Commilitia-Drop/internal/httpapi/server.go

package httpapi

import (
	"context"
	"database/sql"
	"encoding/json"
	"log/slog"
	"net/http"
	"time"

	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
	"github.com/go-chi/httprate"

	"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/apns"
	"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/brokerclient"
	"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/calls"
	"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/clipboard"
	"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/config"
	"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/db"
	"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/hub"
	"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/jwtauth"
	"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/push"
	"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/relay"
	"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/transfer"
	"commilitia.net/cdrop/internal/webui"
)

type Server struct {
	cfg       *config.Config
	db        *sql.DB
	queries   *db.Queries
	auth      *jwtauth.Authenticator
	hub       *hub.Hub
	transfers *transfer.Service
	relay     *relay.Manager
	calls     *calls.Provider    // optional; nil → STUN-only fallback
	clipboard *clipboard.Service // optional; nil → 503 on /api/clipboard
	push      *push.Sender       // inert when VAPID keys unset → push endpoints 503
	apns      *apns.Sender       // inert when APNs keys unset → register endpoint 503
	mux       *chi.Mux

	// broker delegates session lifecycle to the Auth Broker (mint / revoke / refresh).
	broker *brokerclient.Client
	// siteOrigin is the deployment's scheme://host, used for the CSRF Origin check
	// and the scan-login QR link.
	siteOrigin string
}

func New(
	cfg *config.Config,
	dbConn *sql.DB,
	queries *db.Queries,
	auth *jwtauth.Authenticator,
	h *hub.Hub,
	transfers *transfer.Service,
	rm *relay.Manager,
	cp *calls.Provider,
	clip *clipboard.Service,
	pushSender *push.Sender,
	apnsSender *apns.Sender,
) *Server {
	s := &Server{
		cfg:       cfg,
		db:        dbConn,
		queries:   queries,
		auth:      auth,
		hub:       h,
		transfers: transfers,
		relay:     rm,
		calls:     cp,
		clipboard: clip,
		push:      pushSender,
		apns:      apnsSender,
		mux:       chi.NewRouter(),

		broker:     brokerclient.New(cfg.BrokerBaseURL, cfg.BrokerInternalKey, cfg.BrokerAppOrDefault()),
		siteOrigin: deriveSiteOrigin(cfg.PublicURL),
	}
	s.routes()
	return s
}

func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler { return s.mux }

func (s *Server) routes() {
	s.mux.Use(middleware.RequestID)
	s.mux.Use(middleware.RealIP)
	s.mux.Use(middleware.Recoverer)

	s.mux.Get("/healthz", s.handleHealth)

	// Anything not matched below falls through to the embedded frontend bundle.
	// In Docker the binary serves the SPA itself; in local dev the embed FS is
	// empty and this 404s — vite dev on :5173 handles the UI instead.
	s.mux.NotFound(webui.Handler().ServeHTTP)

	s.mux.Route("/api", func(r chi.Router) {
		// Public navigation: 302 to the broker's global-SSO login (bootstraps login).
		r.Get("/auth/login", s.handleAuthLogin)
		// Public: broker coordinates for native clients' device-authorization flow.
		r.Get("/auth/config", s.handleAuthConfig)

		// Public, rate-limited (per-IP; RealIP is mounted above). No bearer: the new
		// device isn't logged in yet (its poll_secret is the only credential), and
		// refresh runs precisely when the access token is expired. 60/min is ample
		// for real use behind a shared NAT while choking a scripted flood.
		r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
			r.Use(httprate.LimitByIP(60, time.Minute))
			// Token refresh — proxied to the Auth Broker, so the SPA stays same-origin
			// and cdrop stores no credential (it just relays the rotated pair).
			r.Post("/auth/refresh", s.handleAuthRefresh)
			// Scan-login: the new device opens a request and long-polls status. The
			// private poll_secret in the X-Poll-Secret header is the only credential.
			r.Post("/auth/qr/start", s.handleQRStart)
			r.Get("/auth/qr/status", s.handleQRStatus)
		})

		// Authenticated routes. Every request past here carries the broker's
		// edge-injected X-Auth-* identity (prod) or a dev token. Guests and full
		// sessions both reach this tier. gzip / compress is intentionally NOT mounted —
		// it would buffer the SSE stream.
		r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
			r.Use(s.auth.Middleware)

			// Clipboard, transfer, messaging, presence, push — guests included.
			r.Get("/clipboard", s.handleClipboardGet)
			r.Put("/clipboard", s.handleClipboardPut)
			// Lightweight version probe — no content; lets pollers detect change
			// cheaply before fetching the full body.
			r.Get("/clipboard/version", s.handleClipboardVersion)

