请在
主设备上重新登录。放在最显眼处(标题下第一块)。 */}
{isGuest && (
<Callout
tone="warn"
icon={<ShieldAlert size={16} />}
title={t("settings.guest.title")}
>
{t("settings.guest.body")}
</Callout>
)}
<Panel title={t("settings.currentDevice.title")}>
<Stack gap="sm">
<TextField
@@ -226,7 +187,7 @@ function SettingsPage()
</Button>
</Group>
<div style={{ height: 1, background: "var(--divider)" }} />
<Text size="sm" c="dimmed">
<Text size="sm" c="dimmed" className="justify" data-jz-level="paragraph">
{t("settings.unregister.currentHint")}
</Text>
<Group>
@@ -245,22 +206,10 @@ function SettingsPage()
{pushSupported() && <PushPanel />}
<Panel title={t("settings.peers.title")}>
{peerDevices.length === 0 ? (
<Text size="sm" c="dimmed">{t("settings.peers.empty")}</Text>
) : (
<Stack gap="xs">
{peerDevices.map((d) => (
<PeerRow
key={d.name}
device={d}
removing={removing.has(d.name)}
onRemove={() => handleRemovePeer(d.name)}
<SessionsPanel
isGuest={isGuest}
onSignedOutSelf={handleSignOut}
/>
))}
</Stack>
)}
</Panel>
<Panel title={t("settings.account.title")}>
<Stack gap="sm">
@@ -335,9 +284,9 @@ function PushPanel()
return (
<Panel title={t("settings.push.title")}>
<Stack gap="sm">
<Text size="sm" c="dimmed">{t("settings.push.hint")}</Text>
<Text size="sm" c="dimmed" className="justify" data-jz-level="paragraph">{t("settings.push.hint")}</Text>
{denied && !subscribed && (
<Text size="sm" style={{ color: "var(--state-error)" }}>
<Text size="sm" className="justify" data-jz-level="paragraph" style={{ color: "var(--state-error)" }}>
{t("settings.push.deniedHint")}
</Text>
)}
@@ -371,37 +320,270 @@ function PushPanel()
);
}
function PeerRow(props: { device: DeviceInfo; removing: boolean; onRemove: () => void })
// sortSessions 把会话排成「在线在上、未活跃(offline)在下」,组内按最近活跃时间降序
// (活跃越近越靠前)。不改变原数组,返回新数组。
function sortSessions(list: AuthSession[]): AuthSession[]
{
const { device, removing, onRemove } = props;
const lastSeenText = device.lastSeen
? t("settings.lastSeen", { time: formatRelative(device.lastSeen) })
: t("settings.lastSeenNever");
return [ ...list ].sort((a, b) =>
{
if (a.online !== b.online) { return a.online ? -1 : 1; }
return b.lastUsedAt - a.lastUsedAt;
});
}
// SessionsPanel:登录会话管理——浏览器 / 扫码登录的设备会话。每条显示在线状态点 +
// 设备名 + 权限级别 Badge + 「本机」标记 + 最近活跃,并提供「登出」(真正吊销该登录
// 的访问令牌)。在线会话排在上、未活跃(offline)的排在下;离线会话仍可登出。
//
// step-upDELETE 返回 403 step_up_required 时,把待登出的 sessionId 暂存 → 发起
// 一次 prompt=login 再认证(returnTo=/settings)→ 整页跳走 → 回来后由本组件 mount
// effect 取出暂存的 {code, verifier} + sessionIdPOST /auth/stepup 记录窗口,再
// 重试那条 DELETE。step-up 窗口内(后端 5 分钟)后续登出不再 403、直接成功。
//
// 受限访客(isGuest):无权管理登录会话、后端 GET 会 403,故根本不发该请求,直接展示
// 一句克制的说明 Callout(不出现任何加载 / 失败态)。
function SessionsPanel(props: { isGuest: boolean; onSignedOutSelf: () => void })
{
const { isGuest, onSignedOutSelf } = props;
const [ sessions, setSessions ] = useState<AuthSession[] | null>(null);
const [ loadError, setLoadError ] = useState(false);
const [ busyId, setBusyId ] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [ stepUpRejected, setStepUpRejected ] = useState(false);
// reload 拉取并写入列表,同时把结果回传给调用方(step-up 重试路径需在 revoke
// 前从这份列表里查出 current,不能在 revoke 之后再拉——若登出的正是本机会话,
// 令牌已失效、那次 listSessions 会 401)。在线会话排前、未活跃的排后,组内按最近
// 活跃时间降序。失败回 null。受限访客不会走到这里(调用方在 guest 分支直接返回)。
