10cf36ecee
后端(委托 Auth Broker,路径 A): - 删自建鉴权(OIDC exchange / 自签会话 / step-up / shortcut / web_sessions / accounts),cdrop 不再存任何凭证;鉴权中间件改读边缘注入的 X-Auth-Subject/Scope/Meta/Name/Roles 头(dev 旁路保留);Claims 加 Tier() / Guest() - internal/brokerclient:mint / revoke(带 X-Broker-App)/ refresh / ListSessions(R1 列举),直连内网、吊销幂等 统一会话模型“委派设备会话”(Delegated Device Sessions): - 每个客户端(浏览器 / 桌面 / 扫码设备)=一条带 meta(device_id) + label 的 broker 机器会话;Broker 作设备会话唯一注册表(R1 按用户+app 列举 + R2 按 (user,app,meta) 幂等铸造),cdrop 退化为薄覆盖层、不再自存权威会话表 - 新增代铸端点 POST /api/auth/device-session:凭边缘已验明的 X-Auth-Subject 委托 broker 铸 / 轮换设备会话(meta=device_id、按调用方 tier 防越权、sameOrigin CSRF、per-IP 限流);R2 幂等保证同一 device_id 重登原地轮换、不堆重复设备 - 会话列表=R1 权威 + 叠加 type(本地缓存)/ online(Hub presence,按设备名)/ current(meta 匹配本请求 X-Auth-Meta)+ 过滤 meta=""(device-authorize 引导会话残留);devices 表降级为 type/presence 薄缓存(非会话权威),device_id 主键、upsert 按 user 限定 - 吊销按 device_id → 缓存优先 / R1 兜底解析 sid → broker 吊销 + X-Broker-App;扫码登录保留三密钥编排,collect 改委托 broker 铸 + 落缓存行 Web 前端: - 登录走 broker 全局 SSO 代跳(/api/auth/login 302);bootstrap 经 /api/me 注入身份后代铸设备会话(稳定 device_id 存 localStorage、Web Locks 跨 tab 串行防重复铸造);refresh 走 /api/auth/refresh - 设备管理按 device_id;改名=同 device_id 重代铸(R2 原地轮换换 label、不产生重复行);登录页反应式守卫修登录回环 - 去 OIDC PKCE / step-up(删 oauth.callback / stepUp) 桌面客户端(Wails): - loopback PKCE(RFC 8252)改指 broker 设备授权流(/device/authorize + /device/token)拿引导令牌,再代铸出带 meta 的托管设备会话——与浏览器同模型、同管理、同吊销;身份取自代铸响应(修“显示名显示为 UUID”);refresh 保留显示名;稳定 device_id 入桌面配置 iOS 客户端(arch A,原生 SwiftUI + 离屏无头 WebView 引擎 + 原生↔JS 桥): - 引擎 / 文件管理 / 设备管理 / 应用图标 / 本地化(此前实现,随本次落入版本库) - 鉴权=引擎自刷(boot 注入 refresh_token)+ broker 轮换经 sessionRotated 回报原生更新 Keychain;去 cookie 同步;Session 加 refreshToken / deviceId 实时 / 健壮性: - presence 走 Hub union(设备表行 ∪ 表外实时连接,按名去重、live-only 标在线) - Hub 通道 close 一律在写锁内、非阻塞 send 一律在读锁内,消除 close-vs-send 闭通道 send panic(revoke 每次 Kick 后该路径变热) 配置 / 删旧栈: - config 改 broker 接入(CDROP_BROKER_* / CDROP_PUBLIC_URL / 按档 TTL),prod 强校验 broker 配置 + PUBLIC_URL(CSRF Origin 守卫不失效) - 删 auth.go / selftoken.go / shortcut.go / jwks.go + 三表(web_sessions / accounts / shortcut_tokens)及验证链;.env.example / compose.snippet.yaml / Caddyfile.snippet 更新为 broker 模型(人机分流 + 公开端点放行 + X-Auth-Meta 透传) - 测试全重写:QR / 会话含 mock broker(R1 列举 + R2 幂等);hub 加 close-vs-send 并发回归;config 加 prod 必填校验
192 lines
6.1 KiB
Go
192 lines
6.1 KiB
Go
package jwtauth
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/config"
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"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/db"
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)
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// Store is the subset of *db.Queries the auth middleware uses: refreshing a managed
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// device's last_seen + tier on each request. Declared as an interface so tests can
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// swap in a fake.
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type Store interface {
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TouchDevice(ctx context.Context, arg db.TouchDeviceParams) error
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}
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// Authenticator turns each request's identity into Claims. After the Auth Broker
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// migration (path A) cdrop no longer verifies tokens itself: in prod the broker
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// authenticates at the edge and injects X-Auth-* headers this process trusts; in dev
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// the claims are synthesised from the dev token.
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type Authenticator struct {
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cfg *config.Config
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store Store
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}
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func New(cfg *config.Config, store Store) *Authenticator {
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return &Authenticator{cfg: cfg, store: store}
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}
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func (a *Authenticator) Middleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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claims, err := a.authenticate(r)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Warn("auth failed", "err", err, "path", r.URL.Path)
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unauthorized(w, "unauthorized")
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return
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}
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deviceName := SanitizeDeviceName(r.Header.Get("X-Device-Name"))
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deviceType := normalizeDeviceType(r.Header.Get("X-Device-Type"))
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// Keep the managed device's last_seen + tier fresh. Identity is the
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// broker-issued device_id (X-Auth-Meta); the row is created at scan-login
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// collect, so this only ever updates — an unmanaged caller (no device_id,
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// e.g. a global SSO browser) is skipped, and a missing row no-ops.