			r.Get("/me", s.handleMe)
			r.Post("/me/disconnect", s.handleDisconnect)
			// 代铸: turn an edge-verified login (SSO cookie or device-authorize bootstrap)
			// into a cdrop-managed device session bound to a stable device_id, so browser
			// and native clients share one device list. Authenticated but not full-only —
			// it mints at the caller's own tier. Rate-limited per IP: with R2 idempotency a
			// normal client mints about once per login, so a generous cap simply bounds an
			// authenticated identity that loops fresh device_ids to mint unbounded sessions.
			r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
				r.Use(httprate.LimitByIP(20, time.Minute))
				r.Post("/auth/device-session", s.handleDeviceSession)
			})
			// Logout revokes the calling device's own broker session (self-service).
			r.Post("/auth/logout", s.handleLogout)
			r.Get("/hub/events", s.handleEvents)
			r.Post("/hub/signal", s.handleSignal)
			r.Post("/message", s.handleMessage)
			r.Get("/devices", s.handleDevices)
			r.Get("/push/vapid-key", s.handlePushVAPIDKey)
			r.Post("/push/subscribe", s.handlePushSubscribe)
			r.Delete("/push/subscribe", s.handlePushUnsubscribe)
			r.Post("/push/apns/register", s.handleAPNsRegister)
			r.Get("/calls/credentials", s.handleCallsCredentials)

			// Full sessions only — restricted guests (scan-login borrows) are
			// rejected: they transfer files but can't manage devices, approve other
			// devices, or revoke sessions.
			r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
				r.Use(requireFullSession)
				r.Delete("/devices/{device_id}", s.handleDeleteDevice)
				r.Patch("/devices/{device_id}", s.handleRenameDevice)
				// Scan-login approval side: the logged-in approver views and authorises
				// the new device. Guests can't reach here, so a borrowed device can't
				// approve further devices.
				r.Get("/auth/qr/request", s.handleQRRequest)
				r.Post("/auth/qr/approve", s.handleQRApprove)
				r.Post("/auth/qr/deny", s.handleQRDeny)
				// Session management: list logged-in devices with their permission
				// level and revoke one (logout that device).
				r.Get("/auth/sessions", s.handleSessionsList)
				r.Delete("/auth/sessions/{id}", s.handleSessionRevoke)
			})

			r.Route("/transfer", func(r chi.Router) {
				r.Post("/initiate", s.handleTransferInit)
				r.Post("/{id}/accept", s.transitionHandler(transfer.StateAccepted, ""))
				r.Post("/{id}/cancel", s.transitionHandler(transfer.StateCancelled, ""))
				r.Post("/{id}/p2p", s.transitionHandler(transfer.StateP2PActive, transfer.ModeP2P))
				r.Post("/{id}/fallback", s.transitionHandler(transfer.StateRelayActive, transfer.ModeRelay))
				r.Post("/{id}/done", s.transitionHandler(transfer.StateDone, ""))
				r.Post("/{id}/fail", s.transitionHandler(transfer.StateFailed, ""))
			})
			r.Route("/relay/{id}", func(r chi.Router) {
				r.Post("/chunk", s.handleRelayChunk)
				r.Get("/stream", s.handleRelayStream)
			})
		})
	})
}

type healthResp struct {
	Status   string `json:"status"`
	AuthMode string `json:"auth_mode"`
	DBOK     bool   `json:"db_ok"`
}

func (s *Server) handleHealth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), 2*time.Second)
	defer cancel()

	resp := healthResp{Status: "ok", AuthMode: s.cfg.AuthMode, DBOK: true}
	if err := s.db.PingContext(ctx); err != nil {
		resp.Status = "degraded"
		resp.DBOK = false
		slog.Error("healthz db ping failed", "err", err)
	}
	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
}

type meResp struct {
	UserID string `json:"user_id"`
	// Name is the display name from the broker (X-Auth-Name); falls back to user_id.
	Name string `json:"name"`
	// Avatar is the broker account's picture URL (X-Auth-Avatar); empty when none.
	Avatar     string   `json:"avatar,omitempty"`
	Groups     []string `json:"groups"`
	DeviceName string   `json:"device_name"`
	// Scope is the session's capability level: "guest" (scan-login borrow,
	// capability-limited) or "full" (normal login). The UI hides account-management
	// affordances on guest sessions.
	Scope string `json:"scope"`
}

func (s *Server) handleMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	claims, ok := jwtauth.ClaimsFromContext(r.Context())
	if !ok {
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{"error": "claims missing"})
		return
	}
	device, _ := jwtauth.DeviceNameFromContext(r.Context())
	scope := "full"
	if claims.Guest() {
		scope = "guest"
	}
	name := claims.Name
	if name == "" {
		name = claims.UserID
	}
	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, meResp{
		UserID:     claims.UserID,
		Name:       name,
		Avatar:     claims.Avatar,
		Groups:     claims.Groups,
		DeviceName: device,
		Scope:      scope,
	})
}

// handleDisconnect 是用户主动告知"本机要下线"的轻量信号（登出 / 关页前）。
// auth 中间件会先 UPSERT device 把 last_seen 更新，本 handler 再 Kick 关闭
// SSE + 立刻广播 presence，让对端不必等 30s 宽限期就看到本设备离线。
func (s *Server) handleDisconnect(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	claims, _ := jwtauth.ClaimsFromContext(r.Context())
	deviceName, _ := jwtauth.DeviceNameFromContext(r.Context())
	if deviceName == "" {
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "missing device"})
		return
	}
	s.hub.Kick(claims.UserID, deviceName)
	s.hub.PublishPresence(r.Context(), claims.UserID)
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}

func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v any) {
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
	w.WriteHeader(status)
	_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
}