const reload = useCallback(async (): Promise<AuthSession[] | null> =>
{
setLoadError(false);
try
{
const list = sortSessions(await listSessions());
setSessions(list);
return list;
}
catch { setLoadError(true); setSessions(null); return null; }
}, []);
// doRevoke 真正执行一条登出。current(本机)会话登出后清本地 auth、回登录页
// (等价退出登录);其余刷新列表。403 step_up_required 由调用方分流,不入此处。
const finishRevoke = useCallback((sess: AuthSession) =>
{
if (sess.current) { onSignedOutSelf(); return; }
toast.ok(t("settings.sessions.revoked"));
void reload();
}, [ onSignedOutSelf, reload ]);
// 进页面拉一次。返回时若检测到 step-up 往返暂存({code, verifier} + 待登出 id),
// 先 POST /auth/stepup 记录窗口,再重试那条 DELETE——一次性串起整页跳转两端。
// 受限访客无权管理会话、后端 GET 会 403,故根本不发请求、直接走说明态。
useEffect(() =>
{
if (isGuest) { return; }
let cancelled = false;
const run = async () =>
{
// step-up 往返恢复:取出暂存(一次性)。无暂存则普通进页只拉列表。
const stash = consumeStepUpCode();
const pendingId = consumePendingRevoke();
const list = await reload();
if (cancelled) { return; }
if (stash && pendingId)
{
// 在 revoke 前就从这份列表里查出待登出的那条(尤其 current 标记):
// 若登出的正是本机会话,revoke 后令牌即失效,不能再 listSessions。
const target = list?.find((x) => x.id === pendingId);
setBusyId(pendingId);
try
{
await postStepUp(stash.code, stash.verifier);
await revokeSession(pendingId);
if (cancelled) { return; }
if (target) { finishRevoke(target); }
else { toast.ok(t("settings.sessions.revoked")); await reload(); }
}
catch (e)
{
if (cancelled) { return; }
if (e instanceof StepUpRequiredError) { setStepUpRejected(true); }
else
{
toast.error(t("settings.error.delete", {
message: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e),
}));
}
void reload();
}
finally { if (!cancelled) { setBusyId(null); } }
}
};
void run();
return () => { cancelled = true; };
}, [ isGuest, reload, finishRevoke ]);
const handleRevoke = async (sess: AuthSession) =>
{
const confirmMsg = sess.current
? t("settings.sessions.confirmCurrent")
: t("settings.sessions.confirmOther", { name: sess.deviceName });
if (!window.confirm(confirmMsg)) { return; }
setBusyId(sess.id);
setStepUpRejected(false);
try
{
await revokeSession(sess.id);
finishRevoke(sess);
}
catch (e)
{
if (e instanceof StepUpRequiredError)
{
// 需再认证:暂存待登出 id,发起 prompt=login 往返,回到 /settings 后
// 由 mount effect 接力重试。成功则整页跳走、本组件卸载。
stashPendingRevoke(sess.id);
try
{
await startStepUpReauth("/settings");
return; // 跳转去 provider,不再 setBusyId。
}
catch (reauthErr)
{
toast.error(t("settings.error.delete", {
message: reauthErr instanceof Error ? reauthErr.message : String(reauthErr),
}));
}
}
else
{
toast.error(t("settings.error.delete", {
message: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e),
}));
}
}
finally { setBusyId(null); }
};
// 受限访客:不展示列表 / 加载 / 失败态,只给一句克制的说明——管理登录会话需在主设备
// 上完整登录。后端 GET 本就 403,前面 effect 也已跳过请求,这里纯文案分支。
if (isGuest)
{
return (
<Panel title={t("settings.sessions.title")}>
<Callout tone="warn" icon={<ShieldAlert size={16} />}>
{t("settings.sessions.guestNote")}
</Callout>
</Panel>
);
}
return (
<Panel title={t("settings.sessions.title")}>
<Stack gap="sm">
<Text size="sm" c="dimmed" className="justify" data-jz-level="paragraph">{t("settings.sessions.hint")}</Text>
{stepUpRejected && (
<Callout tone="warn" icon={<AlertTriangle size={16} />}>
{t("settings.sessions.stepUpRejected")}
</Callout>
)}
{loadError ? (
<Group>
<Text size="sm" style={{ color: "var(--state-error)" }}>
