Files
Commilitia-Drop/internal/jwtauth/claims.go
T
admin 10cf36ecee 鉴权并入 Auth Broker:委派设备会话统一模型 + 四端迁移
后端(委托 Auth Broker,路径 A):
- 删自建鉴权(OIDC exchange / 自签会话 / step-up / shortcut / web_sessions / accounts),cdrop 不再存任何凭证;鉴权中间件改读边缘注入的 X-Auth-Subject/Scope/Meta/Name/Roles 头(dev 旁路保留);Claims 加 Tier() / Guest()
- internal/brokerclient:mint / revoke(带 X-Broker-App)/ refresh / ListSessions(R1 列举),直连内网、吊销幂等

统一会话模型“委派设备会话”(Delegated Device Sessions):
- 每个客户端(浏览器 / 桌面 / 扫码设备)=一条带 meta(device_id) + label 的 broker 机器会话;Broker 作设备会话唯一注册表(R1 按用户+app 列举 + R2 按 (user,app,meta) 幂等铸造),cdrop 退化为薄覆盖层、不再自存权威会话表
- 新增代铸端点 POST /api/auth/device-session:凭边缘已验明的 X-Auth-Subject 委托 broker 铸 / 轮换设备会话(meta=device_id、按调用方 tier 防越权、sameOrigin CSRF、per-IP 限流);R2 幂等保证同一 device_id 重登原地轮换、不堆重复设备
- 会话列表=R1 权威 + 叠加 type(本地缓存)/ online(Hub presence,按设备名)/ current(meta 匹配本请求 X-Auth-Meta)+ 过滤 meta=""(device-authorize 引导会话残留);devices 表降级为 type/presence 薄缓存(非会话权威),device_id 主键、upsert 按 user 限定
- 吊销按 device_id → 缓存优先 / R1 兜底解析 sid → broker 吊销 + X-Broker-App;扫码登录保留三密钥编排,collect 改委托 broker 铸 + 落缓存行

Web 前端:
- 登录走 broker 全局 SSO 代跳(/api/auth/login 302);bootstrap 经 /api/me 注入身份后代铸设备会话(稳定 device_id 存 localStorage、Web Locks 跨 tab 串行防重复铸造);refresh 走 /api/auth/refresh
- 设备管理按 device_id;改名=同 device_id 重代铸(R2 原地轮换换 label、不产生重复行);登录页反应式守卫修登录回环
- 去 OIDC PKCE / step-up(删 oauth.callback / stepUp)

桌面客户端(Wails):
- loopback PKCE(RFC 8252)改指 broker 设备授权流(/device/authorize + /device/token)拿引导令牌,再代铸出带 meta 的托管设备会话——与浏览器同模型、同管理、同吊销;身份取自代铸响应(修“显示名显示为 UUID”);refresh 保留显示名;稳定 device_id 入桌面配置

iOS 客户端(arch A,原生 SwiftUI + 离屏无头 WebView 引擎 + 原生↔JS 桥):
- 引擎 / 文件管理 / 设备管理 / 应用图标 / 本地化(此前实现,随本次落入版本库)
- 鉴权=引擎自刷(boot 注入 refresh_token)+ broker 轮换经 sessionRotated 回报原生更新 Keychain;去 cookie 同步;Session 加 refreshToken / deviceId

实时 / 健壮性:
- presence 走 Hub union(设备表行 ∪ 表外实时连接,按名去重、live-only 标在线)
- Hub 通道 close 一律在写锁内、非阻塞 send 一律在读锁内,消除 close-vs-send 闭通道 send panic(revoke 每次 Kick 后该路径变热)

配置 / 删旧栈:
- config 改 broker 接入(CDROP_BROKER_* / CDROP_PUBLIC_URL / 按档 TTL),prod 强校验 broker 配置 + PUBLIC_URL(CSRF Origin 守卫不失效)
- 删 auth.go / selftoken.go / shortcut.go / jwks.go + 三表(web_sessions / accounts / shortcut_tokens)及验证链;.env.example / compose.snippet.yaml / Caddyfile.snippet 更新为 broker 模型(人机分流 + 公开端点放行 + X-Auth-Meta 透传)
- 测试全重写:QR / 会话含 mock broker(R1 列举 + R2 幂等);hub 加 close-vs-send 并发回归;config 加 prod 必填校验
2026-06-26 22:10:19 +08:00

80 lines
2.8 KiB
Go

package jwtauth
import (
"context"
"strings"
)
// Claims is the authenticated identity for a request. In prod it is sourced from the
// Auth Broker at the edge: broker /verify authenticates the caller and injects X-Auth-*
// headers this process trusts (Caddy strips any client-supplied X-Auth-* at the trust
// boundary, so only the broker can set them). In dev it is synthesised from the dev token.
type Claims struct {
UserID string // X-Auth-Subject (Casdoor sub)
Name string // X-Auth-Name (display name); may be empty
Avatar string // X-Auth-Avatar (profile picture URL from the broker account); may be empty
Groups []string // X-Auth-Roles, comma-split
// Scope is the raw X-Auth-Scope: a global SSO user is "full"; a cdrop delegated
// session is "app:cdrop:<tier>". Tier() reads the capability grade off the end.
Scope string
// DeviceID is X-Auth-Meta: the cdrop device_id this session was minted for — the
// join key to the devices row. Empty for an unmanaged caller (e.g. a global SSO
// browser that never paired through cdrop).
DeviceID string
}
// ScopeTier returns the capability grade — the last colon-separated segment of a broker
// scope ("app:cdrop:guest" → "guest", "full" → "full"). A tierless scope is its own tier.
// Shared by Claims.Tier() and the session-list overlay so the two never diverge.
func ScopeTier(scope string) string {
if i := strings.LastIndex(scope, ":"); i >= 0 {
return scope[i+1:]
}
return scope
}
// Tier returns the capability grade off the caller's scope (see ScopeTier).
func (c *Claims) Tier() string {
return ScopeTier(c.Scope)
}
// Guest reports whether these claims came from a restricted guest session (a
// scan-login borrow). Guest sessions can transfer files but not manage devices,
// approve other devices, or mint long-lived tokens.
func (c *Claims) Guest() bool { return c.Tier() == "guest" }
type ctxKey int
const (
claimsCtxKey ctxKey = iota
deviceCtxKey
deviceTypeCtxKey
)
func ClaimsFromContext(ctx context.Context) (*Claims, bool) {
c, ok := ctx.Value(claimsCtxKey).(*Claims)
return c, ok
}
// ContextWithClaims attaches claims to a context — the inverse of ClaimsFromContext.
// The auth middleware uses this; it is also the seam handlers and tests use to inject
// claims directly.
func ContextWithClaims(ctx context.Context, c *Claims) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, claimsCtxKey, c)
}
func DeviceNameFromContext(ctx context.Context) (string, bool) {
n, ok := ctx.Value(deviceCtxKey).(string)
return n, ok
}
// DeviceTypeFromContext returns the client-declared device type set by the auth
// middleware (browser / macos / windows / linux / ios), defaulting to "browser".
func DeviceTypeFromContext(ctx context.Context) string {
t, ok := ctx.Value(deviceTypeCtxKey).(string)
if !ok || t == "" {
return "browser"
}
return t
}