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if claims.DeviceID != "" {
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if err := a.store.TouchDevice(r.Context(), db.TouchDeviceParams{
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LastSeen: time.Now().Unix(),
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Tier: claims.Tier(),
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DeviceID: claims.DeviceID,
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UserID: claims.UserID,
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}); err != nil {
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// non-fatal: log and continue so a transient DB error doesn't 401 users
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slog.Error("device touch failed",
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"err", err, "user", claims.UserID, "device", claims.DeviceID)
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}
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}
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ctx := ContextWithClaims(r.Context(), claims)
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, deviceCtxKey, deviceName)
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, deviceTypeCtxKey, deviceType)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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})
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}
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// authenticate resolves the request identity. prod trusts the broker's edge-injected
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// X-Auth-* headers; dev synthesises claims from the dev token.
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func (a *Authenticator) authenticate(r *http.Request) (*Claims, error) {
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if a.cfg.AuthMode == "dev" {
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return a.devClaims(r)
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}
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// prod: the request reached cdrop only by passing broker /verify at the edge,
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// which injected these headers. Caddy strips any client-supplied X-Auth-* at the
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// trust boundary, so their presence is the broker's say-so. No subject → the
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// request did not authenticate.
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sub := r.Header.Get("X-Auth-Subject")
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if sub == "" {
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return nil, errors.New("missing X-Auth-Subject (request did not pass broker /verify)")
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}
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return &Claims{
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UserID: sub,
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Name: r.Header.Get("X-Auth-Name"),
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Avatar: r.Header.Get("X-Auth-Avatar"),
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Groups: splitRoles(r.Header.Get("X-Auth-Roles")),
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Scope: r.Header.Get("X-Auth-Scope"),
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DeviceID: r.Header.Get("X-Auth-Meta"),
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}, nil
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}
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// devClaims authenticates the local dev token and synthesises claims. X-Dev-User sets
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// the subject (default "dev-user"); X-Dev-Scope simulates a tier ("guest" → restricted,
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// else full); X-Dev-Device optionally sets a device_id to exercise device flows.
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func (a *Authenticator) devClaims(r *http.Request) (*Claims, error) {
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token, ok := bearerToken(r)
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if !ok || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(token), []byte(a.cfg.DevToken)) != 1 {
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return nil, errors.New("invalid dev token")
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}
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userID := r.Header.Get("X-Dev-User")
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if userID == "" {
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userID = "dev-user"
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}
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scope := r.Header.Get("X-Dev-Scope")
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if scope == "" {
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scope = "full"
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}
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return &Claims{
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UserID: userID,
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Name: userID,
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Groups: []string{"dev"},
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Scope: scope,
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DeviceID: r.Header.Get("X-Dev-Device"),
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}, nil
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}
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// splitRoles parses a comma-separated X-Auth-Roles header into a role slice,
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// trimming whitespace and dropping empties.
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func splitRoles(raw string) []string {
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if raw == "" {
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return nil
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}
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parts := strings.Split(raw, ",")
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out := make([]string, 0, len(parts))
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for _, p := range parts {
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if s := strings.TrimSpace(p); s != "" {
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out = append(out, s)
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}
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}
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return out
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}
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func bearerToken(r *http.Request) (string, bool) {
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h := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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const prefix = "Bearer "
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if !strings.HasPrefix(h, prefix) {
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return "", false
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}
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tok := strings.TrimPrefix(h, prefix)
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if tok == "" {
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return "", false
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}
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return tok, true
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}
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func unauthorized(w http.ResponseWriter, reason string) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
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w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Bearer realm="cdrop"`)
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{
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"error": "unauthorized",
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"reason": reason,
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})
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}
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// SanitizeDeviceName enforces the global ASCII-only device-name policy. Device names
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// ride in the X-Device-Name HTTP header, which can't carry non-ASCII reliably (and
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// browser fetch rejects such header values outright), so the name is restricted to
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// printable ASCII everywhere. Here we keep only printable ASCII (0x20–0x7E), trim, and
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// cap the length as a server-side backstop; clients also validate up front. Empty after
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// sanitising → the caller falls back to a default.
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func SanitizeDeviceName(raw string) string {
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var b strings.Builder
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for _, r := range raw {
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if r >= 0x20 && r <= 0x7E {
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b.WriteRune(r)
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}
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}
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name := strings.TrimSpace(b.String())
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if len(name) > 64 {
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name = strings.TrimSpace(name[:64])
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}
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return name
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}
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// normalizeDeviceType whitelists the client-declared X-Device-Type so a device row
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// only ever carries a known kind; anything unrecognised (incl. empty) falls back to
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// "browser". Native clients send macos/windows/linux/ios.
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func normalizeDeviceType(raw string) string {
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switch t := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(raw)); t {
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case "macos", "windows", "linux", "ios", "browser":
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return t
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default:
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return "browser"
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}
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}
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