{t("settings.sessions.loadError")}
</Text>
<Button size="sm" variant="ghost" onClick={() => void reload()}>
{t("settings.sessions.retry")}
</Button>
</Group>
) : sessions === null ? (
// 仍在加载(首屏闪一帧):不渲染占位文案,避免「暂无」误闪。
null
) : sessions.length === 0 ? (
<Text size="sm" c="dimmed">{t("settings.sessions.empty")}</Text>
) : (
<Stack gap="xs">
{sessions.map((sess) => (
<SessionRow
key={sess.id}
session={sess}
busy={busyId === sess.id}
// 在线、离线会话都可登出(离线亦走 step-up,流程一致)。
onRevoke={() => handleRevoke(sess)}
/>
))}
</Stack>
)}
</Stack>
</Panel>
);
}
// 会话种类标签:网页 / 扫码会话用 settings.sessions.kind.*;原生客户端
// macos / windows / linux / ios)复用设备类型标签(「macOS 客户端」等)。
function sessionKindLabel(kind: AuthSession["kind"]): string
{
if (kind === "oidc" || kind === "self" || kind === "guest")
{
return t(`settings.sessions.kind.${kind}` as const);
}
return t(`deviceType.${kind}` as const);
}
function SessionRow(props: { session: AuthSession; busy: boolean; onRevoke?: () => void })
{
const { session, busy, onRevoke } = props;
const lastUsedText = session.lastUsedAt
? t("settings.sessions.lastUsed", { time: formatRelative(session.lastUsedAt) })
: t("settings.sessions.neverUsed");
const kindLabel = sessionKindLabel(session.kind);
const onlineLabel = t(session.online ? "settings.online" : "settings.offline");
return (
<Panel variant="sunken" padding="tight">
<Group justify="space-between" wrap="nowrap" align="center">
<Stack gap={2} style={{ minWidth: 0, flex: 1 }}>
<Group gap={6} wrap="nowrap">
<StateDot tone={device.online ? "online" : "offline"} />
<Text fw={500} size="sm" truncate>{device.name}</Text>
<Badge tone={device.online ? "online" : "neutral"}>
{t(device.online ? "settings.online" : "settings.offline")}
<StateDot
tone={session.online ? "online" : "offline"}
title={onlineLabel}
/>
<Text fw={500} size="sm" truncate>
{session.deviceName || kindLabel}
</Text>
<Badge tone={session.scope === "guest" ? "warn" : "accent"}>
{session.scope === "guest"
? t("settings.sessions.scopeGuest")
: t("settings.sessions.scopeFull")}
</Badge>
{session.current && (
<Badge tone="online">{t("settings.sessions.current")}</Badge>
)}
</Group>
<Text size="xs" c="dimmed" truncate>
{deviceTypeLabel(device.type)} · {lastSeenText}
{onlineLabel} · {kindLabel} · {lastUsedText}
</Text>
</Stack>
{onRevoke && (
<Button
size="sm"
variant="ghost"
loading={removing}
onClick={onRemove}
loading={busy}
leftIcon={<LogOut size={13} />}
onClick={onRevoke}
style={{ color: "var(--state-error)" }}
>
{removing ? t("settings.peers.removing") : t("settings.peers.remove")}
{busy
? t("settings.sessions.signingOut")
: session.current
? t("settings.sessions.signOutCurrent")
: t("settings.sessions.signOut")}
</Button>
)}
</Group>
</Panel>
);
}
+12 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import type { TransferRecord, ThemeMode, User } from "./types";
import type { TransferRecord, ThemeMode, User, SessionScope } from "./types";
// DONE 是"全部数据已交付"的语义终态,把进行时遥测残留归一到这一事实,避免
// history 行还显示"传输中字节 / 待发送 X MB"等错觉。FAILED / CANCELLED 不归
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ export function normalizeTerminal(cur: TransferRecord, finalState: string): Tran
export const ACCESS_TOKEN_KEY = "cdrop.access_token";
export const USER_KEY = "cdrop.user";
