90a3790a98
身份仍源自 OAuth provider(user_id = OIDC sub),cdrop 在其上自维护一薄层: 自签会话令牌 + accounts 表,并新增扫码快速登录。实施蓝本见 AUTH.md。 后端 · 自签会话原语 - web_sessions 加 kind/scope/granted_by 列(bootstrap 幂等迁移);既有 oidc 会话行为不变,新增 self(滑动续期)/ guest(受限·不续)两类 - cdrop 自签 HS256 会话 access token,密钥派生自 SESSION_SECRET,与落盘 AES、 shortcut HS256 三密钥域隔离;jwtauth.verifySelfToken 无状态校验、靠 typ 区分 - requireFullSession 守卫:guest 会话不得改账号 / 再批准设备 / 签长效 token - /auth/refresh 按 kind 分流:self/guest 纯自签、不触 IdP 后端 · 扫码登录(internal/httpapi/qr.go) - qr/start・status・request・approve・deny 五端点 + login_requests 表 + reaper - 三密钥分离:QR 仅含批准信息,会话只投递给持私有 poll_secret 的原设备 (偷拍 QR 者无 poll_secret 领不到会话、未登录批不了准) - 会话在新设备侧领取(cookie 不经手机)、单次消费、短 TTL 后端 · 薄账户层与 2FA step-up - accounts 表(键 sub,不含任何凭证):exchange/refresh upsert match_key / 显示名 / 头像 / roles,供显示与未来管理员开启迁移标记时跨源关联 - step-up(默认关):开启后 qr/approve 要求新鲜 prompt=login 授权码,后端就地 换 id_token、JWKS 验签 + auth_time 窗口 + sub 匹配,provider 2FA 于此往返强制 前端(web/) - 显码页 /link/new + 批准页 /link + net/qr.ts,对齐 Theme B、复用 AuthShell 与聚珍排版管线、零新全局样式 - step-up 再认证流:批准前跑 prompt=login PKCE,回调分叉(不消费一次性 code、 独立 state key)后带 step_up_code/verifier 调 approve - 三语 i18n qr.*;新增 qrcode 依赖 修复 · clipboard sweeper(早已提交的损坏) - ClearExpiredClipboards 因 clipboard.sql 全角注释触发 sqlc 1.31 多字节偏移 bug,生成 SQL 被截断为「UPDATE clipboard_state SET content =」,sweeper 运行 期报「incomplete input」、过期剪贴板内容从未清除(短 TTL 暴露保护失效) - 注释改纯 ASCII 并加 bug 警告,重生成得完整 SQL;prod 已验证 sweeper 由 ERROR 转为正常清理(cleared count=1) 构建 - .dockerignore:排除本地 node_modules 等,避免宿主原生二进制污染镜像内 vite 构建 - Dockerfile.base:GOPROXY 改为可经 --build-arg 覆盖(默认仍官方代理,受限网络 构建时传区域镜像即可,仓库不固化区域值) 文档 - 新增 AUTH.md(账户与登录实施蓝本);README 特性;.env.example / compose.snippet 增配置项(QR / 自签会话 TTL / step-up / match_claim) 测试 - 自签 token 密钥域隔离、扫码端到端(领取 / 单次 / poll_secret 校验 / deny / step-up 门)、extractIdentity、web_sessions 升级迁移
74 lines
2.3 KiB
Go
74 lines
2.3 KiB
Go
package jwtauth
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import "context"
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type Claims struct {
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UserID string
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Groups []string
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// JTI and Scopes are populated only for HS256 shortcut tokens; a full OIDC /
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// dev session leaves them empty. A non-empty JTI marks a *scoped* token —
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// one allowed to reach only the endpoints its Scopes grant (the route layer
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// enforces this). This keeps a leaked shortcut token's blast radius minimal.
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JTI string
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Scopes []string
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// SessionScope is set only for cdrop self-signed session tokens (scan-login):
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// "full" or "guest". Empty for OIDC / dev sessions and scoped shortcut tokens.
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// A "guest" session is capability-limited (requireFullSession rejects it on
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// account-management routes) even though it is not Scoped().
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SessionScope string
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}
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// Scoped reports whether these claims came from a scoped shortcut token rather
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// than a full login session.
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func (c *Claims) Scoped() bool { return c.JTI != "" }
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// Guest reports whether these claims came from a restricted guest session (a
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// scan-login borrow). Guest sessions can transfer files but not manage the
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// account, approve other devices, or mint long-lived tokens.
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func (c *Claims) Guest() bool { return c.SessionScope == "guest" }
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// HasScope reports whether the claims grant the named scope.
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func (c *Claims) HasScope(scope string) bool {
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for _, s := range c.Scopes {
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if s == scope {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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type ctxKey int
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const (
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claimsCtxKey ctxKey = iota
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deviceCtxKey
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deviceTypeCtxKey
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)
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func ClaimsFromContext(ctx context.Context) (*Claims, bool) {
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c, ok := ctx.Value(claimsCtxKey).(*Claims)
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return c, ok
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}
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// ContextWithClaims attaches claims to a context — the inverse of
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// ClaimsFromContext. The auth middleware uses this; it is also the seam handlers
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// and tests use to inject claims directly.
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func ContextWithClaims(ctx context.Context, c *Claims) context.Context {
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return context.WithValue(ctx, claimsCtxKey, c)
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}
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func DeviceNameFromContext(ctx context.Context) (string, bool) {
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n, ok := ctx.Value(deviceCtxKey).(string)
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return n, ok
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}
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// DeviceTypeFromContext returns the client-declared device type set by the auth
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// middleware (browser / macos / windows / linux), defaulting to "browser".
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func DeviceTypeFromContext(ctx context.Context) string {
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t, ok := ctx.Value(deviceTypeCtxKey).(string)
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if !ok || t == "" {
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return "browser"
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}
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return t
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}
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