export const SESSION_SCOPE_KEY = "cdrop.session_scope";
export const SELF_DEVICE_KEY = "cdrop.self_device";
export const THEME_KEY = "cdrop.theme";
@@ -125,6 +126,16 @@ export function readSessionUser(): User | null
}
}
// 本会话权限级别随 access_token 一并持久化(sessionStorage,同 tab 刷新存活、
// 关标签即清)。缺失 / 非法回退 "full"——/api/me 会在登录 / 水合后校正它,回退到
// 完整态只会多展示入口(后端仍 403),不会把受限态误升级。
export function readSessionScope(): SessionScope
{
if (typeof window === "undefined") { return "full"; }
const raw = window.sessionStorage.getItem(SESSION_SCOPE_KEY);
return raw === "guest" ? "guest" : "full";
}
export function readSelfDevice(): string | null
{
if (typeof window === "undefined") { return null; }
+1
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ export const useAppStore = create<AppState>()((...a) =>
export type {
AppState,
AuthMode,
SessionScope,
ThemeMode,
User,
DeviceInfo,
+21 -3
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,18 @@
import type { StateCreator } from "zustand";
import type { AppState, AuthMode } from "../types";
import type { AppState, AuthMode, SessionScope } from "../types";
import {
ACCESS_TOKEN_KEY,
SESSION_SCOPE_KEY,
USER_KEY,
readSessionAccess,
readSessionScope,
readSessionUser,
} from "../helpers";
export type AuthSlice = Pick<
AppState,
"authMode" | "accessToken" | "user" | "setAuth" | "clearAuth"
"authMode" | "accessToken" | "user" | "sessionScope"
| "setAuth" | "setSessionScope" | "clearAuth"
>;
const initialAuthMode: AuthMode = import.meta.env.DEV ? "dev" : "prod";
@@ -23,6 +26,7 @@ export const createAuthSlice: StateCreator<AppState, [], [], AuthSlice> = (set)
authMode: initialAuthMode,
accessToken: readSessionAccess(),
user: readSessionUser(),
sessionScope: readSessionScope(),
setAuth: (a) =>
{
@@ -37,13 +41,27 @@ export const createAuthSlice: StateCreator<AppState, [], [], AuthSlice> = (set)
});
},
// setSessionScope 由 /api/me 解析结果驱动(登录成功 / 开机水合后调用)。
// 持久化到 sessionStorage,使同 tab 刷新沿用,不必再次往返 /api/me 才能正确
// 隐藏受限入口。
setSessionScope: (scope: SessionScope) =>
{
if (typeof window !== "undefined")
{
window.sessionStorage.setItem(SESSION_SCOPE_KEY, scope);
}
set({ sessionScope: scope });
},
clearAuth: () =>
{
if (typeof window !== "undefined")
{
window.sessionStorage.removeItem(ACCESS_TOKEN_KEY);
window.sessionStorage.removeItem(USER_KEY);
window.sessionStorage.removeItem(SESSION_SCOPE_KEY);
}
set({ accessToken: null, user: null });
// scope 回 "full":登出后下一个登录者默认完整态,再由其自己的 /api/me 校正。
set({ accessToken: null, user: null, sessionScope: "full" });
},
});
+9
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ export interface DeviceInfo
export type AuthMode = "dev" | "prod";
// 本会话的权限级别(来自 /api/me 的 scope):full=完整登录、guest=受限访客。
// 受限访客不能管理账号 / 授权设备——前端据此隐藏相关入口(后端亦 403 兜底)。
export type SessionScope = "full" | "guest";
export type ThemeMode = "light" | "dark" | "system";
// 客户端侧细颗粒度阶段,与服务端的 statePENDING/ACCEPTED/...)正交;
@@ -118,7 +122,12 @@ export interface AppState
authMode: AuthMode;
accessToken: string | null;
user: User | null;
// 本会话权限级别(/api/me 的 scope)。默认 "full";登录成功 / 开机水合后据
// /api/me 校正为 "guest" 时,UI 隐藏「扫码登录新设备」「移除设备」「登出他人」
// 等账号管理入口,并展示「受限访客」标识。
sessionScope: SessionScope;
setAuth: (a: { accessToken: string; user: User }) => void;
setSessionScope: (scope: SessionScope) => void;
clearAuth: () => void;
// ---- device slice ----